QUEST. XL. Whether or no the people have any power over the King, either by his oath, covenant, or any other way? (1) to QUEST. XL. Whether or no the people have any power over the King, either by his oath, covenant, or any other way? (2)

QUEST. XL. Whether or no the people have any power over the King, either by his oath, covenant, or any other way? (1)

ARistotle saith, Ethic. 8. c. 12. [gap]. A Tyrant seeketh his owne, a King the good of the Subjects, for he is no King who is not content, and excelleth in goodnesse. The former part of these words distinguish essentially the King by his office, from the Tyrant. Now every office r[gap]qu[gap]reth essentially a duty to be performed by him that is in office; and where there is a duty required, there is some obligation; if it be a politique duty, it is a politique obligation. Now amongst politique duties betwixt equall and equall, superiour and inf[gap]riour, that is not, de facto, required coaction for the performance ther[gap]f, but de jure, there is, for two neighbour Kings and two neighbour Nations, both being equall and independent, the one toward the other, the one owe a duty to the other, and if the Ammonites do a

wrong to David and Israel, as they are equall de facto, the one cannot punish the other, though the Ammonites do a disgrace to Davids messengers, yet de jure, David and Israel may compell them to politique duties of politique cons[gap]ciation; (for betwixt independent kingdomes there must be some politique government, and some politique and civil Lawes, for two or three making a society, cannot dwell together without some policy) and David and Israel as by the Law of nature they may repell violence with violence, so if the lawes of neighbour-hood and nations be broken, the one may punish the other, though there be no relation of superiority and inferiority betwixt them. 2. Where ever there is a covenant and oath betwixt equals, yea or superiours and inferiours, the one hath some coactive power over the other; if the father give his bond to pay to his son ten thousand pounds, as his patrimony to him, though before the giving of the bond the father was not obliged, but onely by the Law of nature to give a patrimony to his son, y[gap]t now by a politique obligation of promise, covenant and writ he is obliged so to his son to pay ten thousand pounds, that by the Law of Nations and the civil Law, the son hath now a coactive power by Law to compell his father, though his superiour, to pay him no lesse then ten thousand pounds of patrimony. Though therefore the King should stand simply superiour to his kingdom and estates (which I shall never grant) yet if the King come under covenant with his kingdom, as I have proved at length c. 13. he must, by that same, come under some coactive power to fulfill his covenant, for omne promissum (saith the Law) cadit in debitum. What any doth promise falleth under debt, if the covenant be politique and civil, as is the covenant between King David and all Israel, 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3. and between King Iehoash and the people, 2 King. 11.17, 18. Then the King must come under a civil obligation to performe the covenant, and though their be none superiour to King, and the people on earth to compell them both to performe what they have promised, yet de jure, by the Law of Nations, each may compell the other to mutuall performance. This is evident,

1. By the Law of nations, if one nation break covenant to another, though both be independent, yet hath the wronged nation a coactive power, de jure (by accident, because they are weaker, they want stength to compell, yet they have right, and jus to compell them) to force the other to keep covenant, or then to punish them,

because nature teacheth to repel violence by violence, so it be done without desire of revenge and malice.

2. This is proved from the nature of a promise or covenant, for Solomon saith, Prov. 6.1. My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, if thou hast stricken thy hand with a stranger, 2. Thou art snared with the words of thy mouth, & art taken with the words of thy mouth. But whence is it that a man free is now snared as a beast in a gin or trap? Certainly Solomon saith it is by a word and striking of hands, by a word of promise and covenant. Now the Creditor hath coactive power, though he be an equall or an inferiour to the man who is surety, even by Law to force him to pay, and the Judge is obliged to give his coactive power to the Creditor, that he may force the surety to pay. Hence it is cleare that a Covenant maketh a free man under the coactive power of law to an equall and to weaker, and the stronger is by the law of fraternity to help the weaker, with his coactive power, to cause the superiour fulfill his covenant. If then the King (giving, and not granting, he were superiour to his whole Kingdome) come under a covenant to them, to seek their good, not his owne, to defend true Protestant Religion, they have power to compell him to keep his covenant, and Scotland (if the King be stronger then England, and break his covenant to them.) is obliged by Gods law, Prov. 24.11. to adde their forces and coactive power to help their brethren of England.

