QUest. 1. Whether in a good or evill act there be necessarily required an inclination of the will?

1. Ans. First, the will is the principle and the first cause of all humane operation in regard of the exercise of the act. For we therefore doe this or that rather then another thing, because we will; As God himselfe is said to do all things of his owne Will. Eph. 1. 11. So also doth man who is made after the Image of God. The first cause therefore of the goodnesse or sinfulnesse of any Act of man, is in the Will.

2. Secondly, liberty also of election is formally in the will: that therefore any one doth yield obedience to God, or refuseth to do so, proceeds from the will.

3. Lastly, our obedience stands in our conformity to the

Will of God▪ and the disobedience, in our unconformity thereunto. Now our conformity with the Will of God is first and principally in our will, Apoc. 2. 6.

Qu. 2. What are those things which make an action to become not voluntary.

4. Ans. Nothing at all but either absolute violence of constraint, or chance which could not be foreseen, or prevented. And for such things as are done through absolute violence or meere chance, they have neither the nature of Obedience or sin. As if one should be forced to offer incense or bow the knee before an Idoll, or should meerely by chance kill another, D[gap]ut. 19. 56▪ 10.

Q. 3. What are we to thinke of those actions which are done through ignorance?

5. Ans. First, that ignorance which is in some sort a cause of the action (so that if a man knew what he did he would not Doe it) if it be unvoluntary both in it selfe and in its cause, that is, not affected, nor procured, nor tolerated, doth make the action meerly casuall and unvoluntary and so excuseth from sin.

6. Secondly, ignorance of the Law doth nevev wholly excuse, because all men are bound to know the Will of God: but yet it doth somewhat lessen the fault if it be not affected, 1 Tim. 1. 13. Iohn 4. 41. Acts 3. 17. But if it be affected it is of it selfe a sin and so doth not diminish but rather increase the guilt of other sins, 2 Pet. 3. 5.

7. Thirdly, an Ignorance of the fact if a man [gap]ath used such diligence as he ought, doth excuse him▪ because by such an ignorance the fact is made casuall. So Iacob being deceived lay with Leah whom he tooke to be Rachell, Gen. 29. But if due diligence have not beene used, ignorance of the fact, doth not altogether excuse although it do somewhat lessen the fault. And this seemes to have beene the case of Abimil[gap]ch Gen. 20. 5.

Qu. 4. What are we to judge of those actions which are done through feare.

8. Ans. First, feare doth not simply make an action unvoluntary: but doth considering the circumstances of time

and place, &c. impell a man to will this or that. As appeares in that knowne instance of the merchant, who is induced through feare of death to throw away his merchandize into the Sea. Feare therefore doth never wholly excuse from sin: yea more, feare it self is oft a sin forbidden, and a cause too of most grievous sins▪ Mat. 10. 26. Phil. 1. 28. 1 Pet. 3. 14. Apoc. 21. 8. Although therefore a great feare or terrour such as is wont sometimes to trouble even a man of good courage before men, be accounted for a good excuse, and is of force to make contracts done through feare void, yet before God such an excuse will not be taken.

9. Secondly, yet that sin which is committed through some strong terrour, is not so grievous (if other things be alike) as that which is committed of the voluntary inclination of the will without any such feare of danger, because in feare the temptation is stronger: and such a fall, if repentance follow, doth proceed not so much from malice, as from infirmity and perturbation. And this was Peters case when he denied Christ.

Qu. 5. What are we to judge of those actions which are done through concupiscense.

10. Ans. Concupiscense doth not make an act cease to be voluntary, neither doth it indeed diminish the voluntarinesse of it in respect of the act, but increaseth it rather. For he that doth a thing out of concupiscense, hath a will strongly inclined to that which it doth, as is appeares either delightfull or profitable to him, if therefore the concupiscense be fixt the sin's the greater. as it was in [gap]das, who betrayed Christ out of coverousnesse of [gap].

Qu. 6. What are we to judge of those actions which are done through inadvertency▪ or [gap]hrough not minding of what we doe?

11. Ans. Inadvertency or mindlesnesse is of the same nature with ignorance: because it di[gap]ers not from it, but only as the privation of an act doth differ from the privation of a disposition. Inadvertency therefore is it selfe often a fin and is opposed to watchfulnesse. At such a time therefore as wee are bound to watch and attend, if we watch not

and attend, not we may be rightly said to will this watchfulnesse, not to will it, yea to will our inadvertency, Esa. 1. 3.

12. Againe this inadvertency is sometimes voluntarily chosen in it selfe. Amos 6. 10. Sometimes it is voluntarily chosen in its cause. Mat. 13. [gap].

Qu. 7. How are we said to will a thing in its cause?

13. Ans. When we doe wil something upon which an other thing followes. He which will be present at immoderatdrinkings may be said to will drunkennesse. He which willingly gives himselfe to sleepe, and idlenesse, may be accounted guilty of a willing neglect of the duties of his calling-He which will please men, may be said with his will to dis[gap] please God. Gal. 1. 10.