QUEST. XIIII. Whether or no the people make a Person their King conditionally, or absolutely? and whether there be such a thing as a Covenant tying the King no lesse then his subjects? (3) to QUEST. XV. Whether or no the King be Vnivocally, or only Analogically, and by proportion a father?
QUEST. XIIII. Whether or no the people make a Person their King conditionally, or absolutely? and whether there be such a thing as a Covenant tying the King no lesse then his subjects? (3) to QUEST. XV. Whether or no the King be Vnivocally, or only Analogically, and by proportion a father?
QUEST. XIIII. Whether or no the people make a Person their King conditionally, or absolutely? and whether there be such a thing as a Covenant tying the King no lesse then his subjects? (3)
4. Arg. If the people be so given to the King, that they are committed to him as a pledge, oppignorated in his hand, as a pupill to a Tutor, as a distressed man to a Patron, as a flocke to a Shepheard; and so as they remaine the Lords Church, his people, his flocke, his portion, his inheritance, his vineyard, his redeemed ones, then they cannot be given to the King as Oxen and Sheepe, that are freely gifted to a man; or as a gift or summe of gold or silver, that the man to whom they are given may use, so that he cannot commit a fault against the oxen, sheepe, gold or mony, that is given to him, how ever he shall dispose of them.
But the people are given to the King to be tutored and protected of him, so as they remaine the people of God, and in covenant with him, and if the people were the goods of fortune (as Heathens say) he could no more sinne against the people then a man can sin against his gold; now though a man by adoring gold, or by lavish profusion and wasting of gold may sin against God, yet not against gold; nor can he be in any covenant with gold, or under any obligation of either duty or sin to gold, or to livelesse and reasonlesse creatures properly, therefore he may sin in the use of them, and yet not sin against them, but against God. Hence of necessity the King must be under obligation to the Lords people in another manner, then that he should only answer to God, for the losse of men, as if men were worldly goods under his hand, and as if being a King he were now by this Royall Authority priviledged from the best halfe of the law of nature, to wit, from acts of mercy, and truth, and covenant keeping with his brethren.
5. Arg. If a King because a King were priviledged from all covenant obligation to his subjects, then could no Law of men lawfully reach him for any contract violated by him, then he could not be a debtor to his subjects, if he borrowed mony from them, and it were utterly unlawfull either to crave him mony, or to sue him at Law for debts, yet our Civill Lawes of Scotland tyeth the
King to pay his debts, as any other man; yea and King Solomons traffiquing, and buying and selling betwixt him and his owne subjects would seeme unlawfull; for how can a King buy and sell with his subjects if he be under no covenant obligation to men, but to God only. Yea then a King could not marry a wife, for he could not come under a covenant to keepe his body to her only, nor if he committed adultery, could he sin against his wife, because being immediate unto God, and above all obligation to men, he could sin against no covenant made with men, but only against God.
6. If that was a lawfull covenant made by Asa, and the States of Iudah, 2 Chron. 15.13. That whosoever would not seeke the Lord God of their fathers, should be put to death, whether small or great, whether man or woman: this obligeth the King for ought I see, and the Princes, and the people, but it was a lawfull covenant, ergo the King is under a covenant to the Princes and Iudges, as they are to him; it is replyed, If a Master of a Schoole should make a law, whoever shall goe out at the Schoole doores without liberty obtained of the Master, shall be whipped,
it will not oblige the Schoole-master that he shall be whipped, if he goe out at the Schoole doores without liberty; so neither doth this Law oblige the King the supreame Law-giver. Ans. Suppose that the Schollars have no lesse hand and authority magisteriall in making the law, then the Schoole-master, as the Princes of Iudah had a collaterall power with King Asa about that law; it would follow, that the Schoole-master is under the same law. 2. Suppose going out at Schoole doores were that way a morall neglect of studying in the Master, as it is in the Scholars, as the not seeking of God is as hainous a sinne in King Asa, and no lesse deserving death then it is in the people; then should the Law oblige Schoolmaster and Scholler both without exception. 3. The Schoolemaster i[gap] clearely above all lawes of discipline which he imposeth on his Scholars, but none can say that King Asa was clearely above that law of seeking of the Lord God of his fathers. Diodorus Siculus, l. 17. saith, the Kings of Persia were under an oath, and that they might not change the Lawes; and so were the Kings of Egypt and Ethiopia. The Kings of Sparta, which Aristotle calleth just Kings, renew their oath every moneth. Romulus so covenanted with the Senate and People. Carolus V. Austriacus, sweareth he shall not change the Lawes, without the consent of the Electors, nor make new lawes, nor dispose or impledge any thing that belongeth to the Empire. So read
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we, Spec. Saxon. l. 3. Act. 54. and Xenophon Cyriped. l. 8. saith, there was a covenant between Cyrus and the Persians. The nobles are crowned when they crown their King, and exact a speciall Oath of the King. So doth England, Polonia, Spaine, Arragonia, &c. Alberi. Gentilis. Hug. Grotius, prove that Kings are really bound to performe Oathes and contracts to their people; but notwithstanding there be such a covenant, it followeth not from this, saith Arnisaeus, that if the Prince breake his covenant and rule tyrannically, the people shall be free, and the contract or covenant nothing. Ans. The covenant may be materially broken, while the King remaineth King, and the subjects remaine subjects, but when it is both materially and formally declared by the States to be broken, the people must be free from their Allegiance; but of this more hereafter.