3. The Law shall warrant to loose the vassal from the Lord, when the Lord hath broken his covenant. Hippolitus in l. Si quis viduam col. 5. & dixit de quest. l. Si quis major. 41. & 161. Bartol. n. 41. The Magdeburgens. in libel. de offic. magistrat. Imperatores & reges esse primarios vasallos imperii, & regni, & proinde si feloniam contra imperium aut regnum committant, fewdo privari, proinde ut alios vasallos.

Arnisaeus q. 6. An princeps qui jurat subditis, &c. n. 2. saith, This occasioneth confusion and sedition. The Egyptians (saith he) cast off Ptolomeus, because he affected too much the name of a King of the Romans his own friend, Dion. l. 9. The States punished Archidanius because he married a wife of a low stature, Plutarch. in Agos. in pris. The ancient Burgundions thought it cause enough to expell their King, if matters went not well in the State, Marcel. l. 27. The Goths in Spain gave no other cause of expelling their King, nisi quod sibi displiceret, because he displeased them. Aimon. l. 2. c. 20. l. 4. c. 35.

Ans. All these are not to be excused in people, but neither every abuse of power in a King exautorateth a King, nor every abuse in people, can make null their power.

Arnisaeus maketh three kinds of oathes: the first is, when the King sweareth to defend true Religion, and the Pope, and he denyeth that this is an oath of fidelitie, or by paction or covenant made to th[gap] Pope or Clergie, he saith it is onely on oath of protection, nor doth the King receive the Crown from the Pope or Clergie.

Answ. 1. Arnisaeus divideth oathes that are to be conjoyned, we read not that Kings sweare to defend Religion in one oath, and to administrate judgement and justice in another: for David made not two Covenants, but onely one with all Israel. 2. The king was not King while he did swear this oath, and therefore it must be a pactionall oath between him and the Kingdom, and it is true the King receiveth not a Crown from the Church, yet David received a Crowne from the Church, for this end, to feed the Lords people, and so conditionally. Papir Masse l. 3. Chron. Gal. saith, The King was not king before the oath. 2. That he did sweare to be a keeper not onely of the first, but also of the second Table of the Law. Ego N. Dei gratia, mox futuras rex Francorum, in die ordinationis mea coram Deo, & sanctis ejus polliceor, quod servabo privilegia canonica, justitiamque & jus unicuique Praelato debitum, vosque defendam, Deo juvante, quantum potero, quemadmodum Rex ex officio in suo regno defendere debet, unumquemque Episcopum ac Ecclesiam, & administrabo populo justitiam & leges, uti jus postulat. And so is it ordained in the Councel of Tolet. 6. c. 6. Quisquis deinceps regni sortitus fuerit apicem, non ante conscendat Regiam sedem, quam inter reliquas conditiones sacramento policitus fuerit, quod non sinet in regno suo degere cum qui non sit Catholicus. All these by Scripture are oath[gap]s of Covenant, Deut. 17. ver. 17, 18. 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3, 4. 2 Kings 11.17, 18.

Arnisaeus maketh a second oath of absolute Kings, who sweare they shall raigne according to equitie and justice; and he saith, There is no need of this oath, a promise is enough, for an oath encreaseth not the obligation. L. fin. de non num. pec. Onelie it addeth the bound of Religion, for there is no use of an oath, where there is no paction of law against him that sweareth, if he violate his oath. There followeth onelie the punishment of Perjurie. And the word of a Prince is as good as his oath, onelie he condescendeth to sweare to please the people, out of

indulgence, not out of necessitie. And the King doth not therefore sweare because he is made King, but because he is made King he sweareth. And he is not King because he is crowned, but he is crowned because he is King. Where the Crowne goeth by succession, the King never dieth; and he is King by nature before he be crowned.

Answ. 1. This oath is the very first oath spoken of before, included in the covenant that the King maketh with the people, 2 Sam. 5.2, 3, 4. For absolute Princes, by Arnisaeus his grant, doth swear to do the duties of a King, as Bodinus maketh the oath of France, de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. Iuro ego, per deum, ac promitt[gap] me justè regnaturum▪ judicium, equitatem, ac misericordiam facturum. And papir. Mass. l. 3. Chron. hath the same expresly in the particulars. And by this a King sweareth he shall not be absolute, and if he swear this oath, he bindeth himself not to governe by the Law of the King, whereby he may play the Tyrant as Saul did, 1 Sam. 8.9, 10, 11, 12, &c. As all Royalists expound the place.

