BEcause from vertue proceed good Workes; concerning them therefore.

Qu. 1. What is here to be understood by a Worke?

1. Ans. A worke in this place ought not to be distinguished from an action, as it is distinguished by them, who doe account those only for good works, which produce something, that is good and profitable unto men; such as are almes, the building and endowing of Temples, Colledges, Hospitalls, &c. For although among men, which are affected with their owne commodities, such workes are in a singular manner above others extolled. Yet such works may be so done, that that action from whence they come, may be in many respects evill; although the things done may be usefull and good unto other men.

2. Againe▪ even when in such works, not the works only, but the actions be truly good: yet they cannot be equalled to some other actions, which carry not so great a pompe 1 Tim. 3. 1. Iam. 5. 20.

3. This thing ought so much the more diligently to be observed, because it pertains much to the comfort of the poorer sort of believers, who have hardly any power to doe any thing, that may tend to the externall good of others. It serves also to abate the insolency of certaine rich Men, who thinke that they onely doe good workes, and none but they.

Q. 2. Concerning the efficient cause of good works, it may be domanded, whether the works of [gap] unregenerate, (whereby they doe in some sort the same thing which the regenerate doe in their good works) be good works, or no:

4. Ans. In such kind of works, we are to distinguish betweene the substance (as I may say) of the worke, and the fault of the person, wherewith it is defiled: the substance of such works is good, because they are the things of the Law. Rom. 2. 14. Now, every worke so far as it agreeth with Gods Law, is good. But for all that, there be some vices cleaving to them, which come, partly, from the person that doth them, partly, from the manner of doing, whereby such works are so defiled, that though in their owne nature, and in respect of others they be good, yet in respect of any spirituall obedience yielded by them unto God, they are not good, Esa. 1. 13. Esa, 66▪ 3.

Qu. 3. How then can the works of the regenerate be good, seeing they are many wayes defiled?

5. Ans. Although evill doth alwayes cleave both to the persons and the actions of the godly, Rom. 7. 21. Yet this evill in their holy duties takes not away the essence of a spirituall duty, but hinders and diminisheth the degree and perfection thereof; because all the causes of such works are good, and only the adjuncts evill: and so the imperfection being covered in Christ, the works are for Christs sake acceptable, and pleasing unto God 1 Pet. 2. 5.

Qu. 4. Concerning the matter of good works, it may be demanded, whether it is not lawfull for us at our owne pl[gap]asure to make choice of something, in which to yield honour and obedience unto G[gap]d?

6. This is expresly forbiden, Deut. 12. 8. 32. Num. 5. 39. Mat. 15. 9. Mark. 7. 7.

7. Secondly it doth imply a contradiction that we should yield obedience to God in those things, whereof he hath given us no Commandement: Neither without obedience can we give any honour to God, that may be pleasing to him. All works therefore of our owne chusing are only good before men through a fained and vaine persuasion, but not before God.

8. Thirdly, yet there is some difference to be observed in good works, in regard of the matter; for some are expresly and immediatly enjoyned to all, as the duties of the morall Law; others are not commanded to all, but to some only, and that is not expresly and immediatly, but consequently, and upon the supposition of certaine circumstances, by which it comes to passe that (bic & nunc) in some particular case, they partake of the nature of precept[gap].

9. In such things, the will of God is to be gathered and collected by a fillogisme, whose generall proposition is contained in the Scripture; the assumption dependeth upon gift, call, or such like speciall circumstances; and the conclusion is out of the proposition so derived by the assumption, that in respect of this or that man, such or such a time, it hath the same force of binding, with a generall Commandement. For example, all ought to cut off occasion of calumny and scandall, and to take that course which make▪ most for the furtherance of the Gospell, and the edification of the Church. This is the proposition. 1 Cor. 10. 31. 32. 33. Now Paul, considering all circumstances, did thus assume, I Paul, if I shall freely preach the Gospell, shall cut off occasion of calumny. 2 Cor. 11. 12. I shall further the Gospell, 1 Cor. 9. 23. And edify the Church, 1 Cor. 9. 19. Hence this conclusion followes, therefore I Paul ought to preach the Gospell freely, 1 Cor. 9. 15. Againe, all ought according to the gifts which they have, and their vocation, to promote the Gospell, 1 Cor. 7. 17. I have the gift of continency, and the present necessity makes the single life more fit to further the Gospell, then marriage, 1 Cor. 26. Therefore I ought to continue in that single estate.