Arg. 7. If a Master bind himselfe by an Oath to his servant, he shall not receive such a benefit of such a point of service; if he violate the Oath, his Oath must give his servant Law and right, both to challenge his Master, and he is freed from that point of service; an Army appointeth such a one their Leader and Captaine, but they refuse to doe it, except he sweare he shall not betray them to the enemy, he doth betray them, then must the souldiers be loosed from that contract; if one be appointed Pilate of a ship, and not but by an Oath, if he sell the Passengers to the Turke, they may challenge the Pilate of his Oath; and it is cleare that 1. the estates should refuse to give the Crown, to him who would refuse to governe them according to Gods Law, but should professe that he would make his owne will a Law, therefore the intention of the Oath is clearely conditionall. 2. When the King sweareth the Oath, he is but King in fieri, and so not as King above the States of Kingdomes, now his being King doth not put him in a case above all civill obligation of a King to his subjects, because the matter of the Oath is, that he shall be under them so farre, in regard of the Oath of God.
Arg. 8. If the Oath of God made to the people doe not bind him to the people to governe according to Law, and not according to his will and lust, it should be unlawfull for any to sweare such an Oath, for if a power above law agree essentially to a King as a King, as Royalists hold, he who sweareth such a Oath, should both sweare to be a King to such a people, and should sweare to be no King in respect by his Oath he should renounce that which is essentiall to a King.
Arnisaeus objecteth; Ex particularibus non potest colligi conclusio universalis, some few of the Kings, as David & Ioash, made a covenant with the people; it followeth not that this was a universall law. Ans. Yea, the covenant is Deut. 17. and must be a rule to all; if so just a man as David was limited by a covenant, then all the rest also.
QUEST. XV. Whether or no the King be Vnivocally, or only Analogically, and by proportion a father?
IT is true, Aristotle Polit. l. 3. c. 11. saith, That the Kingly power is a fatherly power; and Iustin. Novell 12. c. 2. Pater quamvis legum contemptor, quamvis impius sit, tamen pater est. But I doe not beleeve that, as Royalists say, that the Kingly power is essentially and univocally that same with a paternall or fatherly power; or that Adam as a father, was as a father and King, and that suppose Adam should live in Noahs daies, that by divine institution and without consent of the Kingdomes and communities on earth, Adam hoc ipso, and for no other reason but because he was a father, should also be the universall King, and Monarch of the whole world; or suppose Adam were living to this day; that all Kings that hath been since, and now are, held their Crownes of him, and had no more Kingly power then inferiour Iudges in Scotland have under our soveraigne King Charles, for so all that hath been, and now are lawfull Kings should be unjust usurpers; for if fatherly power be the first and native power of commanding, it is against nature that a Monarch who is not my father by generation, should take that power from me, and be a King over both me and my children.
