CHAPTER XI.

Of a Lot.

1. A Lot is a requesting of a Divine testimony to decide some controversy, by the determining of

an event to be manifested in a meere contingency. Pro. 16. 33. The Lot is cast into the lap: but the whole disposition of it is of the Lord. And 11, 18. A Lot maketh contentions to cease, and decideth among the mighty.

2. We call it a request: because it hath that nature, that it expects that use to which it serves from God alone; and in that respect it hath an immediate respect to his providence.

3. We define it by contingency, that we may avoid the error of those, who place the common consideration of a Lot in that manner of the efficient cause, whereby it is said to work by fortune.

4. For there are many fortuitous causes which doe altogether differ from the consideration of a Lot: as when he finds gold, who digging sought for coles: also there are many Lots wherein fortune is no acting cause, as when the Lot depends upon the flying of birds, or some such like effects, which is produced by a cause that workes of its owne power.

5. Neither can it be Logically defended, that the very cast of a Die, or some such like effect upon which depends the consideration of a Lot, is alwayes beside the intention or scope of the agent, which yet is necessarily required, to fortuitous chance.

6. But we doe not place a Lot simply in contingency, but in meere contingency: because there are three degrees of things contingent: some often happening, some seldome, and some so far as we can understand, equally having themselves on either part: for in other Contingents there is some place left to conjecture by art: but in meere contingency there is none.

7. It is not therefore a fortuitous manner of the efficient cause which is said to rule in Lots, but either that blind fortune which was made a g[gap]ddesse by prosane men, and placed in Heaven, or the speciall

providence of God, working that way that is hidden to us.

8. But seeing that in every Lot there is sought the determination of some question or controversy, and it is sought by meere contingency, in it selfe and in respect of us, altogether undetermined; it must needs be, that the very determination it selfe (whatsoever the actuall intention of men shall be) be from the nature of the thing alwayes sought from an higher power, having power to direct such contingencies, by certaine counsell: and so in very deed the use of a Lot is an appealing alwayes either to the true God, or to some faigned power, which is wont to be set forth by many by the name of fortune.

9. When therefore our Divines doe teach that there is a certaine extraordinary providence of God set over all Lots, they are not so to be taken, as if either those that used Lots did alwayes directly, and distinctly respect such a providence, or as if God did alwayes exercise such a providence: but that the Lot it selfe, of its own nature hath a certaine respect to the singular, and extraordinary providence of God in directing of an event meerly conting[gap]nt, and in this sence their sentence is most true.

10. For seeing that in a Lot some judgement is expected by the common consent of all, and there is no power of giving judgement in contingent events, neither is there any other fortune judging then the certaine providence of God, it must needs be that this judgement be in a singular manner expected, from Gods providence.

11. Neither can meere contingency it selfe have the respect of a principall cause in deciding any questio[gap]: neither can man to whom the event it selfe is meerly contingent, direct it to attaine such an end. It must needs be therefore that such direction be expected of some superior director.

12. Ad hereunto, that such is the order of proceeding in mans inquiry, that when men desire some questiō to be determined, & they have not certaine meanes in their power for this determination, they seek it from some superior power: unto which manner of proceeding the consideration of a Lot doth altogether agree.

13. Neither can it stand, that he that worketh by counsell, intending a certaine end and scope, by certaine reason, can subject his action, either to fortune or meere continge[gap]y as it is such: for so consell should be without knowledge, and indifferency undetermined should bee a meanes of a cause determined.

14. Such an expectation and respect to the singular providence of God is manifestly taught. Prov. 16. vers 33. Whilest the action of every man about a Lot, is affirmed to be bounded in meere contingency. The Lot is cast into the lap, and in accurate discerning the whole judgement is referred to GOD. But all the disposition of it is from the Lord.

15. For although all things are otherwise referred unto Gods providence in the Scriptures: yet nothing is wont to be referred unto it with such discerning, unlesse it have a certaine singular respect unto it.

16. Neither doth it any thing hinder, that the Hebrew word Mischphath is sometime wont to signifie another thing beside Iudgement: because it must alwayes be taken according to the subject matter; and there is a certaine judgement given to Lots by all who describe the nature of them.

17. Hence therefore a Lot ought neither to be used rashly, nor in sporting or lighter matters, nor in those controversies which are either vainer, or can be decided fitly by other ordinary meanes.