2. It is but a poor evasion to distinguish betwixt the Kings promise and his oath, for the promise and covenant of any man, and so of the King doth no lesse bring him under a civil obligation and politique coaction, to keep his promise, then an oath, for he that becometh surety for his friend doth by no civil Law, sweare he shall be good for the sonne, or performe in liew and place of the friend, what he is to performe, he doth onely covenant and promise, and in law and politique obligation he is taken and snared by that promise, no lesse then if he had sworne. Reuben offereth to be caution to bring Benjamin safe home to his old father, Gen. 42.37. & Iudah also, Gen. 43.9. but they do not swear any oath, & it is true that an oath adeth nothing to a contract and promise, but onely it laies on a religious tie before God, yet so as consequently, if the contractor violate both promise and oath, he cometh under the guilt of perjury, which a law of men may punish. Now that a covenant bringeth the King under a politique obligation, as well as an oath is already proved, and farther confirmed by Gal. 3.15. Though it be a mans testament or covenant no man disanulleth and addeth thereunto; No man even by mans law can anull a confirmed covenant, and therefore the man that made the covenant bringeth himself under law to fulfill his own covenant; and so must the King put himself under mens law, by a covenant at his Coronation. Yea and David is reputed by Royallists, an absolute Prince, yet he cometh under a covenant before he be

made King. 3. It is but a weak reason to say, that an oath is needlesse, where no action of law can be against the King who sweareth, if it have any strength of reason. I retort it, a legall and solemne promise then is needlesse also, for there is no action of law against a King (as Royalists teach) if he violate his promise. So then King David needlesly made a Covenant with the people at his Coronation; for though David should turne as bloody an enemie to the Church as Nero or Iulian, the people have no Law-action against David; and why then did Ieremiah seek an oath of the King of Iudah, that he would not kill him, nor deliver him into the hands of his enemies? and why did David seek an oath of Ionathan? It is not like Ieremiah and David could have law-action against a King and a Kings son, if they should violate the oath of God. And farther, it is a begging of the question, to say that the States can have no action against the king, if he should violate his oath. Hugo Grotius putteth seven cases in which the people may have most reall action against the King to accuse and punish him.

1. They may punish the King to death, for matters capitall,

if so it be agreed on betwixt the King and the people, as in Lacedemonia.

2. He may be punished as a private man.

3. If the King make away a Kingdome given to him by succession, his act is null, and he may be resisted, because the Kingdome is a liferent onely to him. Yea saith Barclay, He loseth the Crown.

4. He loseth his Kingdom, if with a hostile mind he seek the destruction of the Kingdome.

5. If such a clause be put in, that if he commit felonie, or doe such oppressions, the Subjects shall be loosed from the bonds of subjection; then the King failing thus, turneth a private man.

6. If the King have the one halfe or part of the Kingdome, and the people or Senate the other halfe; if the King prey upon that half which is not his owne, he may violently be resisted, for in so farre he hath not the Empire.

7. If when the Crowne was given, this be declared, that in some cases he may be resisted; then some naturall liberty is free from the Kings power, and reserved in the peoples hand.

It is then reason that the King sweare an oath. 4. That the Kings oath is but a ceremonie to please the people, and that because he is king, and king by birth; therefore he sweareth, and is crowned, is in question, and denyed. No man is borne a king, as no man

is borne a subject, and because the people maketh him King, therefore he is to swear. The councel of Toledo saith, non antea conscendat regiam sedem quam iuret. 2 An oath is a religious obligation, no arbitrary ceremony. 3. He may swear in his cabinet chamber, not covenanting with the people, as David and Iehoash did. 4. So he maketh promises that he may be King, not because he is King, it were ridiculous, he should promise or swear to be a just King, because he is a just King, and by the same reason the estates swear the oath of loyalty to the new King, not that they may be loyall in all time coming, but because they are loyall Subjects already, for if the one half of the covenant on the Kings part be a ceremony of indulgence, not of necessity, by the same reason, the other half of the covenant must be a ceremony of indulgence also to the people.

Object. Arnisaeus saith, a contract cannot be dissolved in law, but by consent of two parties contracting, because both are obliged. l. ab emptione 58. in pr. de pact. l. 3. de rescind. vend. l. 80. de solu. Therefore if the subjects go from the covenant, that they have made to be loyall to the King, they ought to be punished.

