§. 16. Of a wiues ſpeech of her husband

in his abſence. to Obiect. It is indeed commendable for wiues to ſeeke their husbands conſent as ſhe did, but where ſuch conſent cannot be had, it is not neceſſary.

§. 16. Of a wiues ſpeech of her husband

in his abſence.

The reuerence which a wife beareth to her husband, muſt further be manifeſted by her ſpeeches of him in his abſence. So did Sarah manifeſt her reuerence, and ſo muſt all ſuch as deſire to be accounted the daughters of Sarah. The Church ſpeaking of her Spouſe, doth it with as great reuerence, as if ſhe had ſpoken to him. It was for honour and reuerence ſake, that the Virgin Mary called Ioſeph the Father of Ieſus, when ſhe ſpake of him.

This ſheweth that a wiues reuerend ſpeeches in preſence of

her husband and to his face, are not in flatterie to pleaſe him and fawne vpon him, but in ſinceritie to pleaſe God and performe her dutie.

Contrary therefore to their dutie deale they, who in preſence can afford the faireſt and meek eſt ſpeeches that may be to their husbands face, but behinde their backs ſpeake moſt reproachfully of them.

§. 17. Of a wiues obedience in generall.

Hitherto of a wiues reuerence, it followeth to ſpeake of her obedience: The firſt law that euer was giuen to woman ſince her fall, laid vpon her this dutie of Obedience to her husband, in theſe words, Thy deſire ſhall be to thine husband, and he ſhall rule ouer thee. How can an husband rule ouer a wife, if ſhe obey not him? The principall part of that ſubmiſſion which in this text, and in many other places is required of a wife, conſiſteth in obedience: and therefore it is expreſly commended vnto wiues in the example of Sarah who obeyed Abraham. Thus by Obedience doth the Church manifeſt her ſubiection to Chriſt.

The place wherein God hath ſet an husband; namely, to be an head; the authoritie which he hath giuen vnto him, to be a Lord and Maſter; the duty which he requireth of him to rule, doe all require obedience of a wife. Is not obedience to be yeelded to an Head, Lord, and Maſter? Take away all authoritie from an husband, if ye exempt a wife from obedience.

Contrary is the ſtoutneſſe of ſuch wiues as muſt haue their own will, and doe what they liſt, or elſe all ſhall be out of quiet. Their will muſt be done, they muſt rule and ouer-rule all, they muſt command not only children and ſeruants, but husbands alſo, if at leaſt the husband will be at peace. Looke into families, obſerue the eſtate and condition of many of them, and then tell me if theſe things be not ſo. If an husband be a man of courage, and ſeeke to ſtand vpon his right, and maintaine his authoritie by requiring obedience of his wife, ſtrange it is to behold what an hurly burly ſhe will make in the houſe: but if he be a milke-ſop, and baſely yeeld vnto his wife, and ſuffer her to rule, then, it may be, there ſhall be ſome outward quiet. The ground hereof is an ambitious and proud humour in

women, who muſt needs rule, or elſe they thinke themſelues ſlaues. But let them thinke as they liſt: aſſuredly herein they thwart Gods ordinance, peruert the order of nature, deface the image of Chriſt, ouerthrow the ground of all dutie, hinder the good of the family, become an ill patterne to children and ſeruants, lay themſelues open to Satan, and incurre many other miſchiefes which cannot but follow vpon the violating of this maine duty of Obedience, which if it be not performed, how can other duties be expected?

§. 18. Of the caſes wherein a wife hath power to order things of the houſe without her husbands conſent.

A wiues obedience requireth

Submiſſion.

Contentment.

Submiſſion in yeelding to her husbands minde and will.

Contentment in reſting ſatisfied and content with his eſtate and abilitie.

That Submiſſion conſiſteth in two things.

Firſt, in abſtaining from doing things againſt her husbands minde.

Secondly, in doing what her husband requireth. The former of theſe requireth that a wife haue her husbands conſent for the things which ſhe doth. For the better cleering whereof we are to conſider,

1. What kinde of husbands they muſt be whoſe conſent is required.

2. How many waies his conſent may be giuen.

3. What are the things whereabout his conſent is to be expected.

For the firſt, as on the one ſide it oft falleth out that a wife, prouident, and religious man is maried to a fooliſh woman, a very ideot, that hath no vnderſtanding, of whom there can be no queſtion, but that ſuch a wife is to doe nothing of her ſelfe, and of her owne head, but altogether to be ordered by her husband: So on the other ſide, it oft falleth out that a wiſe, vertuous, and gratious woman, is maried to an husband deſtitute of vnderſtanding, to a very naturall (as we ſay) or a [gap]renzy man, or to one made very blockiſh, and ſtupid, vnfit to manage his affaires through ſome diſtemper, wound, or ſickneſle.