18. Neither theresore it is to be used ordinarily or without speciall revelation, to divining, nor to consult of alright, nor ordinarily of a deed that is past,

but of a division to be made, or of an election lawfull on both sides, which cannot otherwise be so fitly determined, that they whom it concernes would be pleased.

19. The opinion of them who defend playing Lots is sufficiently refuted by this one reason, that (by the consent of all) a Lot hath a naturall fitnesse to aske counsell of Gods providence in a speciall manner. For it cannot be that one and the same action of its own nature should be specially apt to so sacred an use, and yet withall should be applied to jests, and playes.

20. That reason whereby it is contended, that the use of a Lot is lawfull in light and playing matters, because it is lawfully used in those civill controversies which are of lesser moment, hath no consequence: for although those civill controversies in which a Lot hath place, of themselves are not great, yet are made very great by the consequences joyned with them or adhering to them: which cannot be affirmed of those spirring contentions.

21. The tithes of the living Creatures. Lev. 27. 32. The orders of priestly and Leviticall administrations, 1. Chron. 26. 13, 14, &c. Luc. 1. 9. Might bring with them great inconveniences, unlesse they had been determined by some Divine sentence: and in that respect they were appointed by Lot by Gods institution.

22. It doth not appeare from the nature of Lots, that they doe most agree to the lightest things: for although we may not expect Gods speciall determination unlesse we have before done so much as in us is to decide the question, propounded by ordinary meanes, yet by that our indeavour waightinesse is either not removed from the controversie it selfe, or not to be committed to a Lot.

23. The very nature of a Lot is holy, as of an Oath: therefore there is no need that it should receive speciall

sanctification from any speciall institution. For although that contingency which is as it were the matter of a Lot, is not of its owne nature holy, as neither Bread nor Wine ought to be so esteemed; yet in application to its use, it putteth on a certaine sanctity, as the words of an Oath, and the elements in the Sacraments.

24. It is indeed free for Christians to use the Creatures to those ends to which they are naturally apt, or made apt: But meere contingency hath no aptitude of it selfe to determine any question, neither doth it take any aptitude by the consent of them who use it to that end. For in those Lots which are called extraordinary, and are acknowledged to depend upon God, & not upon men; the same consent is had in the same manner, and yet it addes nothing to a Lot.

25. None can shew that a Lot is indifferent, unlesse he shall first demonstrate that there is in it no speciall appealing to Gods providence.

26. Although also the matter of sporting things, is not tied to this or that kind of indifferent actions, yet it hath those bounds set to it selfe, that it can have no place in those things which doe singularly pertaine to communion with God.

27. It is altogether vaine which is objected, that a Lot often repeated will have a divers event: for neither is this likely, if a Lot can be rightly iterated, neither doth every appealing to Gods providnce necessarily bring with it his speciall operation: and yet God even out of order is read to have sometimes answered diversly to those, by whom he was unseasonably tempted, Numb. 22. 12. 20. Goe not with them: Arise, goe with them.

28. But much vainer it is to object in stead of an argument, that God cannot be drawen by us at our pleasure to exercise an extraordinary providence. For notwithstanding this, we may appeale to his extraordinary

providence, when it pleaseth us.

29. Therefore playing at Dice is repugnant to religion, not only by the circumstances and by accident, but of its inward nature and in it selfe.

30. But under the name of the Dye are those playes also comprehended, which are grounded on mere contingency, although they be afterward governed by wit, industry or some art, as in Table, and Cards.

31. But those humane exercises which are grounded upon art, but are in part subject to casualty in the progresse, doe greatly differ from Dice.

32. Whereas men are wont, by playing at Dice to be stirred up to swearings, cursings, and blasphemies, more then in other exercises, this commeth partly from the nature of the play it selfe: because the Lo[gap] being often reiterated and often failing expectation, they thinke that that power which they imagine doth governe the Lot, is against them.

33. By the same reason also it comes to passe, that they that use those playes can scarse put an end or measure to them: because they who are inferior in the contention, have no reason to despaire of their Lot, and sodo persist in a pertinacious expectation of their wished successe.

34. Hence also those losses and inconveniences, by which other playes are wont to be made extrinsecally vitious, in di[gap] doe depend partly upon the veruy nature of the play.