QUEST. XIX. Whether or no the King be in Dignity and power above the people? (2) to QUEST. XIX. Whether or no the King be in Dignity and power above the people? (3)

QUEST. XIX. Whether or no the King be in Dignity and power above the people? (2)

ergo they have in them Royall power to give to the King; those who limit power, can take away so many degrees of Royall power, and those who can take away power, can give power; and it is unconceiveable, to say that people can put restraint upon a power immediatly comming from God, if Christ immediatly infuse an Apostolick spirit in Paul, mortall men cannot take from him any degrees of that infused spirit; if Christ infuse a spirit of nine degrees, the Church cannot limit it to six degrees only; but Royalists consent that the people may choose a King, upon such conditions to raigne, as he hath Royall power of ten degrees, whereas his Ancester had by birth a power of foureteen degrees. 3. It is not intelligible that the Holy Ghost should give Commandement to the people to make such a man King, Deut. 17.15, 16. and forbid them to make such a man King, if the people had no active influence in making a King at all, but God solely and immediately from Heaven did infuse Royalty in the King without any action of the people, save a naked consent only, and that after God had made the King, they should approve only with an after-act of naked approbation. 4. If the people by other Governours, as by heads of families, and other choise men, governe themselves, and produce these same formall effects of Peace, Justice, Religion, on themselves, which the King doth produce, then is there a power of the same kind, and as excellent as the Royall power in the people, and no reason, but this power should be holden to come immediatly from God, as the Royall Power, for it is every way of the same nature and kind, and as I shall prove, Kings and Iudges differ not in nature and spece, but it is experienced that people doe, by Aristocraticall guides, governe themselves, &c. so then, if God immediatly infuse Royalty, when the people chooseth a King, without any action of the people, then must God immediatly infuse a beame of governing on a Provost and a Bailiffe, when the people choose such, and that

without any action of the people, because all Powers are, in abstracto, from God, Rom. 13.2. and God as immediatly maketh inferiour Iudges, as superiour, Prov. 8.16. and all promotion, even to be a Provost or Major, commeth from God only, as to be a King, except Royalists say, all promotion commeth from the East, and from the West, and not from God, except promotion to the Royall Throne, the contrary whereof is said, Ps. 75.6, 7. 1 Sam. 2.7, 8. not only Kings, but all Judges are Gods, Ps. 82.1, 2. and therefore all must be the same way created and moulded of God, except by Scripture Royalists can shew us a difference. An English Prelate giveth Reasons, why People, who are said to make Kings as efficients, and Authors, cannot unmake them: the one is, because God as chief and sole supreame Moderator maketh Kings, but I say, Christ as the chiefe Moderator, and head of the Church, doth immediatly conferre abilities to a man to be a Preacher, and though by industry the man acquire abilities, yet in regard the Church doth not so much as instrumentally conferre those abilities, they may be said to come from God immediatly, in relation to the Church, who calleth the man to the ministery, yea Royalists, as our excommunicated Prelate learned from Spalato, say that God, at the naked presence of the Churches call, doth immediatly infuse that from Heaven, by which the man is now in Holy Orders, and a Pastor, whereas he was not so before; and yet Prelates cannot deny, but they can unmake Ministers, and have practised this in their unhallowed Courts: and therefore though God immediatly without any action of the people make Kings, this is a weake reason, to prove they cannot unmake them. As for their undeleble character, that Prelates cannot take from a Minister, it is nothing, if the Church may unmake a Minister, though his character goe to prison with him: we seeke no more but to anull the reason. God immediatly maketh Kings and Pastors, ergo no power on earth can unmake them; this consequence is as weake as water. 2. The other cause is, because God hath erected no Tribunall on earth higher then the Kings Tribunall, ergo no power on earth can unmake a King; the Antecedent and consequence is both denyed, and is a begging of the question: for the Tribunall that made the King is above the King. 2. Though there be no Tribunall formally regall and Kingly above the King, yet is there a Tribunall vertuall eminently above him in the case of tyranny, for the States and Princes have a Tribunall above him.

