QUEST. XXIX. Whether, in the case of Defensive warre, the distinction of the person of the King, as a man, who can commit acts of hostile Tyrannie against his Subjects: and of the Office and Royall power that he hath from God, and the People, as a King; can have place? (2) to QUEST. XXIX. Whether, in the case of Defensive warre, the distinction of the person of the King, as a man, who can commit acts of hostile Tyrannie against his Subjects: and of the Office and Royall power that he hath from God, and the People, as a King; can have place? (3)

QUEST. XXIX. Whether, in the case of Defensive warre, the distinction of the person of the King, as a man, who can commit acts of hostile Tyrannie against his Subjects: and of the Office and Royall power that he hath from God, and the People, as a King; can have place? (2)

we onely, but the Holy Ghost, in terminis, hath this distinction, Act. 4.19. and 5.29. We ought to obey God rather then men. Them Rulers (for of Rulers sitting in judgement is that speech uttered) commanding and tyrannizing over the Apostles, are men contradistinguished from God; and as they command and punish unjustly, they are but men, otherwise commanding for God, they are Gods, and more then men. 2. From Theophylact also, or from Chrysostome, on Rom. 13. we have this; The Apostle speaketh not (say they) [gap]. 3. Soveraigntie or Royaltie, doth not properly reign or bear the sword, or receive praise, and this accident doth not bear a sword; nor do we think, or Paul speak, Rom. 13. of the abstracted Jew of power and Royaltie, subsisting out of its subject; nor dream we, that the naked accident of Royall Authority, is to be feared and honoured as the Lords anointed; the person or man who is the King, and beareth the Crown on his head, and holdeth the scepter in his hand, is to be obeyed; accidentes are not persons, but they speak non-sense, and like brute beasts, who deny that all the kingly honour due to the King, must be due to him as a King, and because of the Royall dignity that God hath given to him, and not because he is a man; for a Pursevants son is a man, and if a Pursevants son would usurpe the throne, and take the Crown on his head, and the scepter in his hand, and command that all souls be subject to such a superior Power, because he is a man, the Lawes of Scotland would hang a man for a lesse fault, we know: and the P. Prelate was wont to edifie women, and converted souls to Christ, with such a distinction as objectum quod, and objectum quo, in the Pulpits of Edenburgh, and it hath good use here, we never took abstract Royalty to be the King. The Kings of Scotland of old were not second notions, and we exclude not the person of the King, yet we distinguish with leave of the P. Prelate betwixt the person in linea physica, we must take (physica) largly heer and in linea morali, obedience, fear, tribute, honour is due to the person of the King, and to the man who is King, not because of his person, or because he is a man (the P. Prelate may know in what notion, we take the name (Person) but because God by the peoples election, hath exalted him to Royall dignity, and for this cause illdoers are to subject their throats and necks to the sword of the Lords Annoynteds executioner or hangman with patience, and willingly, because in taking away the head of ill doers, for ill doing,

