CHAPTER XXI.

Of telling Truth. Veracity.

1. IUstice which doth affect our Neighbour mediatly, is Veracity and contentation. For by that our Neighbour is affected, by meanes of his credit, and by this by meanes of some worke or action of ours belonging to some Commandement going before.

2. Veracity is a vertue, whereby we are inclined to observe truth in giving testimony, Mat. 23. 22. Eph. 4. 25. Psal. 15. 2.

3. Of this telling truth in giving testimony, the ninth precept doth properly handle, and not of those things only or chiefly which pertaine to the fame of our Neighbour; For fame pertaines to that honour, the consideration whereof is had in the fift precept: neither is it to be put after riches and the profits of this life, whereof it was handled in the eight Commandement. Pro. 22. 1. Neither doth a testimony true or false pertaine to the same of others only, but also to their possessions, and life it selfe. Pro. 30. 14.

4. It is also manifest that the words themselves of this precept doe most directly respect proceeding in judgement, Numb. 35. 30. Deut. 17. 6. & 19. 15. In which places many other things are handled beside fame, although they ought also to be extended to all publick, politick, and sacred testimonies. 1. Cor. 15. 15. Iohn 1. 7. 8. 15. 19. 32. 34.

5. Hence actions in places of judgement, have not only approbation, but also direction from this precept; namely that judgements ought alwayes to be grounded on fit testimony, (unlesse there be that evidence of

the matter which needs to witnesse) or at least strong and violent (as they call them) presumptions, which are equall to testimonies.

6. The words of a testimony must alwayes be used in that sence as they are understood, or are thought to be understood by those to whom the witnesses endeavour to give credence, without equivocation, doubting, or mentall reservation.

7. Truth in a testimony is threefold. 1. When that which is said is conformable to the thing which is in hand. 2. When it is comformable. 3. When tis conformable both to the thing and to the mind.

8. The second truth is that which is most properly looked at in a testimony and in veracity: yet the third is required in those things, a certaine knowledge of which we are either bound or professe to have.

9. This veracity is in a simple assertion, or in a promise.

10. The truth of an assertion is alwayes thus farnecessary that if we affirme any thing, it doe consent with the mind and our judgement.

11. Also sometime an assertion it selfe is necessary when either Iustice or Charity requires it of us.

12. Iustice requires it in publick judgements of the Iudge, of the plaintife, the defendant, of the witnesse, of the advocate, the notary, and the proctor, and out of judgement when we are bound to beare witnesse by some speciall right.

13. Charity requires this when good comes to our Neighbour by it, without equivalent hurt to our selves or others.

14. Truth of a promise is called fidelity.

15. Fidelity is a vertue, whereby we are inclined to keepe constantly our credit given.

16. This Fidelity is the foundation of civill Iustice, and all agreements, and contracts: for a reciprocall promise is a contract.

17. To the truth of a testimony is opposed a Lye. Eph. 4. 25.

18. A lie is properly a testimony, whereby one pronounceth otherwise then is in his heart. Act. 5. Whence is that phrase in Scripture of a double heart, of a man that is a lyer. Psal. 12. 3.

19. But because a thing pronounced, doth not consist only in outward words, but chiefly in their sence; therefore the same words which are true in one sence, in another sence become a lye. Mat. 26. 61.

20. Ironies, fables, jests, repeatings also of false things, and the like are not lies, because they are not testimonies; and they are not testimonies because they are not confirmed by the credit and authority of the speaker.

21. An intention of deceiving, although it doe almost alwayes accompany a false testimony, yet it is not of the essence of it, neither is it necessarily required to a lie; for although one know that he with whom he hath to doe cannot be deceived by his lie; yet if he have an intention in speaking to affirme that which is false, he lyeth no lesse then if he had hope of deceiving.

22. An intention of hurting doth indeed increase the mischiefe of a lie: but it maketh not the nature of it: for if a man out of jesting or a desire to please and be officious, confirme that by his credit which he knowes to be false, it is a lie: pernicious of its own nature, if not others, yet to the author himselfe: as it is in those who are given to flatteries or boastings, or are delighted in confirming monstrous fables or fictions unto others.

23. An intention to speake that which is false, makes a lie, although that which is spoken be most true.

24. The asseveration of a thing incertaine for certaine, is accounted with a lie although we thinke it to be true.

25. Also that secrecy whereby one doth not speake the truth when Justice or Charity requires it, doth partake of the nature of a lie.

26. But when neither Iustice nor Charity requires to give testimony, then the truth or part of it may be concealed without sin. Ier. 38. 27.

27. Among lies, those are more hainous, in which the testimonie is more solemne, as in publick judgements, which are chiefly respected in the words of the ninth precept, in sacred matters, and in the like. Matth. 26. 59. 1. Cor. 15. 15.

28. Hence subscriptions, testimonies, or commendatory letters, given against the knowne truth are foule lies.

29. That dissembling which consists in deeds or signes, and not in words, is not properly a lie: unlesse the same either of their own nature, or by some certaine appointment, have the force and use of speech: as, 1. Sam. 20. 20. 21. 22. Mat. 26. 49. Because such deeds and signes that are not verball, have no certaine and determinate signification, so as they can have the force of a testimony.

30. Therefore such dissembling is sometime lawfull, as in warlike stratagems. Ios 8.

31. But it is made unlawfull when in respect of the end or manner, it fights with religion, Iustice or Charity.

32. Unto fidelity is opposed perfidy or unfaithfulnesse.

33. A lie is committed in a promise, if there be not an intention of doing that which is promised, unfaithfulnesse is committed, if there be not an answerable indeavour to performe the same: therefore a lie and unfaithfulnesse, may be joyned together, and they may be also severed.

34. When a testimony toward our Neighbour is

confirmed by an oath, then the oath is an adjunct of that testimony: and although it doe in it selfe respect God only, yet in this use it respects our Neighbour also.

35. Therefore perjury in such a testimony is directly and immediatly a sin against reverence due to God: but mediatly it violates also that Iustice which is due to our Neighbour.

36. Asseveration is the manner of a testimony whereby the sincerity of the witnesse, and the certitude of knowledge which he hath of the thing witnessed, is declared: whence also it is not unfitly by some called a protestation, because it produceth a witnessing by explication.

37. Therefore in an asseveration there is not a second contestation comming to the former as there is in an oath: but an illustration of one and the same thing.

38. Neither is there any calling upon God in a mere asseveration, which is essentiall to an oath.

39. Yet an asseveration is not convenient but to the more grave testimonies, for it is as it were a middle degree between a simple testimony and an oath.

40. We must most of all abstaine from those asseveratioins our common speech, which have some shew of an oath.