3. To this the constituent cause is of more power and dignity then the effect, and so the people is above the King. The P. Prelate borrowed an answer from Arnisaeus, and Barclay, and other Royalists, and saith, If we knew any thing in Law, or were ruled by reason; Every constituent (saith Arnisaeus and Barclay more accurately then the P. Prelate had a head to transcribe their words) where the constituent hath resigned all his power in the hand of the Prince whom h[gap] constitutes, is of more worth, and power, then he in whose hand they resigne the power: so the proposition is false. The servant who hath constituted his Master Lord of his liberty, is not worthier then his Master whom he hath made his Lord, and to whom he hath given himselfe a[gap] a slave; for after he hath resigned his liberty he cannot repent, he must keepe covenant though to his hurt: yea such a servant is not only not above his Master, but he cannot move his foot without his Master. The Governour of Britaine (saith Arnisaeus) being despised by King Philip▪ resigned himselfe as Vassall to King Edward of England, but did not for that make himselfe superiour to King Edward: indeed he who constituteth another under him as a Legat, is superiour; but the people do[gap] constitute a King above themselves, not a King under themselves, and therefore the people are not by this made the Kings superiour, but his inferiour.

Ans. 1. It is false that the people doth, or can by the Law of nature resigne their whole liberty in the hand of a King, 1. they cannot resigne to others that which they have not in themselves, Nemo potest dare quod non habet, but the people hath not an absolute power in themselves to destroy themselves, or to exercise those tyrannous acts spoken of, 1 Sam. 8.11, 12, 13, 14, 15, &c. for neither God, nor Natures Law hath given any such power. 2. He who constituteth himselfe a slave is supposed to be compelled to that unnaturall fact of alienation of that liberty, which he hath from his Maker, from the wombe, by violence, constraint, or extreame necessity, and so is inferiour to all free men, but the people doth not make themselves slaves when they constitute a King over themselves, because God giving to a people a King, the best and excellentest Governour on earth, giveth a blessing and speciall fafour, Esay 1.26. Hosea 1. v. 11. Esay 3.6, 7. Ps. 79.70, 71, 72. but to lay upon his people the state of slaverie, in which they renounce their whole libertie, is a curse of God, Gen. 9.25. Gen. 27.29. Deut. 28.32.36. But the people having their liberty to make any

of ten or twenty, their King, and to advance one from a private state to an honorable throne, whereas it was in their libertie to advance another, and to give him Royall power of ten degrees, whereas they might give him power of twelve degrees, and of eight, or sixe, must be in excellencie and worth above the man, whom they constitute King, and invest with such honour: as Honour in the fountain, and honos participans & originans, must be more excellent and pure then the derived honour in the King, which is honos participatus & originatus. 2. If the servant give his libertie to his master, ergo, he had that libertie in him; and in that act, libertie must be in a more excellent way in the servant, as in the Fountaine, then it is in the master: and so this libertie must be purer in the people then in the King: and therefore in that, both the servant is above the master, and the People worthier then the King: and when the people give themselves conditionally and Covenant-wise to the King, as to a Publique servant, and Patron, and Tutour, as the Governour of Britaine, out of his humour, gave himselfe to King Edward; there is even here a note of superioritie; Every giver of a benefit, as a giver, is superior to him to whom the gift is given; though after the servant hath given away his gift of libertie, by which he was superiour, he cannot be a superior, because by his gift he hath made himselfe inferior. 3. The People constituteth a King above themselves, I distinguish, supra se, above themselves, according to the fountaine power of Royaltie, that is false; for the fountaine-power remaineth most eminently in the people, 1. because they give it to the King, ad modum recipientis, and with limitations, ergo, it is unlimited in the people, and bounded and limited in the King, and so lesse in the King then in the people. 2. If the King turne distracted, and an ill spirit from the Lord come upon Saul, so as reason be taken from a Nebuchadnezzar, it is certaine the people may put Curators and Tutors over him, who hath the Royall power. 3. If the King be absent, and taken captive, the People may give the Royall power to one, or to some few to exercise it as custodes regni. And 4. if he die, and the Crown goe by election, they may create another with more or lesse power: all which evinceth, that they never constituted over themselves a King, in regard of fountaine-power; for if they give away the fountaine, as a slave selleth his libertie, they could not make use of it. Indeed they set a King above them, quoad potestatem legum executivam, in regard of a power of executing lawes and actuall government,