In ſuch a caſe the whole gouernment lieth vpon the wife, ſo as her husbands conſent is not to be expected.

Queſt. What if the husband be a wicked and prophane man, and ſo blinded and ſtupified in his ſoule, doth not this ſpirituall blindneſſe and blockiſhneſe giue a religious wife as great libertie as naturall ſtupiditie?

Anſw. No verily: For S. Peter exhorteth faithfull wiues that were maried to Infidell husbands to be ſubiect to them, and that in feare.

The reaſon is cleare: For ſpirituall blindneſſe diſableth not from ciuill gouernment: indeed nothing that ſuch a man doth is acceptable to God, or auailable to his owne ſaluation; but yet it may be profitable to man: a wicked man may be prouident enough for wife, children, and whole family in outward temporall things.

Againe, it oft falleth out, that an husband is a long time farre off abſent from the houſe: ſometimes by reaſon of his calling, as an Ambaſſadour, Souldier, or Mariner; ſometimes alſo careleſly or wilfully neglecting houſe, goods, wife, children and all: and in his abſence hath left no order for the ordering of things at home: in this caſe alſo there is no queſtion, but that the wife hath power to diſpoſe matters without her husbands conſent: prouided that ſhe obſerue thoſe rules of Gods word concerning iuſtice, equitie, truth and mercie, which an husband in his diſpoſing of them ought to obſerue.

The firſt of theſe caſes declareth an impotencie in the huſband: the other an impoſſibilitie for him to order matters: wherefore the wife being next to the husband, the power of ordering things is diuolued on her: ſhe is not bound to haue his conſent.

§. 19. Of diuers kindes of conſent.

II. A conſent may be generall or particular. A generall conſent is giuen, when without diſtinct reſpect to this or that particular, libertie is granted to a wife by her husband to doe all things as ſeemeth good in her owne eyes. That excellent good wife, and notable good houſe-wife that is ſet forth by the Wiſe-man, had ſuch a conſent. For firſt, it is ſaid, The heart of her husband truſteth in her; and then it is inferred, that

ſhe ordereth all the things of the houſe, whereof many particulars are there ſpecified. Whence I gather, that her husband obſeruing her to be a godly, wiſe, faithfull, and induſtrious woman, gaue her power and liberty to doe in the houſe-hold affaires, what ſhe thought good, (he being a publike magiſtrate, for he was knowne in the gates, ſitting among the Elders of the land) and accordingly ſhe vſed her liberty.

A particular conſent is that which is giuen to one or more particular things, as that conſent which Abraham gaue to Sarah about Hagar; and that which Elkanah gaue to Hanna about tarrying at home till her childe was weined.

This particular conſent may be expreſſed or implied. An expreſſed conſent is when the husband manifeſteth his good liking by word, writing, meſſage, or ſigne, and that whether his conſent be asked (as was noted in the example of Elkanah) or freely offered.

An implicit conſent, when by any probable coniecture it may be gathered that the husbands will is not againſt ſuch a thing, though he haue not manifeſted his minde concerning that very particular. This implicit conſent may be gathered either by his ſilence when he is preſent to ſee a thing done, or otherwiſe hath knowledge thereof: or elſe when he is abſent, by his former cariage or diſpoſition in other like caſes. The Scripture accounteth an husbands ſilence, when he knoweth a thing and may, but doth not forbid it, to be a conſent: as in the caſe of a wiues vow. For any thing we read to the contrary the Shunemite had no other conſent to prepare a chamber for the Prophet, and to goe vnto him, then her husbands ſilence, and not forbidding it when he knew it.

As for the other kinde of implicit conſent, it may be ſet forth in this following inſtance: ſuppoſe a good wife hath an husband whom ſhe knoweth by his former cariage and diſpoſition to be a pittifull and charitable man, taking all occaſions to ſhew mercy, and in his abſence there falleth out a fit and needfull occaſion of ſhewing mercy; if ſhe take that occaſion to ſhew mercy, ſhe hath an implicit conſent, for ſhe may well thinke that if her husband knew it he would approue what ſhe doth. It is to be ſuppoſed that Annah vpon ſome ſuch ground vowed her childe to God.

For it is not likely that ſhe who would not tarry at home to weine her childe without her husbands conſent, would much leſſe vow him to the Lord (which was a farre greater matter) without ſome perſwaſion of her husbands good liking thereof. Now that a wife may ſhew ſhe dealeth vprightly in this caſe vpon a true perſwaſion of her heart concerning her husbands minde, ſhe ought (when conueniently ſhe can) to make known to her husband what ſhe hath done: as without all queſtion Annah did; and ſo much may be gathered out of theſe words which Elkanah vttered to Annah,

the Lord eſtabliſh his word.