But I assert, that though the Word warrant us to esteem Kings fathers, Esa. 49.23. Jud. 5.7. Gen. 20. v. 2. yet are not they essentially and formally fathers by generation, Num. c. 11. v. 12. Have I conceived all this people? have I begotten them? and yet are they but fathers metaphorically; 1. By office, because they should care for them as fathers doe for children, and so come under the name of fathers in the fifth Commandement; and therefore rigorous and cruell Rulers are Leopards and Lyons, and Wolves, Ezech. 22.27. Zeph. 3.3. If then tyrannous Judges be not essentially and formally Leopards and Lyons, but only metaphorically, neither can Kings be formally fathers. 2. Not only Kings, but all Iudges are fathers in defending
their subjects from violence and the sword, and fighting the Lords battells for them, and counselling them. If therefore Royalists argue rightly, A King is essentially a father, and, fatherly power and royall power are of the same essence and nature; As therefore he who is once a father, is ever a father, and his children cannot take up armes against him to resist him, for that is unnaturall, & repugnant to the 5. Commandement: So he who is once a King, is evermore a King, and it is repugnant to the fifth Commandement to resist him with armes. It is answered, that the Argument presupposeth that Royall power, and Fatherly power is one and the same in nature, whereas they differ in nature, and are only one by analogie and proportion: for so Pastors of the Word are called fathers, 1 Cor. 4.15. it will not follow, that once a Pastor, evermore a Pastor; and that if therefore Pastors turne wolves, and by hereticall doctrine corrupt the flock, they cannot be cast out of the Church. 3. A father, as a father, hath not power of life and death over his sonnes, because, Rom. 13. by divine institution the sword is given by God to Kings and Iudges: and if Adam had had any such power to kill his sonne Cain, for the killing of his brother Abel, it had been given to him by God as a power politike, different from a fatherly power: for a fatherly power, as such, is formally to conserve the life of the childaen, and not to take away the life: yea, and Adam, though he had never sinned, nor any of his posteritie, Adam should have been a perfect father, as he is now indued with all fatherly power that any father now hath; yea should not God have given the sword or power of punishing ill doers, since that power should have been in vaine, if there had been no violence, nor bloodshed, or sinne on the earth: for the power of the sword and of lawfull warre, is given to men now in the state of sinne. 4. Fatherly government and power is from the bosome and marrow of that fountaine law of nature; but Royall power is not from the law of nature, more then Aristocraticall or Democraticall power. D. Ferne saith, Monarchie is not jure divino, (I am not of his mind) nor yet from the law of Nature, but, ductu naturae, by the guidance of nature. Sure it is from a supervenient commandement of God, added to the first law of nature, establishing Fatherly power. 5. Children having their life and first breathings of nature from their parents, must be in a more intire relation from their father, then from their Prince: Subjects have not their Being naturall, but their civill, politique and peaceable well-being from their
Prince. 6. A father is a father by generation, and giving the being of nature to children, and is a naturall head and root, without the free consent and suffrages of his children, and is essentially a father to one childe, as Adam was to one Cain: but a Prince is a Prince by the free suffrages of a community, and cannot be a King to one only, and he is the politique head of a civill Corporation. 7. A father, so long as his children liveth can never leave off to be a father, though he were mad, and furious, though he be the most wicked man on earth. Qui genuit filium non potest non genuisse filium, what is once past cannot by any power be not passed, a father is a father for ever. But by confession of Royalists, as Barclay, Hug. Grotius, and Arnisaeus and others grant, if a King sell his subjects by sea or land to other nations, if he turne a furious Nero, he may be dethroned, and the power that created the King under such expresse conditions, as if the King violate them by his owne consent, he shall be put from the Throne, may cease to be a King, and if a stronger King conquer a King and his subjects, Royalists say the conquerour is a lawfull King; and so the conquered King must also lawfully come downe from his Throne, and turne a lawfull captive sitting in the dust. 8. Learned Polititians, as Bartholomeus Romulus, Defens. part. 1. num. 153. Ioannes de Anania in c. fin. de his qui fil. occid. teach that the father is not obliged to reveale the conspiracy of his son against his Prince, nor is he more to accuse his son, then to accuse himselfe; because the father loveth the sonne better then himselfe. D. Listi quidem. Sect. Fin. quod. met. caus. & D. L. fin. c. de cura furiosi, and certainly a father had rather dye in his own person as choose to dye in his sonnes, in whom he affecteth a sort of immortality, In specie, quando non potest in individuo: but a King doth not love his subjects with a naturall or fatherly love thus; and if the affections differ, the power which secondeth the affection, for the conservation either of being, or well being, must also differ proportionally.