for their good and safetie: but this proveth only that the King is above the people, [gap], in some respect; but the most eminent and fountaine-power of Royaltie remaineth in the people, as in an immortall spring, which they communicate by succession to this or that mortall man, in the manner and measure that they thinke good: And Vlpian and Bartolus, cited by our Prelate out of Barclaius, are only to be understood of the derived▪ secondary and borrowed power of executing lawes, and not of the fountaine power, which the people cannot give away, no more then they can give away their rationall nature; for it is a power naturall, to conserve themselves, essentially adhering to every created Being: For, if the People give all their power away, 1. What shall they reserve to make a new King, if this man dye? 2. What if the Royall line surcease? there be no Prophets immediately sent of God, to make Kings. 3. What if he turne Tyrant, and destroy his Subjects with the sword? The Royalists say, they may flie: but when they made him King, they resigned all their power to him, even their power of flying; for they bound themselves by an oath (say Royalists) to all passive and lawfull active obedience: and, I suppose, to stand at his Tribunal, if he summoned the three Estates, upon Treason, to come before him, is conteined in the oath, that Royalists say, bindeth all, and is contradictorie to flying.

Arnisaeus, a more learned Iurist and Divine then the P. Prelate, answereth the other Maxime, The end is worthier then the meane leading to the end, because it is ordained for the end. These meanes, saith he, which referre their whole nature to the end, and have all their excellencie from the end, and have excellencie from no other thing but from the end, are lesse excellent then the end; that is true, such an end as medicine is for health. And Hugo Grotius, l. 1. c. 3. n. 8. Those meanes which are only for the end, & for the good of the end, and are not for their own good, also are of lesse excellencie, and inferior to the end. But so the assumption is false. But those meanes which beside their relation to the end, have an excellencie of nature in themselves, are not alwayes inferior to the end. The Disciple, as he is instituted, is inferior to the Master; but as he is the sonne of a Prince, he is above the Master. But by this reason, the shepherd should be inferior to bruit beasts, to sheep. And the master of the familie is for the familie, and referreth all that he hath for the entertaining of the familie: but it followeth not therefore the familie is above him. The forme is for the action, therefore the action is

more excellent then the forme, and an accident then the subject or substance? And Grotius saith; Every government is not for the good of another, but some for its own good, as the government of a master over the servant, and the husband over the wife.

Ans. I take the answer thus: Those who are meere meanes, and only meanes referred to the end, they are inferior to the end: but the King as King,

hath all his officiall and relative goodnesse in the world, as relative to the end. All that you can imagine to be in a King, as a King, is all relative to the safety and good of the people, Rom. 13.4. He is a minister for thy good. He should not, as King, make himselfe, or his own gaine and honour, his end. I grant, the King, as a man, shall dye as another man, and so he may secondarily intend his own good; and what excellencie he hath as a man, is the excellencie of one mortall man, and cannot make him amount in dignitie, and in the absolute consideration of the excellencie of a man, to be above many men and a whole Kingdome: for the moe good things there be, the better they are, so the good things be multiplicable, as a hundred men are better then one: Otherwise, if the good be such as cannot be multiplied, as one God, the multiplication maketh them worse, as many Gods are inferiour to one God. Now if Royalists can shew us any more in the King then these two, we shall be obliged to them; and in both, he is inferiour to the whole.

The Prelate and his followers would have the Maxime to lose credit; for then (say they) the shepherd should be inferior to the sheep: But in this the Maxime faileth indeed. 1. Because the shepherd is a reasonable man, and the sheep bruit beasts, and so must be excellenter then all the flocks of the world. Now as he is a reasonable man, he is not a shepherd, nor in that relation referred to the sh[gap]ep and their preservation, as a mean to the end; but he is a shepherd by accident, for the unrulinesse of the creatures, for mans sinne, withdrawing themselves from that naturall dominion that man had over the creatures, before the fall of man: in that relation of a meane to the end, and so by accident, is this officiall relation put on him; and according to that officiall relation, and by accident, man is put to be a servant to the bruitish creature, and a meane to so base an end. But all this proveth him, through mans sinne, and by accident, to be under the officiall relation of a meane, to baser creatures then himselfe, as to the end, but not as a reasonable man. But the King, as King, is an officiall and Royall meane to this end, that the people

may lead a godly and peaceable life under him. And this officiall relation being an accident, is of lesse worth then the whole people, as they are to be governed. And I grant, the Kings sonne, in relation to blood and birth, is more excellent then his Teachers: but as he is taught, he is inferiour to his Teacher: but in both considerations the King is inferior to the people; for though he cōmand the people, and so have an executive power of law above them, yet have they a fountain power above him, because they made him King, and in Gods intention he is given as King for their good, according to that, Thou shalt feed my people Israel: & that, I gave him for a leader of my people.