§. 20. Of the things whereabout a wife muſt haue her huſbands conſent.

The things whereabout an husbands conſent is to be expected, are ſuch as he by vertue of his place and authoritie hath power to order: as for example, ordering and diſpoſing the goods, cattell, ſeruants, and children of the family, entertaining ſtrangers; yea, alſo ordering euen his wiues going abroad, and making of vowes, with the like: now then diſtinctly to lay downe a wiues dutie in this firſt branch of obedience, it is this:

A wife muſt doe nothing which appertaineth to her husband authoritie ſimply without, or directly againſt his conſent. Doe not theſe words of that old law (thy deſire ſhall be to thy husband) imply as much? I deny not but that there may be ſundry things proper and peculiar to a wife, wherein I will not reſtraine her libertie: and therefore I vſe this phraſe (which appertaineth to her husbands authoritie.) And I grant the forenamed generall and implicit conſent, to be a true conſent, ſo as there needeth not an expreſſe particular conſent for euery thing, and therefore I haue added theſe clauſes (ſimply without, or directly againſt conſent.)

That is done ſimply without conſent which is done without all warrant from the husband, and that ſo couertly as ſhe is afraid it ſhould come to his notice, imagining he would by no meanes like it: As Rahels taking her fathers idols without all conſent of Iaakob.

That is done directly againſt conſent which is expreſly forbidden and diſclaimed by the husband.

But to deſcend to the particulars before mentioned: Firſt concerning the goods of the family: It is a queſtion controuerted whether the wife haue power to diſpoſe them without or againſt the husbands conſent.

Before I determine the queſtion, I thinke it needfull to declare, 1. What goods, 2. What occaſion of giuing the queſtion is about.

§. 21. Of the things which a wife may diſpoſe without her husbands conſent.

1. For the goods, ſome are proper and peculiar to the wife: others are common. Goods proper to the wife are ſuch as before mariage ſhe her ſelfe, or her friends except from the huſband to her ſole and proper vſe and diſpoſing, whereunto he alſo yeeldeth: or ſuch as after mariage he giueth vnto her to diſpoſe as ſhe pleaſe: ſuppoſe it be ſome rent, annuity, fees, [gap]ailes, or the like.

Theſe kindes of goods are exempted out of the queſtion in hand; the wife hath liberty to diſpoſe them as ſhe pleaſe without any further conſent then ſhe had by vertue of her hausbands former grant.

To theſe I may referre other goods, but of another nature, namely ſuch as ſome friend of hers, ſuppoſe father, mother, brother, or any other, obſeruing her husband to be a very [gap]ard man, not allowing ſufficient for her ſelfe, much leſſe to diſtribute on charitable vſes, ſhall giue vnto her to diſpoſe as [gap]e pleaſe, charging her not to let her husband know thereof. How becauſe it is in the power of a free doner to order his [gap]ift as he pleaſe, and becauſe he ſo ordereth this gift as he will not haue her husband know of it, I doubt not but ſhe may of her ſelfe according to the doners minde without her huſbands conſent, diſpoſe ſuch goods. She is herein but as a [gap]offee in truſt.

Againe of common goods ſome are ſet forth by the huſband to be ſpent about the family, other he reſerueth for a [gap]ocke, or to lay forth as he himſelfe ſhall ſee occaſion.

Concerning thoſe which are ſet forth to be ſpent, I doubt [gap]ot but the wife hath power to diſpoſe them; neither is ſhe [gap]ound to aske any further conſent of her husband. For it

is the wiues place and dutie to guide or gouerne the houſe, by vertue whereof, prouiding ſufficiently for the family, ſhe may, as ſhe ſeeth good occaſion, of ſuch goods as are ſet apart to be ſpent, diſtribute to poore, or otherwiſe.

This I haue noted for ſuch tender conſciences as thinke they cannot giue a bit of bread, or ſcarp of meat to a poore body, or make a meſſe of broth or caudle for a ſicke body, except they firſt aske their husbands conſent.

Prouided that if her husband expreſly forbid this liberty, ſhe take it not except neceſſity require it.

But our queſtion is concerning ſuch goods as the husband hath not ſet apart, but reſerued to his owne diſpoſing.

§. 22. Of a wiues liberty in extraordinary matters.