Answ. A contract, the conditions whereof are violated, by neither side, cannot be dissolved, but by the joynt consent of both; and in buying and selling, and in all contracts unviolated, the sole wil of neither side can violate the contract, of this speaketh the law. But I ask the Royalist, if the contract betwixt the spies sent to view Iericho and Rahab the harlot, had not been null, and the spies free from any obligation, if Rahab had neglected to keep within doors, when Iericho was taken, though Rahab and the spies had never consented expresly to break the covenant? We h[gap]ld that the law saith with us, that vassals lose their farme, if they pay not what is due: Now what are Kings but vassals to the State, who if they turne Tyrants, fall from their Right?

Arnisaeus saith in the councell of Toledo 4. c. 74. The subjects ask from the King, that Kings would be meek and just, not upon the ground of a voluntarie Contract and Paction, but because God shall rejoice in King and People, by so doing.

Answ. These two do no more fight one with another, then that two Marchants should keep faith one to another, both because God hath said he shall dwell in Gods mountaine who sweareth and covenanteth, and standeth to his oath & covenant, though to his losse & hurt, Psa. 15. and also, because they made their covenant and contract thus and thus.

QUEST. XL. Whether or no the people have any power over the King, either by his oath, covenant, or any other way? (2)

Arnisaeus. 16. Every Prince is subject to God, but not as a vassal: for a Master may commit felonie, and lose the proprietie of his farme; can God do so? The Master cannot take the farme from the vassal without an expresse cause legally deduced, but cannot God take what he hath given, but by a law-Processe? a vassall can intitle to himself a farme against the Masters will, as some jurists say, but can a Prince intitle a kingdom to himself, against the God of heavens will? though we grant the comparison, yet the subjects have no law over the Kings, because the coercive power of the vassal is in the Lord of the manner, the punishing of Kings belongeth to God.

Answ. We compare not the lord of a mannor and the Lord of Heaven together, all these dissimilitudes we grant, but as the King is Gods vassal, so is he a noble and Princely vassal to the Estates of a kingdom, because they make him. 2. They make him rather then another their noble servant. 3. They make him for themselves, and their own Godly, quiet, and honest life. 4. They, in their first election, limit him to such a way, to governe by law, and give to him so much power for their good, no more, in these four acts they are above the Prince, and so have a coercive power over him.

Arnisaeus n. 9. It is to make the Princes fidelity doubtfull to put him to an oath. Lawyers say there is no need of an oath, when a person is of approved fidelitie.

Answ. Then we are not to seek an oath of an inferiou r Magistrate, of a Commander in wars, of a pastor, it is presumed these are of approved fidelity, and it maketh their integritie obnoxious to sland[gap]rs, to put them to an oath. 2. David was of more approved fidelity then any King now adayes, and to put him to a covenant seemed to call his fidelity in question; Ionathan sought an oath of David to deal kindly with his seed, when he came to the throne, Ieremiah sought an oath of the King of Iudah, did they put any note of false-hood on them therefore?

Arnisaeus. You cannot prove that ever any King gave an oath to their subjects in Scriptures.

Answ. What more unbeseeming Kings is it to swear to do their duty, then to promise covenant wayes to do the same? and a covenant you cannot deny. 2. In a covenant for religious duties there was alwayes an oath. 2 Chro. 15.12, 13, 14. hence the right of cutting a calf, and swearing in a covenant Ier. 34.18. 3. There is an oath that the people giveth to the King to obey him, Eccles. 8.2. and a

covenant 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3. mutuall between the king and people, I leave it to the juditious, if the people swear to the king obedience in a covenant mutuall, and he swear not to them.

Arnisaeus sheweth to us a third sort of oath that limited Princes do swear, this oath in Denmarke, Suecia, Polonia, Hungaria, is sworne by the kings, who may do nothing without consent of the Senat, and according to order of Law, this is but the other two oathes specified, and a Prince cannot contraveen his own contract, the law saith in that the Prince is but as a private man, in l. digna vox C. de ll. Rom. cons. 426. n. 17. And it is known that the Emperour is constituted and created by the Princes Electors, subject to them, and by Law may be dethroned by them.

The B. of Rochester saith from Barclay, none can denude a King of his power, but he that gave him the power, or hath an expresse commandement so to do, from him that gave the power.

But God onely and the people gave the King his power. Ergo, God with the people having an expresse commandement from God, must denude the King of power.