10. If this explication be duely observed, it will easily without any longer dispute, overthrow the Doctrine of the Papists, who make distinction betweene Evangelicall counsells, and the Lawes of God.

Qu. 5. Concerning the end of good worke▪ it is demanded, what force intention hath to make an action either good, or bad?

11. Ans. A good intention by it selfe cannot make a good

action, because goodnesse is a perfection, and doth arise from the perfection and integrity of all the causes. Neither is there any action so wicked, but may be committed out of some good end: the incest of Lots Daughter was upon a good end. Gen. 19. 32. And many doe kill Christians, thinking thereby to doe God service. Io[gap]. 16. 2.

12. Yet an evill intention doth make an action evill, because evill, is a defect, and doth arise out of any defect, Mat. 6. 1. Take heed yee doe not your almes before men to be seene of them, &c.

Qu. 6. What kind of intention is necessarily required to make an action good?

13. Ans. First, it is absolutely necessary that it be done with a respect to honesty, and in reference to the pleasing of God, and obeying his Will. Acts 24. 16. For an action cannot be good, unlesse it be don under the notion of goodnesse; Now to doe a good thing under the notion of goodnesse, is to have a respect to honesty and goodnesse in the doing of it. For hee that doth a thing that is honest, because it is delightfull, or profitable, may be said to doe rather a thing profitable, or delightfull, then honest. 1 Tim. 6. 5.

14. Secondly, a secondary intention of profit, or pleasure doth in no sort take away the honesty of an action, but adorn it rather. Rom. 1. 12. & 15.

15. Thirdly, it is also absolutely necessary, that there be a reference of the action to the glory of God, 1 Cor. 10. 37. This is done vertually in the intention of our doing our duty: but the more distinct and direct respect is unto God in action, the more perfect it is, Ps. 16. 8.

16. Fourthly, it is meet also there be a secondary intention of setting our own salvation. 1 Cor. 9. 24.

17. Fifthly, in such works as come to the notice of others, it is requisite also that we thinke of stopping the mouths of the wicked, 1 Pet. 3. 16. And of furthering others in the way of salvation. Mat. 5. 16.

18. Sixthly, the cause is otherwise in evill actions; for to make an action evill, it is not required, that there be any

respect to evill, or expresse intention of dishonouring Gods Name, or of bringing death, or giving offence unto others: because as the nature of sin consists in privation, so the want of good intention is [gap]n evill intention, and (as it is chosen by the will) interpretatively is reckoned for the intention of all those evills, which are opposed to good intentions: and hence it is that the sinner is said to love death, Pro. 8. 36.

Qu. 7. Of the forme of a good action wherein it doth consist?

19. It consists properly in the manner of doing, when the agent is not onely well disposed, and that thing which he doth is approved of God, but also the action is so ordered in respect of all the circumstances, as God prescribeth, what and of what nature this is, appeareth by the defect. 1 Cor. 11. 27. 28. 29. Comande. 3.

Qu. 8. Because the information and force of Conscience d[gap]th neerely pertaine to the forme of doing concerning it may be demanded, whether the Conscience of man be a sufficient and absolute rule to worke by?

20. Ans. The Conscience of a man since the fall is defiled, Tir. 1. 15. And so by it selfe cannot be a perfect, and pure rule, yea: if we simply follow it as a leader, we shall be brought oftentimes into vil[gap] wickednesse. Io[gap]. 16. 2. Acts 26. 9. Phil. 3. 6. It is therefore only a subordinate rule, so far of force, as it is directed by the Word of God. Hence an erring Conscience hath not that power to bind, that we are simply bound to follow the judgement of such a Conscience. For we ought never to content our selves, till our Conscience be certainly informed in those things which concerne our duty; although in this sence it may be said to bind, because against such a Conscience, while such, we are to doe nothing.