4. Saith the P. Prelate: The constituent cause is excellenter then the effect constituted, where the constitution is voluntary,

QUEST. XIX. Whether or no the King be in Dignity and power above the people? (3)

and dependeth upon the free act of the will, as when the King maketh a Vice-Roy or a Iudge, durante beneplacito, during his free will: but not when a man maketh over his right to another; for then there should be neither faith nor truth in covenants, if people might make over their power to their King, and retract and take back what they have once given.

Ans. This is a begging of the question: for it is denyed that the people can absolutely make away their whole power to the King: It dependeth on the people that they be not destroyed. They give to the King a politique power for their own safetie, and they keepe a naturall power to themselves, which they must conserve, and cannot give away; and they doe not breake their covenant, when they put in act that naturall power to conserve themselves; for though the people should give away that power, and sweare, though the King should kill them all, they should not resist, nor defend their own lives; yet that being an oath against the sixth Command, which enjoyneth naturall selfe-preservation, it should not oblige the conscience; for it should be intrinsecally sinfull; and it's all one to sweare to non-self-preservation, as to sweare to selfe-murther.

5. If the people (saith the Prelate, begging the answer from Barclay) the constituent be more excellent then the effect, and so the people above the King, because they constitute him King. Then the Counties and Corporations may make voyd all the Commissions given to the Knights and Burgesses of the House of Commons,

and send others in their place, and repeal their Orders, therefore Buchanan saith, that Orders and Lawes in Parliament were but [gap] preparatorie consultationis, and had not the force of a Law, till the people give their consent, and have their influence authoritative, upon the

Statutes and Acts of Parliament. But the observator holdeth that the legislative power is whole and intire in the Parliament. But when the Scots were preferring Petitions and Declarations, they put all power in the collective body, and kept their distinct tables. Ans. There is no consequence here, the Counties and Incorporations that send Commissioners to Parliament, may make voyd their Commissions and anull their Acts, because they constitute them Commissioners; if they be unjust acts, they may disobey them, and so disanull them, but it is presumed God hath given no morall power to doe ill, nor can the Counties and Corporations give any such power to evill, for they have not any such f[gap]om God, if they be just acts, they are to obey them, and cannot retract Commissions to make just Orders. Illud tantum possumus quod [gap]ure possumus, and therefore as power to governe justly is irrevocably committed by the three est[gap]tes who made the King, to the King, so is that same power committed by the Shires and Corporations to their Commissioners, to decree in Parliament, what is just and good irrevocably, and to take any j[gap]st power from the King which is his due, is a great sin; but when he abuseth his power to the destruction of his subjects, it is lawfull to throw a sword out of a mad-mans hand, though it be his owne proper sword, and though he have due right to it, and a just power to use it for good, for all fiduciary power abused may be repealed; and if the Knights and Burgesses of the House of Commons abuse their fiduciary power to the destruction of these Shires and Corporations, who put the trust on them, the observator did never say that Parliamentary power was so intire and irrevocably in them, as that the people may not resist them, anull their Commissions, and rescind their acts, and denude them of fiduciary power, even as the King may be denuded of that same power by the three estates, for particular Corporations are no more to be denuded of that fountain-power of making Commissioners, and of the self preservation, then the three estates are. 2. The P. Prelate commeth not home to the mind of Buchanan, who knew the fundamental Lawes of Scotland, & the power of Parliaments, for his meaning was not to deny a legislative power in the Parliament, but when he calleth their Parliamentary declarations [gap] his meaning is only that which Lawyers and Schoole-men both say, Leges non promulgatae non habent vim legis actu completo obligatoriae, Lawes not promulgated doe not oblige the subject while they be promulgated,

but he falsifies Buchannan, when he saith, Parliamentary Lawes must have the authoritative influence of the people, before they can be formall Lawes, or any more then [gap] or preparatory notions. And it was no wonder, when the King denyed a Parliament, and the supreme Senate of the secret Counsell was corrupted, then that the people did set up Tables, and extraordinary judicatures of the three estates, seeing there could not be any other government for the time.