Answ. 1. This shall prove that God onely by an immediat action, or some having an expresse commandement from him, can deprive a preacher for scandals, Christ onely, or those who have an expresse commandement from him can excommunicate, God only or the magistrate with him can take away the life of man; and Numb. 11.14, 15, 16. No inferiour Magistrates, who also have their power from God immediatly, Rom. 13.1. If we speak of the immediation of the office, can devide inferiour judges of their power. God only by the husbandmans paines maketh a fruitfull vineyard, Ergo, the husbandman cannot make his vineyard grow over with nettles and briars.

2. The argument must run thus, else the assumption shall be false. God onely by the action of the people, as his instrument, and by no other action make a lawfull King. God onely by the action of the people as his instrument can make a King, God onely by the action of the people as his instrument can dethrone a King, for as the people making a King, are in that doing what God doth before them, and what God doth by them in that very act, so the people unmaking a King, doth that which God doth before the people, both the one and the other according to Gods rule obligeth, Deut. 17.14.15.16.17.18.19.20.

The Prelate, whose tribe seldom saith truth, addeth, As a fatherly power, by God and natures law, over a family,

was in the father of a family, before the children could either transfer their power, or consent to the translation of that power to him, so a Kingly power (which succeedeth to a paternal or fatherly power) to governe many families, (yea & a Kingdom) was in that same father, in relation to many families, before these many families can transfer their power. The Kingly power floweth immediately from God, & the people doth not transfer that power, but doth onely consent to the person of the King, or doth onely choose his person at some time. And though this power were principally given to the people, it is not so given to the people as if it were the peoples power, & not Gods▪ for it is Gods power, neither is it any other waies given to the people, but as to a streame, a beam, and an instrument which may confer it to another. M. Anton. de domini. l. 6. c. 2. n 22.23. doth more subtilly illustrate the matter, if the King should confer honour on a subject, by the hand of a servant, who had not power or freedom to confer that honour, or not to confer it, but by necessity of the Kings commandment must confer it, nothing should hinder us to say, that such a subject had his honour immediately from the King: so the earth is immediately illuminated by the sun, although light be received in the earth, but by the interveening mediation of many inferiour bodies and elements, because by no other thing, but by the sun only, is the light as an efficient cause in a nearest capacity to give light, so the Royall power in whomsoever it be is immediatly from God onely, though it be applyed by men to this, or this person, because from God onely, and from no other the Kingly power is formally and effectively that which it is, and worketh that which it worketh, and if you ask by what cause is the tree immediatly turned in fire, none sound in reason would say, it is made fire, not by the fire, but by him that laid the tree on the fire. Iohn P. P. would have stollen this argument also, if he had been capable thereof.

Ans. 1. A fatherly power is in a father, not before he have a child, but indeed before his children by an act of their free-will consent that he be their father, yea & whether the children consent or no, from a physical act of generation he must be the father; & let the father be the most wicked man & let him be made by no moral requisite, is he made a father, nor can heever leave off physically to be a father, he may leave off morally to do the duty of a father, & so be non pater officio, but he cannot but be pater naturae generantis vi. So there never is nor can be any need, that childrens fre consent interveen to make Kish the Father

of Saul because he is by nature a father, to make Saul a King & a moral father by analogy and improperly, a father by ruling, governing, guiding, defending Israel, by good laws, in peace and godlinesse, I hope there is some act of the peoples free-will required even by Spalatoes way, the people must approve him to be King, yea they must King him, or constitute him King, say we, no such act is required of naturall sons to make a physicall father, and so here is a great halt in the comparison, and it is most false that there is a Kingly power to governe many families in the same father, before these many families can transfer their power to make him King. Put Royallists to their Logick, they have not found out a medium to make good, that there is a formall Kingly power, whereby Saul is King and father morally over all Israel before Israel chose him and made him, as Kish was Sauls father formally, and had a fatherly power to be his father, before Saul had the use of free-will to consent, that he should be his father. Royalists are here at a stand; The man may have Royall gifts before the people make him King, but this is not (regia potestas) a Royall power, by which the man is formally King. Many have more Royal gifts then the man that beareth the Crown, yet are never Kings, nor is there formally, (regia potestas) kingly power in them. In this meaning Petrarcha said, Plures sunt reges quam regna.