II. For the occaſion of diſpoſing goods it may be ordinary or extraordinary. Extraordinary for the good of the husband himſelfe, and others in the family, or ſuch as are out of the family. If there fall out an extraordinary occaſion whereby the wife by diſpoſing the goods without or againſt the conſent of her husband may bring a great good to the family, or preuent and keepe a great miſchiefe from it, ſhe is not to ſtay for his conſent; inſtance the example of Abigail. Thus a faithfull prouident wife obſeruing her husband to riot, and to ſpend all he can get in carding, dicing, and drinking, may without his conſent lay vp what goods ſhe can for her husbands, her own, her childrens, and whole houſholds good. This is no part of diſobedience, but a point wherein ſhe may ſhew her ſelfe a great good helpe vnto her husband; for which end a wife was firſt made.

Concerning ſuch as are out of the family, if they be in great need, and require preſent releefe, though the wife know her husband to be ſo hard-hearted, as he will not ſuffer her to releeue ſuch an one, yet without his conſent ſhe may releeue him. The ground of this and other like caſes is that rule laid downe by the Prophets, and by Chriſt himſelfe, viz. I will haue mercie and not ſacrifice. If God in caſe of mercie diſpenſeth with a dutie due to himſelfe, will he not much more diſpenſe with a dutie due to an husband?

§. 23. Of a wiues

reſtraint in diſpoſing goods without conſent of her husband: and of the ground of that reſtraint.

Out of all theſe things thus premiſed I gather the true ſtate of the queſtion in controuerſie concerning the power of wiues in diſpoſing the goods of the family to be this,

Whether a wife may priuily and ſimply without, or openly and directly againſt her husbands conſent diſtribute ſuch common goods of the family as her husband reſerueth to his owne diſpoſing, there being no extraordinary neceſſity?

The moſt ancient and common anſwer vnto this queſtion hath beene negatiue, namely, that a wife hath not power ſo to doe: whereunto I for my part ſubſcribe.

The ground of this anſwer is taken from that primary law of the wiues ſubiection, Thy deſire ſhall be vnto thine husband. How is her deſire ſubiect to her husband, if in the caſe propounded ſhe ſtand not vpon his conſent? It is further confirmed both by the forenamed, and alſo by all other proofes that might be produced out of the Scripture concerning the ſubiection of wiues vnto their husbands. If in ordering the goods of the family ſhe yeeld not ſubiection, wherein ſhall ſhe yeeld it?

Againſt this ground-worke ſome obiect that the ſame law of ſubiection is impoſed vpon a younger brother in the very ſame words, and yet a younger brother was not therby bound to haue his elder brothers conſent in diſpoſing his goods.

Anſw. The law of the regality (as I may ſo ſpeake) and preheminency of the firſt borne was vnder thoſe words ordained: and therfore a younger brother was made a ſubiect to his elder, while he remained in the family, as a ſonne to the father. The elder brother was as a lord ouer his other brothers: whereupon when Iſaak conferred the right of the firſt borne vpon Iaakob (thinking he had beene his eldeſt ſonne Eſau) he vſed theſe words, Be lord ouer thy brethren, and let thy

mothers ſonnes bow downe to thee. Which being ſo, queſtionleſſe the younger brother might not ſimply without or directly againſt the elder brothers conſent diſpoſe the goods of the family: ſo as this obiection more ſtrongly eſtabliſheth the forenamed argument.

Againe it is obiected that that old law is to be expounded of weighty matters.

Anſw. The Apoſtle who was guided by the ſpirit of the law-maker, extendeth that law to euery thing: But is not this matter of diſpoſing goods a weighty matter? The conſequences which I ſhall by and by note to follow hereupon will ſhew it to be a matter of moment.

§. 24. Of the example of the Shunemite in asking her huſbands conſent.

As another reaſon may be alleged the Shunemites patterne who asked her husbands conſent before ſhe prepared the things that were thought meet for the Prophets entertainment: and before ſhe vſed the things which were meet for her iourney.

Obiect. It is indeed commendable for wiues to ſeeke their husbands conſent as ſhe did, but where ſuch conſent cannot be had, it is not neceſſary.

Anſw. This example being grounded vpon a law (as we ſhewed before) it doth not only declare what may be done, but alſo what ought to be done. And if a wife be bound to haue her husbands conſent for doing of a thing, by conſequence it followeth that ſhe is bound from doing it, without her huſbands conſent.

2. Anſw. They that except againſt this reaſon taken from example, vſe themſelues the like reaſon in other points, as the examples of Abigail, Ioanna, and Suſanna for the contrarie.

2. Obiect. In the Shunemites example there was more then a mercifull releefe of the Prophet, namely bringing him into the houſe to diet and to lodge, wherein the husband muſt haue a chiefe ſtroake.

Anſw. The word of God maketh not that difference betwixt releeuing and entertaining: it extendeth a wiues ſubiection to euery thing: wherefore the husband hath a chiefe ſtroake as well in the one, as in the other.