The P. Prelate objecteth against us thus, stealing word by word from Arnisaeus: When a King is elected Soveraigne to a multitude, he is surrogated in the place of a common father, Exod. 20.5. Honour thy father; then as a naturall father receiveth not Paternall right, power, or authority from his sonnes, but hath this from God, and the ordinance of nature, nor can the King have his right from the community. 2. The maxime of the Law is, Surrogatus gaudet privilegiis ejus cui surrogatur, & qui succedit in locum, succedit in jus. The
person surrogated, hath all the Priviledges that he hath, in whose place he succeedeth, he who succeedeth to the place, succeedeth to the right; the adopted sonne, or the bastard who is legittimated, and commeth in the place of the lawfull borne sonne, commeth also in the priviledges of the lawfull borne sonne; a Prince elected commeth to the full possession of the Majesty of a naturall Prince and Father, for Modus acquirendi non tollit naturale jus possidendi (saith Arnisaeus, more fully then the poore Plagiarius) the manner of acquiring any thing taketh not away the naturall possession, for how ever things be acquired, if the title be just, possession is the Law of Nations; then when the King is chosen in place of the father, as the father hath a divine right by nature, so must the King have that same: and seeing the right proprietor (saith the Pamphleting Prelate) had his right by God, by nature, how can it be, but howsoever the designation of the person is from the disordered community, yet the collation of the power is from God immediatly, and from his sacred and inviolable ordinance. And what can be said against the way by which any one elected obtained his right, for seeing God doth not now send Samuells or Elisha's to anoynt or declare Kings, we are in his ordinary providence to conceive the designation of the person is the manifestation of Gods Will, called Voluntas signi, as the Schooles speake, just so as when the Church designeth one to sacred orders.
Ans. 1. He that is surrogated in the place of another, due to him, by a positive Law of man, he hath Law to all the priviledges that he hath in whose place he is surrogated, that is true. He who is made Assignee to an Obligation for a summe of money, hath all the rights that the principall party to whom the Bond or Obligation was made, he who commeth in the place of a Major of a City, of a Captaine in an Army, of a Pilot in a ship, of a Pope, hath all the priviledges and Rights that his predecessors had by Law. Jus succedit juri, persona jure predita personae jure preditae. So the Law, so far as my reading can reach, who professe my selfe a Divine; but that he who succeedeth to the place of a father, by nature, should injoy all the naturall Rights and Priviledges of the person to whom he succeedeth; I beleeve the Law never dreamed it, for then the adopted sonne comming in place of the naturall sonne, hath right to the naturall affection of the father; if any should adopt Maxwell the Prelate, should he love him as the Pursevant of Craile, Maxwell his father loved him? I conceive not; hath the adopted sonne his life, his being, the figure bodily, the manners of the sonne in whose place he is adopted?
or doth he naturally resemble the father as the naturall sonne doth? The Prelate did not read this Law in any approved Iurist, though he did steale the argument from Arnisaeus, and stole the citations of Homer and Aristotle out of him, with a little Metathesis: A naturall sonne is not made a sonne by the consent of Parents, but he is a sonne by generation, so must the adopted sonne be adopted without the free consent and grace of the father adopting: so here the King commeth in the place of a naturall father, but I conceive the Law saith not that the elected King is a King without consent of the subjects, as the naturall father is a father without consent of his sonnes. 2. Nor is it a Law true, as once a father alwaies a father, so once an elected King, alwaies a King, though he sell his subjects, being induced thereunto by wicked Counsellors. 3. If the King have no priviledges, but what the naturall father hath in whose place he commeth, then as the naturall father in a free Kingdome hath not power of life and death over his sonnes, neither hath the King power of life and death over his subjects, this is no Law. 4 This maxime should prove good, if the King were essentially a father, by generation and naturall propagation, but he is onely a father Metaphorically, and by a borrowed speech. A father non generando, sed politicò alendo, tuendo, regendo, therefore an elected Prince commeth not in the full possession of all the naturall power and rights of a naturall father. 2. The P. Prelate speaketh disgracefully of the Church of God, calling it a disorderly community, as if he himselfe were borne of Kings, where as God calleth the King their Shepheard, and the people, Gods stocke, inheritance and people; and they are not a disorderly body by nature, but by sin; in which sense the Prelate may call King, Priest and people, a company of Heires of Gods wrath, except he be an Arminian still, as once he was. 3. If we are in ordinary providence now, because we have not Samuels, and Prophets to anoynt Kings, to hold the designation of a person to be King, to be the manifestation of Gods Will, called voluntas signi, is Treason, for if Scotland and England should designe Maxwell in the place of King Charles our native Soveraigne (an odious comparison) Maxwell should be lawfull King for what is done by Gods Will, called by our Divines (they have it not from Schoolemen, as the Prelate ignorantly saith) his signified will which is our rule, is done lawfully, there can be no greater treason put in print then this.
Source and provenance
Citation: Samuel Rutherford, Lex, Rex (1644), EEBO-TCP A57975, section 13.
Original work: public-domain historical work; EEBO-TCP Phase I keyboarded text released under CC0 1.0
Digital source: EEBO-TCP / Text Creation Partnership
Edition status: Needs verification
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Scripture refs: 2CH.15.13, GEN.20.5, ZEP.3.3, 1CO.4.15, EXO.20.5
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