CHAPTER II. (2)

feeble knees. Thirdly, It containes sufferance or patience. Iames 5. 7, 8. Heb. 10. 36. Be of patient mind, and stabl[gap]sh your hearts. For ye have need of patience.

31. The fourth is Temperance, whereby all those desires which divert men from wel-doing are asswaged and restrained: and so it makes vertue undefiled. 2 Tim. 2. 4. None that goeth a warfare entangleth himselfe. 1 Pet. 1. 13. Gird up the loynes of your mind, be sober, &c. It is often called in Scripture Sobriety when that word is used in a more generall sence, as 1 Pet. 1. 13. & 5. 8. And purity or cleannesse of heart. 1 Tim. 1. 5. 1 Peter 2. 22. And also sincerity, as it doth exclude pollution of any mixture. This force of the word is shewed 2 Cor. 1. 12. With simplicity and sincerity of God, not with fleshly wisdom.

32. Of these foure conditions of vertue, the first doth order and as it were constitute vertue: the second doth direct and free it from error: the third doth strengthen it against inconveniences: the fourth makes it pure, and defends it against all allurements which doe seduce it.

33. All these vertues doe seeme to be prescribed, and explained together and almost by name. 2 Pet. 1. 4. & 6. Ad to Faith Vertue: that is Justice or an universall rectitude: to vertue knowledge, that is, Prudence directing aright all your wayes: to Prudence continence, that is, that temperance whereby ye may containe your selves from all allurements of pleasures, wherewith men use to be fleshed, and drawen away from the right way: to continence patience, that is fortitude, whereby ye may endure any hardship for righteousnesse sake. But that which followes there of piety & charity doth containe a distribution of vertue, to be propounded in his proper place.

34. Yet because every of those affections doe more

appeare in some vertues then in other, therefore some speciall vertues doe take both their name and definition from them: for because an accurate rectitude doth most appeare in the number, measure, weight, and valew of those things which are mutually received and given by man, therefore Iustice, in a certaine speciall manner is wont to be placed in things of such sort. And because those inconveniences are held most terrible, which are wont to happen in warre and such like dangers, therefore the name of fortitude is wont to be restrained to such things. Because the pleasures of the sences are wont most to tickle, therefore temperance is for the most part placed in them only; although those three together with Prudence taken in a generall sence, are tied and folded together among themselves, as that Philosopher did observe, who did first almost propound those foure heads of vertues.

35. Whereas the forme of vertue is placed by many in a certaine mediocrity between two vices in the extreame, that can be defended by reason. 1. Because privation is not the forme of an habit; but mediocrity, is nothing else then a privation of a defect and an excesse. 2. Because the forme of vertue is to be sought in that conformity which it hath to his rule: But this conformity doth neither only, nor chiefly, nor sometime at all consist in mediocrity. 3. Because vertue in its formall respect cannot be too much intended, & so doth not admit excesse, but either in that materiall thing which it hath common with vices, or in the circumstances of operations, as when some of them are exercised when they ought not, or are not excercised when they ought.

36. That meane which is found in all vertues, is no other thing then a conformity to their rule, or measure: for by this they have certaine measures and bounds in which their nature is as it were contained, so that they

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may not decline to the right hand or to the left, but by this reason mediocrity is no more the forme of vertues, then of all other things which are distinguished from other things by certaine formes and differences.

37. But those vertues which consist in the middle between two vitious habits, are not therefore vertues because they consist in the middle, but because they doe in that manner consist in the middle as their rule prescribes; in which manner, mediocrity whether of participation or negation, Rei vel rationis, of the thing, or of a respect, is to be considered rather as a subject matter, then as a perfecting forme.

38. But it is manifest that such mediocrity hath no place in some vertues: for the love of God is not in that respect praised that it is not too much, but that is is most ardent, here the measure is without measure.

39. There is the like reason of all vertues in respect of their proper and specificall nature. Hee that giveth when he ought not, is not too liberall: but he is too much in giving, so that in that respect he ceaseth to be liberall, and in the same act he may be as much defective in not doing that which he ought.

40. The wiseman indeed admonisheth, Eccles. 7. 16. That we be not just overmuch, but this is not at all to be understood of Iustice in its nature (for it followes Verse 20. that there is none just upon Earth who doth good and sinned not) but as it is in opinion, whereby many doe challenge too much to themselves, and would have it attributed to Iustice: but in true vertues we ought alwayes to endeavour to this, that we may more and more abound, as in the holy Scriptures we are often admonished.

41. There be no degrees in vertue of one and the same kind, if it be considered in it selfe in the extent. For there is no vertue which at least in disposition doth not extend it selfe to all those things which are contained

in the compasse of its object. He is not temperate which doth moderate himselfe in one [gap]st, and favours himselfe in others; but in respect of the subject some vertue is more strong in one then it is in another, either by reason of a more apt disposition by nature, or because of greater accustoming, or because of a more perfect judgement of reason, or finally because of a geater Gift of GOD.

42. That which is wont to be said, that vertues are increased by daily use and exercise, that must be so understood in solid vertues proceeding from sanctifying grace, that dayly exercise is the disposing cause, and by vertue of the promise of God in some sort the procuring cause, not principally or properly effecting such an increase of vertue.

43. But vertues are lessened by the opposite vitious acts, and in respect of the disposition which they bring, and by reason of the merit that is in them.

44. By how much the acts of vertues, or contrary vices are more intent, more frequent and more continuall, so much the more they prevaile, either to the increasing or diminution of vertues.

45. Hence is that distinction of vertues into humane and heroicall; into vertues purging, purged and exemplary: and of those that are endued with vertue, into Infants, and men of ripe age. Heb. 5. 13, 14.

46. The communion of vertues is both in the connexion and subordination of them among themselves.

47. For connexion is that whereby all vertues which are simply necessary, doe cleave together among themselves. 1. In respect of the beginning from whence they flow: For every good giving, and every perfect gift descends from the Father of lights; By the spirit of grace. Iames 1. 17. 1 Cor. 12. 2. In respect of the end and intention, which is to the same thing in generall; for all vertues doe so respect God, that if his authority

be violated in one, it is withall virtually violated in all. Iames 2. 10. 3. In respect of that helping indeavour which they performe mutually one to another. For one vertue doth dispose to the act of another, and also doth defend and confirm the same with the act.

48. Yet vertues are not so essentially and intrinsecally knit together, that every one is of the essence of the other, or doth necessarily depend upon it as upon a procreating cause.

49. Subordination of vertues is that whereby the act of one vertue is ordered to the act and object of another, either as a meanes to an end which is the command of a superior upon an inferior vertue as Religion commands Iustice temperance, and the like, when it refers their acts to the furthering the worship and glory of God; or as a cause to its effect, which belongs to every vertue in respect to every one: for so Religion it selfe is ordained to bring forth and conserve Iustice.

50. Whensoever the act of one vertue is ordered to the end of another vertue, this ordination although in respect of the direction it depends upon Prudence, yet in respect of the effectuall force and authority, it depends upon a superior vertue.