HItherto we have spoken of that Synteresis, or Proposition, whence Conscience telleth what is Law. Now followes the second part of the judgement, whereby a mans conscience beares witnesse of his fact according to that Law. By reason of this act Conscience is named a witnesse, and in the common Proverbe, a thousand witnesses. It is likewise called a Booke, Revel. 20. 12. because it is left written in mans minde, at it were in a register, what he hath done, and with what intent, and at length is read and spoken of by Conscience.

The Assumption of that practicall Syllogisme wherein Conscience consists, is nothing else, but the recognizing, or considering of our action, or estate, as it hath respect to that Law which Conscience giveth. For the better understanding of the nature hereof, some things must bee made cleare concerning the action which is recognized; and some things concerning the

recognizing itselfe.

The action is either agreeable to that which Conscience teacheth, or is contrary to it.

The dictate of Conscience, whereunto an action is to be conformed, doth sometime goe before and accompany the action, and sometimes follow it. Against the dictate of Conscience that goeth before, or accompanieth the action, we haue an example in those, of whom the Apostle speakes, Rom. 1. 32. Who knowing the Iudgement of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not onely doe the same, but haue pleasure in them that doe them. Wee haue an example of an action committed against the judgement of Conscience, following the fact, in those Iewes which put Christ to death through ignorance, Acts 3. 17. 1 Cor. 2. 8. yet being afterwards better taught, they judged far otherwaies of their fact, then when they did commit it, Acts 3. 37.

Quest. From hence ariseth a hard question, how a man can do any thing against the dictate of Conscience which goeth before, or accompanieth his action? the Question ariseth thus.

The Will, as it seemes to many, cannot will or nill any thing, unlesse Reason haue first iudged it to bee willed or nilled; neither can it choose but follow the last practicall judgement, and doe that which Reason doth dictate to be done: and by consequent, the Will cannot moue against the determination of Conscience.

Answ. For the unfolding of this matter, these conclusions are to be laid downe. It is so cleare that no man can question it,

1. That many both may doe, and doe against Conscience, as it is an habite, or Summary of Principles:

and in so doing, they doe in some sense, goe against Conscience.

2. Against Conscience as it is an act, all those doe, who do any thing against that Iudgement which they had actually, and yet haue virtually or in the principle, though actually they judge not as they haue done formerly.

3. The Will cannot will, desire, choose, or follow after any thing, without a speculatiue apprehension of it, because the object of the will is knowne Good. No man was ever knowne to desire what hee no waies knew.

4. A bare and simple apprehension of the object, without any practicall judgement, that forthwith it must be prosequuted, or avoided, may be sufficient to draw forth the Act of the Will. This appeareth sufficiently in Mad men, Infants, and in every undeliberate motion of the Will. The reason of this is, because a Good, apprehended or knowne, hath all those Conditions, which are required to the Object of the Will. The Will is as able about its Object, as the sensitiue appetite is about its: But Sense is stirred up at the apprehension of its object, as the Eye at sight of Colours, the Eare at Sounds, &c.

5 The Will can at pleasure suspend its act about that which is apprehended and judged to be good, without any foregoing act of judgement, that it should doe so; for if to suspend an act, and to leaue of acting, an act of judgement, bee necessarily required; then to suspend that judgement, another judgement is requisite; and to suspend that, another; and so in infinitum.

6 The Will can turn away the understanding fro the consideration of any object, which at present it apprehendeth

and judgeth to be good, to the consideration that it hath formerly apprehended and judged to be so. By reason of this commanding power, the Will is the first cause of unadvisednesse, and blame-worthy error in the Vnderstanding. When the Will doth first begin, to draw away the understanding from that, which it hath judged to be good, it doth it, by its owne inclination without any judgement that it should doe so; otherwise these two judgements should bee together; namely, this ought to be followed, and this ought not, which were absurd.

7 The Will can moue it selfe, towards an object that is apprehended and iudged good for profit or pleasure in some respect, though reason iudge that it is not lawfull but sinfull. The reason is: 1. Because whatsoever good the understanding propoundeth to the will, in this life, it propoundeth it with a kind of indifferency of Iudgement, as not having any necessary connexion, with the universall good. Vpon which the will is naturally set and determined. Hence it is that freedome or liberty in an action, is said to bee radically in the iudgement and reason. 2 Though the will bee determined by the understanding in regard of the specification or kinde of thing to be willed, because it willeth nothing but that which the understanding hath first apprehended; yet in regard of excercise or act of willing, it mooveth both it selfe, and the understanding with the rest of the faculties. And hence it is that liberty is in the will formally, which should not be true, if it were necessarily determined by the understanding. 3 If the iudgement being right, the will could not but will aright; then before the first sinne of Angels and men, (which was

in the Will) there must necessarily bee an error in the Vnderstanding: and if so, then the punishment of sinne should be before the first sinne; for all Practicall error in the Vnderstanding, is either sinne, or the punishment of it. 4. If the Will doe necessarily follow the judgement of the understanding; then there should (in proper speaking) be no sinne of malice, distinct from those sinnes, which are committed through ignorance, or passion. But it is manifest, that this kind of sinne is found in Devils, & likewise in some men. 5. If the Will doe necessarily follow the Vnderstanding, then in Regeneration the will it selfe neede not bee internally renewed grace: for the inlightening of the Vnderstanding would be sufficient. But this is repugnant to Faith and godlinesse.

8 Though the Will doth not alwaies follow the Iudgement, yet doth it ever follow that command whereto it is subject; and that agreeth oftentimes with Iudgement. But this command though as touching the direction, it doth belong to the understanding; yet as touching the power and efficacy, it belongeth to the Will. From hence we speake truely, and by the consent of all Nations, say, I will Will.