he is acting the Office of the Lord, by whom he Raigneth; but if he take away their heads, and send out the long-tusked Vultures and Boares of Babylon, the Irish Rebells to execute his wrath, as he is in that act a mis-informed man, and wanteth the authority of Gods Law, or mans Law, he may be resisted with Armes. For 1. If Royalists say against this, then if a King turne an habituall Tyrant, and conduce an hundred thousand Turkes to destroy his subjects upon meere desire of revenge, they are not to resist, but to be subject, and suffer for conscience. I am sure Grotius saith, If a King sell his subjects, he loseth all title to the Crowne, and so may be resisted, and Winzetus saith, A Tyrant may be resisted, and Barclay, It is lawfull for the people in case of Tyranny to defend themselves Adversus immanem saevetiam, against extreame cruelty: and I desire the Prelate to answer how people are subject in suffering such cruelty of the higher power, because he is Gods ordinance, and a power from God, except he say, as he selleth his people, and barbarously destroyeth by Cut-throat Irishes, his whole subjects refusing to worship Idolls, he is a man and a sinfull man, eatenus, and an inferiour power inspired by wicked counsell, not a King, eatenus, not a higher power, and that in resisting him thus, the subjects resist not the ordinance of God. Also suppone King David defend his Kingdome and people against Iesse his naturall father, who we suppose cometh in against his sonne and Prince, King David, with a huge army of the Philistimes, to destroy him and his Kingdome, if he shall kill his owne native father, in that warr at some Edge-hill, how shall he preserve at Ierusalem that honour, & love that he oweth to his father, by vertue of the fifth Commandement, Honour thy father and thy mother, &c. Let them answer this, except King David consider Iesse in one relation, in abstracto, as his father, whom he is to obey, and as he is a wicked man, and a perfidious subject, in another relation, and except King David say, he is to subject himselfe to his father as a father, according to the fifth Commandement, and that in the act of his fathers violent invasion, he is not to subject himselfe to him, as he is a violent invader, and as a man. Let the Royalist see how he can answer the Argument, and how Levie is not to know his father and mother as they are sinfull men, Deut. 33.9. and yet to know and honour them as Parents; and how an Israelite is not to pitty the wife that lyeth in his bosome, when she inticeth him to goe a whooring after strange Gods, but is to kill her, Deut. 13.6, 7, 8. and yet the husband

is to love the wife as Christ loved his Church, Eph. 5.25. If the husband take away his wives life in some mountaine in the holy Land, as Gods Law commandeth, let the Royalists answer us, where is then the maritall love he owes to her, and that respect due to her as she is a wife and a helper. But let not the Royalist infer, that I am from these examples pleading for the killing of Kings, for lawfull resistance is one thing, and killing of Kings is another; the one defensive and lawfull, the other offensive and unlawfull, so long as he remaineth a King, and the Lords Anoynted: But if he be a murtherer of his father, who doth counsell his father to come to a place of danger, where he may be killed, and where the King ought not to be, as Abner was worthy of death, who watched not carefully King Saul, but slept when David came to his bed side, and had opportunity to kill the King, they are Traitors and murtherers of the King, who either counselled his Majesty to come to Edge-hill, where the danger was so grett, or did not violently restraine him from comming thither, seeing Kings safety and lives are as much, yea more in the disposing of the people then in their owne private will, 2 Sam. 18.2, 3. for certainly the people might have violently restrained King Saul from killing himselfe, and the King was guilty of his own death, and sinneth against his Office and subjects, who commeth out in person to any such battles where he may be killed, and the contrary party free of his blood. And here our Prelate is blind, if he see not the cleare difference between the Kings Person, and the Office as he is King, and between his private Will, and his publicke and Royall Will. 3. The Angels may be named Thrones and Dominions in abstracto, and yet created, in concreto, and we may say the Angell and his power are both created at once; but David was not both borne the Son of Iesse, and a King at once: and the P. Prelate, by this may prove it is not lawfull to resist the Divell (for he is of the number of these created Angells, Col. 1.) as he is a Divell, because in resisting the Divell as a Divell, we must resist an Angell of God, and a Principality. 4. To speake ill of dignities, 2 Pet. 2. and Iud. 8. Piscator insinuateth is, to speake evill of the very Office of Rulers, as well as of their manners▪ and Theodat. saith, on 2 Pet. 2. that these Raylers spake evill of the place of Governours and Masters, as unbeseeming beleevers. All our Interpreters, as Beza, Calvin, Luther, Bucer, Marloratus from the place saith, It is a speciall reproofe of Anabaptists and Libertines, who in that time maintained, that we are all free men in Christ, and that there should not be Kings, Masters, nor any Magistrates; however the abstract is put for the concrete,

