QUEST. I. In what sense Government is from God? to QUEST. II. Whether or not, Government be warranted by the Law of nature.

QUEST. I. In what sense Government is from God?

I Reduce all that I am to speak of the power of Kings, to the Author or efficient. 2. The matter or subject. 3. The form or power. 4. The end and fruit of their Government; And 5. to some cases of resistance. Hence,

Quest. I. Whether Government be warranted by a divine Law?

The question is, either of Government in generall, or of the particular species of Government; such as are Government by one only, called Monarchy; the Government by some chief leading men, named Aristocracie; the Government by the people, going under the name of Democracie. 2. We cannot but put difference betwixt the institution of the Office, to wit, Government, and the designation of person, or persons to the Office. 3. What is warranted by the direction of natures light, is warranted by the Law of nature, and consequently by a divine Law; for who can deny the Law of nature to be a divine Law?

That power of Government in generall must be from God: I make good, 1. Because, Rom. 13.—1. there is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God. 2. God commandeth obedience, and so subjection of conscience to powers, Rom. 13.5. Wherefore we must be subject not onely for wrath (or civill punishment) but for conscience sake, 1 Pet. 2.13. Submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake▪ whether it be to the King as Supreme, &c. Now God onely by a divine Law can lay a band

of subjection on the conscience, tying men to guilt, and punishment, if they transgr[gap]sse.

2. Conclus. All civill power is immediately from God in its root. In that, 1. God hath made man a sociall creature, and one who inclineth to be governed by man; then certainly, he must have put this power in mans nature: so are we by good reason taught by Aristotle.

2. God and nature intendeth the policie and peace of mankinde, then must God and nature have given to mankinde, a power to compasse this end; and this must be a power of Government. I see not then why John Prelate, Master Maxwel the excommunicate P. of Rosse, who speak[gap]th in the name of I. Armagh, had reason to say, That he feared that we fancied, that the Government of Superiours was onely for the more perfit▪ but have no Authoritie over or above the perfit, N[gap]c Rex, nec Lex, justo posita. He might have imputed this to the Brasilians, who teach, That every single man hath the power of the sword to revenge his own injuries, as Molina saith.

QUEST. II. Whether or not, Government be warranted by the Law of nature.

AS domestick societie is by natures instinct, so is civill societie naturall, in radice, in the root, and voluntary, in modo, in the manner of coalescing. Politick power of Government, agreeth not to man, singly, as one man, except in that root of reasonable nature; but supposing that men be combined in societies, or that one family cannot contain a societie, it is naturall, that they joyn in a civill societie, though the manner of Union in a politick body; as Bodine saith, be voluntary, Gen. 10.10. Gen. 15.7. and Suarez saith, That a power of making Laws, is given by God as a property flowing from nature, Qui dat formam, dat consequ[gap]ntia ad formam, Not by any speciall action or grant, different from creation, nor will he have it to result from nature, while men be united into one politick body: which Union being made, that power followeth without any new action of the will,

We are to distinguish betwixt a power of Government, and a power of Government by Magistracy. That we defend our selves from violence by violence, is a consequent of unbroken and sin-lesse nature; but that we defend our selves by devolving our power over in the hands of one, or more Rulers, seemeth rather positively morall, then naturall, except that it is naturall for the childe to expect

help against violence, from his father: For which cause I judge that learned Senator Ferdinandus Vasquius said well, That Princedom, Empire, Kingdom, or Iurisdiction hath its rise from a positive and secundary law of Nations, and not from the law of pure Nature. The Law saith, there is no law of Nature agreeing to all living creatures for superiority; for by no reason in Nature, hath a Boar dominion over a Boar, a Lyon over a Lyon, a Dragon over a Dragon, a Bull over a Bull; And if all Men be born equally free (as I hope to prove) there is no reason in Nature, why one Man should be King and Lord over another; therefore while I be otherwise taught by the forecasten Prelate Maxwell, I conceive all jurisdiction of Man over Man, to be as it were Artificiall and Positive, and that it inferreth some servitude, whereof Nature from the womb hath freed us, if you except that subjection of children to parents, and the wife to the husband; and the Law saith, De jure gentium secundarius est omnis principatus. 2. This also the Scripture proveth, while as the exalting of Saul or David above their Brethren to be Kings, and Captains of the Lords people, is ascribed, not to Nature, (for King and Beggar spring of one clay-mettall) but to an act of Divine bounty and grace, above Nature, so Psal. 78.70, 71. He took David from following the Ewes, and made him King and feeder of his people, 1 Sam. 13.13.

