CAP. I. What conscience is.

COnscience is a part of the vnderstanding in all reasonable creatures, determining of their particular actions either with them or against them.

I say conscience is a part of the vnderstanding, and I shew it thus. God in framing of the soule placed in it two principall faculties, Vnderstanding and Will. Vnderstanding is that facultie in the soale whereby we vse reason: and it is the more principall part seruing to rule and order the whole man, and therefore it is placed in the soule to be as the wagginer in the waggin. The Will is an other facultie, whereby we doe will or nill any thing, that is, choose or refuse it. With the will is ioyned sundrie affections, as ioy, sorrow, loue, ha[gap]ed, &c.

whereby we imbrace or eschew that which is good or euill. Now, conscience is not placed in the affections nor will, but in the vnderstanding, because the actions thereof stand in the vse of reason. Vnderstanding againe hath two parts. The first is that which stands in the view and contemplation of truth and falshood, and goes no further. The second is that which stands in the view and consideration of euery particular action, to search whether it be good or badde. The first is called the Theorical, the second the practical vnderstanding. And vnder this latter is conscience to be comprehended: because his propertie is to iudge of the goodnes or badnes of things or actions done.

Againe I say that conscience is a part of the minde or vnderstanding, to shewe that conscience is not a bare knowledge or iudgement of the vnderstanding (as men commonly write) but a naturall power, facultie, or created qualitie from whence knowledge and iudgement proceede as effects. This the Scriptures confirme in that they ascribe sundrie workes and actions to conscience, as accusing, excusing, comforting, terrifying. Which actions could not thence proceede, if conscience were no more but an action or act of the minde. Indeede I graunt, it may be taken for a certen actuall knowledge,

which is the effect thereof: but to speake properly, this knowledge must proceede of a power in the soule, the propertie whereof is to take the principles and conclusions of the minde and applie the, & by applying either to accuse or excuse. This is the ground of all, and this I take to be conscience. If it be obtected that conscience cannot be a naturall power, because it may be lost: I answer if conscience be lost, it is onely in respect of the vse thereof, as reason is lost in the drunken man, and not otherwise.

I adde, that the proper subiects of conscience are reasonable creatures; that is, men and angels. Hereby conscience is excluded first of all from [gap] beasts for though they haue life & sense, & in many things some shadows of reason, yet because they want true reason, they want conscience also. Secondly from God the creator, who beeing righteousnes it selfe, needeth not conscience to order & gouerne his actions. And wheras Peter saith, 1. Pet. 2. 19. that men must indure griese wrongfully for conscience of God, his meaning is not to shewe that God hath conscience, but that men are to suffer many wrogs because their cosciences do bind the, in so doing to obay Gods wil, which conscience directly respecteth.

And I say that conscience is in all reasonable creatures, that none might imagine that some

men by nature haue conscience in them, some none at all. For as many men as them are, so many consciences there be: and euery particular man hath his owne particular conscience.

The proper ende of conscience is, to determine of things done. And by this one thing, conscience is distinguished from all other gifts of the min[gap] as intelligence opinion, science faith, prudence. Intelligence simply conce[gap] thing to be or not to be: science iudgeth it to be certen and sure: faith is a perswasion, whereby we beleeue things that are not: [gap] discerneth what is meete to be done, what to be left vndone; but conscience goes further yet then all these: for it determines or giues sentence of things done, by saying vnto vs, This was done, this was not done: this may be done, this may not be done this was weldone, this was ill done.

The things that conscience determines of, are a mans owne actions: his owne actions, I say. To be certen what an other man hath saide or done, is commonly called knowledge: but for a man to be certen what he himselfe hath done or saide, that is conscience. Againe conscience meddles not with generals, onely it deales in particular actions: and that, not in some fewe, but in all.

The manner of consciences determination,

is to set downe his iudgement either with the creature or against it: I adde this clause, because conscience is of a diuine nature, and is a thing placed by God in the middest betweene him and man, as an arbitratour to giue sentence and to pronounce either with man or against man vnto God. For otherwhiles, it consents and speakes with God against the man in whome it is placed: other whiles againe it consents with him and speakes for him before the Lord. And hence comes one reason of the name of conscience. Scire, to know, is of one man alone by himselfe: and conscire is, when two at the least know some one secret thing; either of them knowing it togither with the other. Therefore the name [gap], or Conscientia conscience, is that thing that combines two togither, and makes them partners in the knowledge of one and the same secret. Now man and man, o[gap] man and Angel can not be combined; because they can not know the secret of any man vnlesse it be reucaled to them: it remaines therefore that this combination is onely betweene man and God. God knowes perfectly all the doings of man, though they be neuer so hid and concealed: and man by a gift giue him of God, knows togither with God, the same things of himselfe: and this gift is named Conscience.