QVestion, 1. Wherein consists the nature of a thing indifferent?

1. Ans. First, adiaphorum (for so it is called) according to the interpretation of the word, is that which hath such a respect to two extreams, that it is inclined no more to the one, then the other, and in the same sense is called an indifferent thing, or a thing of a middle nature.

2. Secondly, now although according to this large acceptation of the word, any middle thing may be called indifferent or adiaphorum, yet the word doth commonly signify only such a thing as is in the middle betweene morall good and evill.

3. Thirdly, the middle betweene good and evill is either, 1. of meere deniall (as they terme i[gap]) in which there is neither good nor evill to be found; and so all substances, whether they be things naturall or artificiall, are middle things or indifferent: or it is, 2. a middle of participation, which doth so far agree with both extreams, as the extreams agree betweene themselves; and thus no substances are properly things middle and indifferent by themselves, because none of them are either good or evill, but only actions, and dispositions to actions.

4. Fourthly, such actions therefore as are neither commanded nor forbidden, and that be in their owne nature neither points of obedience, or disobedience, are indifferent or middle.

Qu. 2. Whether there be any actions indifferent in regard of their kind?

5. Ans. First, this may be understood two wayes: either that indifferency be of the specificall nature of any action, which is false: or that the common nature of an action should have an indifferent respect to good or evill, which is true.

6. Secondly, there is therefore no action of its own nature so indifferent, but by circumstances it may be made good, or evill; but there be divers actions which in their common and bare nature, before they be as it were clothed with circumstances, doe include in themselves no goodnesse or badnesse; as, to eat, to drink, to take a journey, to walke, &c.

Qu. 3. Whether indifferent actions differ nothing among themselves, but are all equally distant from good and evill?

7. Ans. In their owne intrinsecall nature they differ nothing at all; but yet there are some▪ which for the most part have evill circumstances annexed to them, and so bend more toward evill, and have an evill name, as to doe the worke of an accuser, the office of an hangman, &c. Some there be also which for the most part have good circumstances, and so bend toward good, and have a good name, as, to till the ground▪ to follow our study diligently▪ &c.

Qu. 4. Whether doe things indifferent make any thing for order and comlinesse?

8. Ans. Whatsoever it is that of its owne nature serves for order or comlinesse, or edification, is not indifferent: for when they doe participate the nature of goodnesse, they are not in the middle betwixt good and bad. And when they produce good, they must needs have some good force and efficacy in them: every thing brings forth its like.

Qu. 5 Whether do indifferent things cease to be indifferent when any certain thing is set down concerning them, by such as are in authority?

9. Ans. Nothing ought to be commanded, but that which is good, nor to be forbidden, but what is evill; That which is indifferent cannot simply, absolutely, and for ever be either injoyned or forbidden; but commanded, as it drawes neer to good, forbidden, as it approacheth to evill.

Qu. 6. Whether any singular and individuall action be indifferent?

10. Ans. First, there be some actions which though they be actions of a man, yet they are not humane actions; such are those which proceed from imagination only, and not from deliberate reason, as the rubbings of mens hands,

[gap]o scratch the head or beard, to take up a straw, &c. while we are thinking of something else: these actions are not morally good or evill, they want that which is required to make them so, namely counsell and deliberation. For although a man may sin by those actions, as if in time of Prayer he suffer his imagination to wander; and do give way to such toyings as those. Yet these actions considered in themselves are neither good nor evill. It is true these motions are subject to the command of mans will, but yet they are so subject, that they may be exercised without any precedent act of reason: Neither are we bound any further by reason to prevent them; but only so far that they hinder not the duties we are about. So for moving of the eye lids, reason and the will have power to moderate them, but it is not worth the while to take notice how often we winke, if so be we take heed that in such things nothing be done which is undecent, [gap]r against our duty.

11. Secondly, every action which proceeds from deliberate reason, and is properly called humane, considered singularly and in the individuall, as it is an exercised action, is either good or evill. For such a kind of action is either ordered to a good end, or it is not; If it be, [gap]hen it hath the nature of a good action, if other circumstance[gap] be correspondent; if it be not ordered to a good end, it is an evill action because it wants the perfection, which ought to be in it, and is not according to its rule.

12. Yet is not required to the goodnesse of naturall action, that it be alwayes actually and explicitly referred to the due [gap]nd, so that this be done implicity and vertually; because reason in that exercise of such kinde of actions, may often with more profit be conversant about those objects.

13. Thirdly, some one or two circumstances of an human action may be indifferent, as if one scholler be speaking with another, it is sometimes indifferent whether they use the Latine tongue, or any other. But their talke taken with all thee circumstances is necessarily either good or bad: the reason is, because the determination of an action doth not depend upon one circumstance apart, but upon all jointly together.

14. Fourthly, there may be some singular action in which there is no goodnesse speciall to be found, which may not be found in another, and so, that at this time we doe this or that, rather then another thing, therein is oftetimes neither good nor evill. Opportunity, or the suggestion of our minds without any respect of morall goodnesse, may be of weight sufficient to make the determination▪

15. Fifthly, although therefore there b[gap] no singular actions humane, that is neither good, nor evill; yet there are divers, which singularly and in comparison of others are neither necessary nor unlawfull. For as the C[gap]rver hath oftentimes no certain reason, why he rather makes this image, then that: yet if he make any, it is necessary that he either follow the rules of his Art, and make a good one, or faile and so make a bad one. So it is in many singular actions of men, which in respect of the exercise, have no proper reason beside the inclination of the mind, but in the doing they are either good or bad.