Qu. 9. What is to be done when the Conscience is in doubt?

21. Ans. If the Conscience doe doubt whether the action be lawfull we ought to abstaine from that action, till we be certain concerning it. Ro. 14. 23.

Qu. 10. What if the Conscience be in a perplexity, so that it thinks it a sin aswell to abstain[gap] from the action as to doe it?

22. Ans. Out of the nature of the thing it selfe, and of the Conscience considered by it selfe, such a case cannot fall out: for it cannot be that the judgement of the Conscience should at the same time assent to both parts of the contradiction.

Qu. 11. What is to be done when the Conscience is troubled with scruples?

23. The conscience is then said to be troubled with scruples when it doth give assent to one part of the question being hereunto induced by sufficient arguments, but yet in some sort troubled with the objections of the other side, which it cannot easily answer. Such kind of doubts (if it may be) ought by a certaine judgement to be laid downe; but if this cannot be such an imperfection of judgement (in asmuch as it doth not hinder assent by a doubtefull wavering, but only make that assent to be more weake) is no just cause to make us forbeare that, which such an assent leads us unto. Deut. 13. 1. 2. 3. 1 Kings. 13. 21▪

Q[gap]. 12. How ought a man to carry himselfe between contrary opinions, when he is uncertaine of the truth?

24. Ans. First, it is not enough for a good conscience to adhere to the authority of men, though they be learned and godly; because the conscience is not by it selfe to be subjected to the judgement of man: Neither hath any humane testimony, sufficient strength to argue Gods approbation of a thing▪ or to excuse in Gods presence. Rom. 14 12. 1 Cor. 8. 10.

25. Secondly, every one ought to follow that opinion, which (after due diligence to search the truth) he judgeth to be improbable out of the nature of the thing and the Law of God compared together, whether that probability appeare to him by his owne search, or by the helpe of others. 1 Cor. 8. 4. with 7.

26. Thirdly, if after due inquisition made the minde be wholly in suspence, whether the action be lawfull or unlawfull,

then that doubtfullnesse remaining, the safer part is to be chosen. Now that is the safer part in which there is no danger of sinning, and in this case he sinneth not, who simply abstaines from such an action, so that he condemnes not another which doth it. Rom. 14. 5. with 4. 23. We are therefore to abstaine from all such things, about which (after due diligence used) the conscience is in doubt, whether they be lawfull or no. They which doe otherwise, doe not only expose themselves to the danger of sinning in the very action it selfe, but without doubt doe [gap]in in the very manner of doeing.

Qu. 13. When a man doth apprehend, that, of two sins he must needs commit one, which is he to choose?

27. Ans. The precepts of God doe never so jarre of their own nature, that it is necessary to break one of them by sin: For when a lesse Commandement is neglected, that a greater may be observed, that lesse Commandament doth cease for the while to bind; so that they who upon such an occasion neglect it, are altogether blamelesse, that is, sin not. Math. 12. 5. 7.

28. For that usuall saying, that of two evills we must chuse the least, it is meant of evills of punishment, not of sin.

29. A man ought therefore alwayes to have a fixed resolution to eschew and avoid all sin.

30. There is no necessity of feare, danger, or outward constraint whereby a man can be excused, if he doe upon that pretence commit the least sin.

31. Neither indeed is there properly any constraint, when any thing is done with certain counsell, and the will (which cannot be compelled) induced by feare, consenteth to the actinn.

32. Thirdly, if any through weaknesse be brought to those straits, that he thinks he must needs of two sins commit one, the conscience cannot give judgement in such a case, because that deliberation is made against the conscience. Yet it cannot be doubted, but he sins lesse, which commits the lesser sin.