its true, and it saith we are not to raile upon Nero, but to say Nero was a persecutor of Christians, and yet obey him commanding what is just, are very consistent. 5. The persons are proposed, Rom. 13. to be the object of our obedience, saith D. Ferne, it is very true; but he is ignorant of our mind in exponing the word Person: we never meant that feare, honour, royalty, tribute, must be due to the abstracted accident of Kingly Authority, and not to the man who is King. Nor is it our meaning that Royalty in abstracto is Crowned King, and is anoynted, but that the Person is crowned and anoynted. But againe by a person we meane nothing lesse then the man Nero wasting Rome, burning, crucifying Paul, and torturing Christians, and that we owe subjection to Nero, and to his person in concreto as to Gods ordinance, Gods Minister, Gods sword-bearer in that notion of a Person; is that only that we deny. Nay in that Nero in concreto to us, is no Power ordained of God, no Minister of God, but a Minister of the Divell, and Sathans armour-bearer, and therefore we owe not feare, honour, subjection, and tribute to the Person of Nero. But the Person thus far is the object of our obedience; that feare, honour, subjection, and tribute must be due to the man in concreto, to his Person who is Prince; but not because he is a man, or a person simply, or a sword-bearer of Papists, but for his office, for that eminent place of royall dignity that God hath conferred on his Person. We know the light of the Sun, the heate of fire, in abstracto, doe not properly give light and heat, but the Sun and fire, in concreto; yet the principium quo, ratio qua, the principles of these operations in Sun and fire be light & heate, and we ascribe illuminating of dark bodies, heating of cold bodies to Sun and fire in concreto, yet not to the subjects simply, but to them as affected with such accidents: so here we honour and submit to the man who is King, not because he is a man, that were treason; not because he useth his sword against the Church, that were impiety: but because of his Royall Dignity, and because he useth it for the Lord. It is true, Arnisaeus, Barclay, Ferne, say, That Kings leave not off to be Kings, when they use their power and sword against the Church and Religion. And also it is considerable, that when the worst of Emperors bloody Nero did raigne, the Apostle presseth the duty of subjection to him, as to a power appointed of God, and condemneth the resisting of Nero, as the resisting of an ordinance of God. And certainely if the cause and reason in point of duty-Morall, and of conscience before God remaine in Kings, to wit, that while they are enemies and persecutors as Nero was▪ their Royall Dignity given them of God

remaineth, then subjection upon that ground is lawfull, and resistance unlawfull. Ans. It is true so long as Kings remaine Kings, subjection is due to them because Kings, but that is not the question. But the question is, if subjection be due to them, when they use their power unlawfully and Tyrannically. What ever David did, though he was a King, he did it not as King, he deflowred not Bathsheba as King, and Bathsheba might with bodily resistance and violence lawfully have resisted King David, though Kingly Power, remained in him, while he should thus attempt to commit Adultery; else David might have said to Bathshba, Because I am the Lords Anoynted, it is rebellion in thee a subject to oppose any bodily violence to my act of forcing of thee, it is unlawfull to thee to cry for helpe, for if any shall offer violently to rescue thee from me, he resisteth the ordinance of God. Subjection is due to Nero as an Emperour, but not any subjection is due to him in the burning of Rome, and torturing of Christians, except you say that Nero's power abused in these acts of cruelty was, 1. A power from God. 2. An ordinance of God. 3. That in these, he was the Minister of God for the good of the Common-wealth. Because some beleeved Christians were free from the yoake of Magistracy, and that the dignity it selfe was unlawfull. And 2. because, ch. 12. he had set downe the lawfull Church Rulers, and in this and the following chapter the duties of brotherly love of one toward another. So here ch. 13. he teacheth that all Magistrates, suppose Heathen, are to be obeyed and submitted unto in all things, so far as they are Ministers of God. Arnisaeus objecteth to Buchan. If we are by this place to subject our selves to every power in abstracto, then also to a power contrary to the truth, and to a power of a King exceeding the limits of a King, for such a power is a power,

and we are not to distinguish where the Law distinguisheth not.

Ans. The Law clearely distinguisheth we are to obey Parents in the Lord, and if Nero command Idolatry, this is an excessive power; are we obliged to obey, because the Law distinguisheth not? 2. The text saith, we are to obey every power, 1. from God, 2. That is Gods ordinance, 3. by which the man is a Minister of God for good; but an unjust and excessive power is none of these three. 3. The text in words distinguisheth not obedience active in things wicked, and lawfull: yet we are to distinguish.