There is no cause why Royallists should deny Government to be naturall, but to be altogether from God, and that the Kingly power is immediatly and only from God; because it is not naturall to us to subject to Government, but against Nature, and against the hair for us to resign our liberty to a King, or any Ruler or Rulers; for this is much for us, and proveth not but Government is naturall; it concludeth that a power of Government tali modo, by Magistracy, is not naturall, but this is but a Sophisme; a [gap], ad illud quod est dictum [gap] this speciall of Government, by resignation of our liberty, is not naturall; Ergo, power of Government is not naturall; it followeth not, a negatione sp[gap]ciei non sequitur negatio generis, non est homo, ergo non est animal. And by the same reason I may by an antecedent will, agree to a Magistrate and a Law, that I may be ruled in a politick Society, and by a consequent will onely, yea and conditionally onely agree to the penalty and punishment of the Law; and it is most true, no man by the instinct of Nature giveth consent to Penall Laws as Penall, for Nature doth not teach a man, nor incline his spirit to yeeld that his life shall be taken away by the sword, and his

blood shed, except in this remote ground, a man hath a disposition, that a veine be cutt by the Physitian, or a Member of his body cut off, rather then the whole body and life perish by some contagious disease; but here reason in cold blood, not a naturall disposition is the neerest prevalent cause, and disposer of the businesse. When therefore a communitie by natures instinct and guidance, incline to Government, and to defend themselves from violence; they do not by that instinct formally agree to Government by Magistrates; and when a naturall conscience giveth a deliberate consent to good Laws, as to this, He that doth violence to the life of a man, by man shall his blood be shed, Gen. 9.6. He doth tacitely consent that his own blood shall be shed; but this he consenteth unto consequently, tacitely, and conditionally. If he shall do violence to the life of his brother: Yet so as this consent proceedeth not from a disposition every way purely naturall. I grant, reason may be necessitated to assent to the conclusion, being as it were forced by the prevalent power of the evidence of an insuperable and invincible light in the premises, yet from naturall affections there resulteth an act of self-love, for self-preservation. So David shall condemn another rich man who hath many Lambs, and robbeth his poor brother of his one Lamb, and yet not condemn himself, though he be most deep in that fault, 1 Sam. 12.5, 6. yet all this doth not hinder, but Government even by Rulers hath its ground in a secondary Law of nature, which Lawyers call, secundariò jus naturale, or jus gentium secundarium; a secondary Law of nature, which is granted by Plato, and denied by none of sound judgement in a sound sense, and that is this, Licet vim virepellere, It is lawfull to repeal violence by violence, and this is a speciall act of the Magistrate.

2. But there is no reason, why we may not defend by good reasons, that politick Societies, Rulers, Cities, and Incorporations, have their rise and spring from the secundary Law of nature: 1. Because by Natures Law, Family-Government hath its warrant; and Adam though there had never been any positive Law, had a power of governing his own family, and punishing malefactors; but as Tannerus saith well, and as I shall prove God willing, this was not properly a Royall or Monarchicall power; and I judge by the reasoning of Sotus,

Molina, and Victoria. By what reason a Family hath a power of Government, and of punishing Malefactors, that same power must be in a societie of men, Suppose that societie were not made up of Families, but of single persons;

for the power of punishing ill-doers doth not reside in one single man of a familie, or in them all, as they are single private persons, but as they are in a familie. But this argument holdeth not but by proportion; for paternall government, or a fatherly power of parents over their families, and a politick power of a Magistrate over many families, are powers different in nature, the one being warranted by natures law even in its species, the other being in its spece and kind warranted by a positive law, and in the generall only warranted by a law of nature.

2. If we once lay the supposition, that God hath immediately by the law of nature appointed there should be a Government; and mediately defined by the dictate of naturall light in a communitie, that there shall be one, or many Rulers to governe the Communitie; then the Scriptures arguments may well be drawn out of the school of nature: as, 1. The powers that are, be of God; therefore natures light teacheth, that we should be subject to these powers. 2. It is against natures light to resist the ordinance of God. 3. Not to feare him to whom God hath committed the sword, for the terror of evill doers. 4. Not to honour the publike rewarder of well-doing. 5. Not to pay tribute to him for his worke. Therefore I see not but Govarruvias,

Soto,

Suarez, have rightly said, that power of Government is immediately from God, and this or this definite power is mediately from God, proceeding from God by the mediation of the consent of a Communitie, which resigneth their power to one or moe Rulers: and to me Barclaius saith the same: quamvis populus potentiae largitor videatur, &c.