Ames Conscience

Ames Conscience / Book 1 / CHAP. V. Of a surmising and doubting Conscience.

CHAP. V. Of a surmising and doubting Conscience.

CHAP. V. Of a surmising and doubting Conscience.

Quest. 1. WHether a man may content himselfe with a doubting Conscience?

Answ. For the unfolding of this question, it is to be noted, that Opinion sometimes signifies a certaine and setled judgement without all doubting. A certaine judgement nor arising from Sense, Knowledge, or true Faith, but Reason. Sometimes it is taken more strictly; For that judgement whereby indeede we assent to the truth of a thing, but not without suspition, feare, or doubting of its being otherwise.

Vpon this distinction, I answer: First, in such things as are necessarie to salvation, and Gods worship, no opinion can be sufficient, though it haue never so great certainety of reason; because Faith is required to these, and Faith takes onely the infallible word of God.

2 In such things which are more remote from their principles, diligent care is to be had, that we also get a certaine perswasion, or beliefe of them, out of the Scriptures; but if that cannot be obtained, it is lawfull in our actions to follow some such opinion, as is certaine and tried by the rule of Scripture.

3 Vsing also all diligence to bee certaine (though we be not) it is lawfull in many things to follow that opinion, which is most probable.

4 It is never lawfull to doe against our owne opinion, whether it be certaine, or probable, for respect to other mens authority.

5 No man can at the same time haue two contrary probable opinions, concerning the same thing; so as he may lawfully leaue the one, and follow the other.

Quest. 2 What shall one doe when his Conscience is doubtfull?

Answ. For the declaration of this question, wee must obserue: First, Conscience is said to be doubtful in a large sense, as when the assent even of Faith, or Opinion prevaileth; yet there is some doubting joyned. But strictly, and properly, that Conscience is named doubting, which yeeldeth to neither part of the question in hand, but stickes and staggers betweene assent and dissent, not knowing which to doe.

Touching the first sort of doubting, it hath partly beene spoken in the former question, and shall partly be spoken of in the question following. Heere wee treat of that Conscience, which in a proper and strict sense, is called doubting.

Secondly, doubting is either Speculatiue, or Practicall.

Speculatiue is that, which is not immediately conversant about a practise or action: as when one doubteth, whether this or that thing be his or not. Practicall, is that, which immediately is conversant about some particular action.

Answ. These things being laid downe, it is answered;

First, in all those doubts which doe any way belong to our practise, diligent enquiry is to be made, that we may clearely perceiue the truth and not doubt; because while the minde remaines in doubt, the action must of necessity want that perfection which it would haue, if it were done with Knowledge, and certainty of judgement.

For the more certaine our knowledge is, touching those things which we doe, the more confident we are in doing, and more ioyfull when wee haue done them.

2 Oft times it is lawful to do a thing, though a speculatiue doubt remaine, because he that doth so, doth not necessarily doe either against a doubting Conscience, nor without a perswaded Conscience; for notwithstanding that speculatiue doubt, he may assuredly conclude with himselfe; that, that which hee doth, ought to be done. As for example, A man possesseth a peice of ground lawfully, and begins to doubt whether it be his owne or not; yet if he know not, that it belongs to any other body, he may lawfully keepe the same still, because other things being considered, possession is a better ground to keepe it, then doubting is to leaue it.

3 It is not lawfull to doe any thing against a Practicall doubt; that is, a doubt whether the thing to bee done be lawfull: The reason is, 1. Because a man cannot doe it of faith, Rom. 14. 23. 2 Because, he that doth so, doth not sufficiently abhorre sinne: for willingly and wittingly he exposeth himselfe to the danger of sinning. 3. Because he is not fully enough addicted to Gods will; for as he that doth that willingly, whereof he doubts, whether it bee acceptable to his friend or no, doth against the law of friendship: so he that doth that, whereof he doubts, whether it be acceptable to God or not; doth against the law of loue to God. 4. In things doubtfull, the safest way is to be chosen; but that is the safest part, which if we follow, it is certaine we shall not sinne. As for example, A man doubteth whether Vsury be lawfull or nor? the safest way is to abstaine; for herein is no danger of sinning.

Some of the Philosophers had some knowledge of the equity of this rule, whose Iudgement thereof Tully relates, and approoues: Office: Lib. 1. Those giue good counsell (sayeth he) who forbide to doe any thing whereof one doubts, whether it be iust or uniust: the equity thereof is apparant in it selfe, because Doubting imports, thought, or feare of being hurt.