Mr. Symmons. Is authoritie subjected solely in the Kings Law, and no whit in his Person, though put upon him both by God and Man?

Or, is Authoritie only the subject; and the Person exercising the Authoritie,

a bare accident to that, being in it only more separably, as pride and folly are in a man: Then if one in Authoritie command, out of his own Will, and not by Law: if I neithr actively, nor passively obey, J doe not so much as resist abused Authoritie: and then must the Prince by his disorderly Will have quite lost his authoritie, and become like another man; and yet his Authoritie has not fled from him.

Ans. If we speake acurately, neither the Man solely, nor his Power only is resisted: but the Man clothed with lawfull habituall power, is resisted, in such and such acts flowing from an abused power. 2. It is an ignorant speech, to ask, Is Authoritie subjected solely in the Kings Law, and no whit in his Person? for the Authoritie hath all its power by Law, not from the Mans person; The Authoritie hath nothing from the Person, but a naked inherencie in the Person, as in the subject: and the Person is to be honored for the Authoritie, not the Authoritie for the Person. 3. Authoritie is not so separable from the person, as that for every act of lawlesse Will, the King loseth his Royall authoritie, and ceaseth to be King: no, but every act of a King, in so far can claime subjection of the inferiour, as the act of commanding and ruling, hath law for it; and in so far as it is lawlesse, the Person in that act repugnant to Law, loseth all due claime of actuall subjection in that act, and in that act, power actuall is losed, as is cleare, Act. 4.19. & 5.29. The Apostles say to Rulers, It is safer to obey God than Men. What? were not these Rulers lawfull Magistrates, armed with power from God? I answer, habitually they were Rulers, and more then men, and to obey them in things lawfull, is to obey God: But actually in these unlawfull commandements, especially being commanded to speake no more in the name of Iesus; the Apostles doe acknowledge them to be no more but Men: and so their actuall authoritie is as separable from the person, as pride and folly from men.

Symmons. The distinction holdeth good of inferior Magistrates, That they may be considered as Magistrates,

and as Men: because their authoritie is only sacred, and addeth veneration to their persons; and is separable from the person; The Man may live, when his Authoritie is extinguished: but it holdeth not in Kings. King Sauls person is venerable as his authoritie, and his authoritie commeth by inheritance, and dyeth, and liveth inseparably with his person: and Authoritie and Person adde honour each one to another.

QUEST. XXIX. Whether, in the case of Defensive warre, the distinction of the person of the King, as a man, who can commit acts of hostile Tyrannie against his Subjects: and of the Office and Royall power that he hath from God, and the People, as a King; can have place? (3)

Ans. 1. If this be true, Manasseh, a King, did not shed innocent blood, and use [gap]orcerie▪ he did not these great wickednesses as a man,

but as a King. Salomon played the Apostate as a King, not as a man: if so, the man must make the King more infallible then the Pope; for the Pope, as a man, can erre; as a Pope he cannot erre, say Papists. But Prophets, in their persons, were anoynted of God, as Saul and David were: then must we say, Nathan and Samuel erred not as men, because their persons were sacred and anointed: and they erred not as Prophets, sure; Ergo, they erred not all. A King, as a King, is an holy Ordinance of God, and so cannot doe injustice, Ergo, they must doe acts of Iustice, as men. 2. The inferior Iudge is a Power from God. 2. To resist him, is to resist an ordinance of God. 3. He is not a terrour to good workes, but to evill. 4. He is the minister of God for good. 5. He is Gods Sword-bearer; his officiall power to rule, may by as good right come by birth, as the Crown: and the Kings person is sacred only for his office, and is annointed only for his office. For then the Chaldeans dishonored not inferior Iudges, Lam. 5.12. when they hanged the Prince, & honored not the faces of Elders. It is in questiō, if the Kings actual authority be not as separable frō him, as the actuall authority of the Iudge.