3. He saith, The people doth not confer royall power, but onely consent to the person of the man, or choise of his person. This is non-sense, for the peoples choosing of David at Hebron to be King, and their refusing of Sauls seed to be King, what was it but an act of God, by the free suffrages of the people, conferring royall power on David, and making him King? whereas in former times, David even anointed by Samuel at Bethleem, 1 Sam. 16. was onely a private man, the subject of King Saul, and never tearmed by the Spirit of God, a King; nor was he King, till God, by the peoples consent, made him King at Hebron; for Samuel neither honoured him as King, nor bowed to him as King, nor did the people say, God save King David, but after this David acknowledged Saul as his Master, and King. Let Royalists shew us any act of God making David King, save this act of the people making him formally King at Hebron, and therefore the people as Gods instrument transferred the power, and God by them in the same act transferred the power, and in the same they chose the person; the Royalists affirm these to be different actions; affirmanti incumbit probatio.

4. This power is the peoples radically, naturally, as the Bees (as some think) have a power naturall to choose a King-Bee, so hath a communitie a power naturally, to defend and protect themselves; and God hath revealed in Deut. 17.14, 15. the way of regulating the act of choosing Governours and Kings, which is a speciall mean of defending and protecting themselves; and the people is as principally the subject and fountain of Royall power, as a fountain is of water. I shall not contend, if you call a Fountain Gods Instrument to give water, as all creatures are his Instruments. 5. For Spalato's comparison, he is far out, for the people choosing one of ten to be their King, have freewill to choose any, and are under a Law, Deut. 17.14, 15. In the manner of their choosing, and thought, they erre and make a sinfull choice; yet the man is King, and Gods King, whom they make King; but if the King command a servant to make A. B. a Knight, if the servant make C. D. a Knight, I shall not think C. D. is a valid Knight at all; and indeed, the honour is immediately here from the King, because the Kings servant by no innate power maketh the Knight, but Nations by a radicall and naturall and innate power maketh this man a King, not this man: and I conceive, the man chosen by the people, oweth thanks, and gratefull service to the people, who rejected others, that they had power to choose, and made him King. 6. The light immediately and formally, is light from the Sun, and so is the Office of a King, immediately instituted of God, Deut. 17.14. Whether the institution be naturall, or positive, it is no matter. 2. The man is not King, because of Royall indowments, though we should say these were immediately from God, to which instruction and education may also conferre not a little; but he is formally King, ratione [gap], in regard of the formall essence of a King, not immediately from God, as the light is from the Sun, but by the mediation of the free consent of the people, 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3. nor is the people in making a King, as the man who onely casteth Wood in the fire; the Wood is not made fire formally, but by the fire, not by the approach of fire to Wood, or of Wood to fire; for the people do not apply the Royaltie, which is immediately in, and from God to the person: explicate such an application; for to me it is a Fiction unconceiveable, because the people hath the Royaltie radically in themselves, as in the Fountain and Cause, and conferreth it on the man who is made King; yea, the people by making David

King, confer the Royall power on the King: this is so true, that Royalists forgetting themselves, inculcate frequently in asserting their absolute Monarch from Vlpian, but misunderstood, that the people have resigned all their power, libertie, right of life, death, goods, chastitie, a potency of rapine, homicides, unjust wars, &c. upon a creature called an absolute Prince, even, saith Grotius, as a man may make himself a slave, by selling his liberty to a master. Now if the people make away this power to the King, and this be nothing but the transcendent absolutenesse of a King: certainly, this power was in the people; for how can they give to a King, that which they have not themselves? As a man cannot make away his liberty, to a master, by becoming a slave to him, if his libertie were immediately in God, as Royalists say, Soveraigntie is immediately in God, and people can exercise no Act about Soveraignty, to make it over to one man, rather then to another. People onely have an after-approbation, that this man to whom God hath given it immediately, shall have it. Furthermore, they say, people in making a King, may make such conditions, as in seven cases a King may be dethroned, at least resisted, saith Hu. Grotius. Ergo, people may give more, or lesse, half or whole, limited or absolute Royall power to the Prince; but if this power were immediately in God, and from God; how could the people have the husbanding of it, at their need to expend it out in ounce weights, or pound weights, as they please? And that the people may be Taverners of it, to sell, or give it, is taught by Grotius de jur. bel & pac. l. 1. c. 4. Barclai. advers. Monarch. l. 4. c. 6. Arnisae. cap. 6. de majest. an princeps qui jurat subditis, &c. n. 10. n. se Aventiun. Anal. l. 3. Chytreus, l. 23. l. 28. Saxon Sleid. lib. 1. in fi; yet Arnisaeus is not ashamed to cite Arist. po. c. 12. l. 3. That he is not a true and absolute King, who ruleth by Laws: The point black contrary of which Aristotle saith.