6. Barclay answereth to that, The meane is inferiour to the end, it holdeth not, the Tutor and Curator is for the minor, as for the end,

and given for his good; but it followeth not that therefore the Tutor in the administration of the minor or Pupils inheritance is not superiour to the minor. Ans. 1. It followeth well that the Minor virtually, and in the intention of the Law is more excellent then the Tutor, though the Tutor can exercise more excellent acts then the Pupill, by accident, for defect of age in the Minor, yet he doth exercise those acts with subordination to the Minor, and with correction, because he is to render an account of his doings to the Pupill comming to age: so the Tutor is only more excellent, and superiour in some respect, [gap] but not simply, and so is the King in some respect above the people.

The P. Prelate beggeth from the Royalists another of our Arguments, Quod efficit tale, est magis tale.

That which maketh another such, is farre more such it selfe; if the people give Royall Power to the King, then farre more is the Royall Power in the people. By this (saith the Prelate) it shall follow if the observator give all his goods to me, to make me rich, the observator is more rich; if the people give most part of their goods to foment the Rebellion, then the people are more rich, having given all they have upon the Publicke Faith. Ans. 1. This greedy Prelate was made richer then ten poore Pursevants, by a Bishopricke, it will follow well; ergo the Bishopricke is richer then the Bishop, whose goods the curse of God blasteth. 2. It holdeth in efficient causes, so working in other things as the vertue of the effect remaineth in the cause, even after the production of the effect. As the Sunne maketh all things light, the Fire all things hot, therefore the Sun is more light, the Fire more hot; but where the cause doth alienate and make over, in a corporall manner, that which it hath to another, as the hungry Prelate would have the Observators goods, it holde[gap]h not; for the effect may

exhaust the vertue of the cause, but the people doth, as the fountaine, derive a streame of Royalty to Saul, and make him King, and yet so as they keepe Fountain-power of making Kings in themselves; yea when Saul is dead to make David King at Hebron, and when he is dead to make Solomon King, and after him, to make Rehoboam King: and therefore in the people there is more fountaine power of making Kings then in David, in Saul, in any King of the world; as for the Prelates jeere about the peoples giving of their goods to the good cause, I hope it shall by the blessing of God inrich them more, whereas Prelates by the Rebellion in Ireland (to which they assent, when they counsell His Majesty to sell the blood of some hundred thousands of innocents killed in Ireland) are brought from thousands a yeare, to begg a morsell of bread.

The Prelate answereth that Maxime, Quod ef[gap]icit tale, id ipsum est magis tale.

That which maketh another such, it is it selfe more such. It is true, De principio formali effectivo (as I learned in the Vniversity) of such an Agent as is formally such in it selfe, as is the effect produced. Next, it is such as is effective and productive of it selfe, as when fire heateth cold water, so the quality must be formally inherent in the Agent, as Wine maketh drunke, it followeth not, Wine is more drunke because Drunkennesse is not inherent in the Wine, nor is it capable of drunkennesse; and therefore Aristotle qualifieth the Maxime with this, Quod efficit tale est magis tale, modo utrique insit. And it holdeth not in Agents, who operate by donation, if the right of the King be transferred from the people to the King. The donation devesteth the people totally of it, except the King have it by way of loane, which to my thinking, never yet any spoke— Soveraignty never was, never can be in the Community; Soveraignty hath power of life and death, which none hath over himselfe, and the community conceived without government, all as equall, endowed with Natures and native liberty, of that community can have no power over the life of another. And so the Argument may be turned home, if the people be not tales, such by nature (as hath formally Royall power, he should say) they cannot give the King Royall Power. Also none hath power of life and death either eminenter or formally, the people either singly or collectively have not power over their owne life, much lesse over their neighbours.

Ans. 1. The Prelate would make the maxime true of a formall cause, and this he learned in the University of St. Andrewes,