Symmons, p. 24. The King himselfe may use this distinction. As a Christian, he may forgive any that offendeth against his person: but as a Iudge, he must punish, in regard of his office. Ans. Well then, Flatterers will grant the distinction, when the King doth good, and pardoneth the blood of Protestants, shed by bloody Rebels: But when the King doth acts of injustice, he is neither man, nor King, but some independent absolute God.

Symmons, p. 27. Gods Word tyeth me to every one of his personall commandements, as well as his legall commandements: nor doe I obey the Kings law, because it is established, or because of its known penaltie; nor yet the King himselfe, because he ruleth according to Law. But I obey the Kings law, because I obey the King: and I obey the King, because I obey God: I obey the King, and his Law▪ because I obey God and his Law. Better obey the Command, for a reverent regard to the Prince, then for a penaltie. Ans. It is hard to answer a sick man. It is blasphemie, to seek this distinction of Person and Office, in the King of Kings; because by (Person) in a mortall King, we understand a Man that can sinne. 1. I am not obliged to obey his personall commandement, except I were his domestick: nor his unlawfull personall commandements, because they are sinfull. 2. It is false that you obey the Kings Law, because you obey the King: for then you say but this, I obey the King, because I obey the King. The truth is,

Obedience is not formally terminated on the person of the King; Obedience is relative to a precept: and it is Men-service, to obey a Law, not because it is good and just; but upon this formall motive, because it is the will of a mortall man to command it. And Reverence, Love, Feare, being acts of the Affection, are not terminated on a Law, but properly on the Person of the Iudge: and they are modifications, or laudable qualifications of acts of obedience; not motives, not the formall reason why I obey, but the manner how I obey. And the Apostle maketh expresly, Rom. 13▪4. feare of punishment, a motive of obedience, while he saith, He beareth not the sword in vaine; Ergo, Be subject to the King. And this hindreth not personall resistance to unjust commandements.

Symmons, p. 27, 28, 29. You say, To obey the Princes Personall commandement against his Legall will, is to obey himselfe against himselfe. So say I, To obey his Legall will against his Personall will, is to obey himselfe against himselfe: for I take his Person to be himselfe

Ans. To obey the Kings personall will, when it is sinfull, (as we now suppose) against his legall will, is a sinne, and a disobedience to God, and the King also, seeing the Law is the Kings will, as King: but to obey his Legall will against his sinfull personall will (as it must be sinfull, if contrary to a just Law) is obedience to the King as King, and so obedience to God. 2. You take the Kings person to be himself; but you take quid pro quo, for his person here, you must take not Physically for his suppost of soul and body; but morally, it is the King, as a sinning man doing his worst will, against the Law which is his just and best will, and the rule of the Subjects: and the Kings personall will is so far just, and to regulate the Subjects, in so far, as it agreeth with his legall Will, or his Law, and this will can sinne, and therefore may be crossed without breach of the fifth Commandement: but his Legall Will cannot be crossed without disobedience both to God and the King.

Symmons, p. 28. The Kings Personall will doth not alwayes presuppone passion: and if it be attended with passion, yet we must beare it for conscience sake. Ans. We are to obey the Kings Personall will, when the thing commanded, is not sinne; but his Subjects as Subjects, have little to do with his personall will in that notion. It concerneth his domestick servant, and is the Kings will as he is the master of servants, not as he is King in relation to Subjects; but we speak of the Kings personall will, as repugnant to Law, and contrary to the Kings will as King, and so contrary to the fifth

Commandment; and this is attended often, not onely with Passion, but also with prejudice; and we owe no subjection to prejudice, and Passions, or to Actions commanded, by these misordered powers, because they are not from God, nor his Ordinances, but from men, and the flesh, and we owe no subjection to the flesh.

Doct. Ferne, Sect. 9. pag. 58. The distinction of personall and legall will, hath place in evill actions, but not in resistance, where we cannot sever the person, and the dignitie, or authority, because we cannot resist the power, but we must resist the person who hath the power. Saul had lawfully the command of Arms, but that power he useth unjustly, against innocent David. I ask when these Emperours took away lives and goods at their pleasure; was that a power ordained of God? No, but an Illegall will, a Tyranny, but they might not resist: nay, but they cannot resist: for that power and soveraigntie imployed to compasse these illegall commandments, was ordained and settled in them. When Pilate condemned our Saviour, it was an illegall will, ye[gap] our Saviour acknowledgeth in it Pilates power, that was given him from above. Answ. 1. Here we have the distinction, denyed by Royalists, granted by D. Fern; but if when the King commands us to do wickednesse, we may resist that personall will, and when he commandeth us to suffer unjustly we cannot resist his will, but we must resist also his Royall person. What? Is it not still the King, and his person sacred, as his power is sacred, when he commandeth the subjects to do unjustly, as when he commandeth them to suffer unjustly? It were fearfull to say, when Kings command any one act of idolatry, they are no longer Kings; if for conscience I am to suffer unjustly, when Nero commandeth unjust punishment, because Nero commanding so, remaineth Gods Minister. Why? But when Nero commandeth me to worship an Heathen God, I am upon the same ground to obey that unjust will in doing ill: For Nero in commanding Idolatry, remaineth the Lords Minister, his person is sacred in the one commandment of doing ill, as in inflicting ill of punishment. And do I not resist his person in the one, as in the other? His power and his person are unseparably conjoyned by God in the one, as in the other, 2. In bodily thrusting out of Vzzah from the Temple, these fourscore valiant men did resist the Kings person, by bodily violence, as well as his power. 3. If the power of killing the Martyrs in Nero, was no power ordained of God, then the resisting of Nero, in his taking away the lives of the Martyrs, was but the resisting of Tyranny: And certainly, if that

power in Nero was [gap] a power ordained of God, and not to be resisted, as the place, Rom. 13. is alleaged by Royalists, then it must be a lawfull power, and no Tyranny; and if it cannot be resisted, because it was a power ordained and settled in him, it is either setled by God, and so not Tyranny; except God be the Author of Tyranny, or then settled by the devill, and so may well be resisted; but the Text speaketh of no power, but of that which is of God. 4. We are not to be subject to all powers in concreto, by the Text; for we are not to be subject to powers lawfull, yet commanding active obedience to things unlawfull. Now subjection includeth active obedience of honour, love, fear, paying tribute, and therefore of need force, some powers must be excepted. 5. Pilates power is meerly a power by divine permission, not a power ordained of God, as are the powers spoken of Rom. 13. Gregori. mor. l. 3. c. 11. expresly saith, This was Satans power given to Pilate, against Christ. Manibus Satanae pro nostra redemptione se traddit. Lyra. A Principibus Romanorum & ulterius permissum a Deo, qui est potestas, superior. Calvin, B[gap]za, Diod[gap]tus, saith the same, and that he cannot mean of Legall power from Gods regulating will is evident; 1. Because Christ is answering Pilate,

John 19.10. Knowest thou not, that I have power to crucifie thee? This was an untruth. Pilate had a command to worship him, and beleeve in him; and whereas Ferne saith, Sect. 9. pag. 59. Pilate had power to judge any accused before him: It is true, but he being obliged to beleeve in Christ, he was obliged to be perswaded of Christs innocency; and so neither to judge, nor receive accusation against him: and the power he saith, he had to crucifie, was a Law-power in Pilates meaning, but not in very deed any Law-power; because a Law-power is from Gods regulating will in the fifth Commandment; but no creature hath a lawfull or a Law-power to crucifie Christ. 2. A Law-power is for good, Rom. 13.4. A power to crucifie Christ, is for ill. 3. A Law-power is a terrour to ill works, and a praise to good. Pilates power to crucifie Christ, was the contrary. 4. A Law-power is to execute wrath on ill-doing, a power to crucifie Christ is no such. 5. A Law-power conciliateth honour, fear, and veneration to the person of the Judge, a power to crucifie Christ, conciliateth no such thing, but a disgrace to Pilate. 6. The Genuine Acts of a lawfull power, are lawfull Acts; for such as is the Fountain-power, such are the Acts flowing therefrom; good Acts slow not from bad powers, neither hath God given a power to sin, except by way of permission.