he wrongeth the University, he rather learned it while he kept the Calves of Craile, the wall is white from whitenesse, ergo whitenesse is more white by the Prelates learning; never such thing was taught in that learned University. 2. Principium formale effectivum is as good Logick, as principium effectivum materiale, formale, finale. The Prelate is in his acuracy of Logick now, he yet maketh the causality of the formall cause all one with the causality of the efficient, but he is weake in his Logicks. 3. He confoundeth a cause equivocall, and a cause univocall, and in that case the Maxime holdeth not. Nor is it necessary to make true the maxime, that the quality be inherent in the cause, the same way. For a City maketh a Major, but to be a Major is one way in the City, and another way in him who is created Major; and the Prelates Maxime would helpe him, if we reasoned thus: The people maketh the King, ergo the people is more a King, and more formally a Soveraigne then the King. But that is no more our Argument, then the simile that Maxwell used, as neere heart and mouth both. Wine maketh drunk the Prelate, ergo Wine is more drunk. But we reason this, the Fountaine-power of making six Kings is in the people, ergo there is more fountain-power of Royalty in the people then in any one King; for we read that Israel made Saul King, and made David King, and made Abimelech King; but never that King Saul made another King, or that an earthly King made another Absolute King. 4. The Prelate will have the Maxime false, where the Agent worketh by donation, which yet holdeth true by his owne grant, c. 9. pag. 98. The King giveth power to a Deputy, ergo there is more power in the King. 5. He supposeth that which is the Basis and foundation of all the question, that people devesteth themselves totally of their Fountaine power, which is most false. 6. Either they must devest themselves totally (saith he) of their power, or the King hath power from the people, by way of loane, which to my thinking never any yet spake. But the P. Prelates thinking is short, and no rule to Divines and Lawyers, for to the thinking of the learnedst Jurists this power of the King is but fiduciary, and that is (whether the Prelate thinke it, or thinke it not) a sort of power by trust, pawn'd or loane. Rex director Regni, non proprietarius, Molinae. in consuet. Parisi. Tit. 1.9.1. Glos. 7. n. 9. The King is a life-renter, not a Lord, or proprieter of his Kingdome. So Novel. 85. in princip. &c. 18. Quod magistratus sit nudus dispensator & defensor jurium regni, non proprietarius, constat

ex eo quod non posset alienare imperium, oppida, urbes, regionésve, vel res subditorum, bonàve regni. So Gregory, l. 3. c. 8. de Repub. per c. 1. Sect. praeterea, de propo. feud. Hottoman. quest. illust. 1. Ferdinan▪ Vasquez. l. 1. c. 4. Bossius de princip. & privileg. illius, n. 290. The King is only a steward, and a defender of the lawes of the Kingdome, not a proprietor, because he hath not power to make away the Impire, Cities, Townes, Countries, and goods of the Subjects: and, bona commissa Magistratui, sunt subjecta restitutioni, & in prejudicium successorum alienari non possunt, per l. ult. Sect. sed nost. C. Comment. de leg. l. peto 69. fratrem de leg. 2. l. 32. ult. d. t. All the goods committed to any Magistrate, are under Restitution[gap] for he hath not power to make them away to the prejudice of his successors. The Prelates thoughts reach not the secrets of Jurists, and therefore he speaketh with a warrant; he will say no more then his short-travel'd thoughts can reach; and that is but at the doore. 7. Soveraigntie is not in the Communitie (saith the P. Prelate.) Truly it neither is, nor can be, more then ten, or a thousand, or a thousand thousands, or a whole Kingdome can be one man; for Soveraigntie is the abstract, the Soveraigne is the concrete: Many cannot be one King or one Soveraigne: a Soveraigne must be essentially one; and a multitude cannot be one: but what then? may not the Soveraigne power be eminently, fontaliter; originally and radically in the people? I thinke it may, and must be. A King is not an under-Iudge, he is not a Lord of Councell or Session formally, because he is more: The people is not King formally, because the people is eminently more then the King; for they make David King, and Saul King. And the power to make a Lord of Councell and Session, is in the King (say Royalists.) 8. A Communitie hath not power of life and death. A King hath power of life and death, (saith the Prelate) What then? ergo, a Communitie is not King. I grant all. But (poore man!) Ergo, the power of making a King, who hath power of life and death, is not in the people. It is like Prelates logick. Samuel is not a King; ergo, he cannot make David a King. It followeth not, by the Prelates ground. So the King is not an in inferiour Iudge: What? ergo, he cannot make an inferiour Iudge. 9. The power of life and death is eminently and virtually in the people, collectively taken, though not formally. And though no man can take away his own life, or hath power over his own life formally; yet a man, and a body of men hath power over their own lives, radically and virtually; in

respect they may render themselves to a Magistrate, and to Lawes, which if they violate, they must be in hazard of their lives, and so they virtually have power of their own lives, by putting them under the power of good lawes for the peace and safety of the whole. 10. This is a weake consequence: None hath power of his owne life, Ergo, far lesse of his neighbours (saith the Prelate.) I shall denie the consequence. The King hath not power of his own life, that is, according to the Prelates mind, he can neither by the law of nature, nor by any Civill law. kill himselfe: Ergo, the King hath far lesse power to kill another. It followeth not: for the Iudge hath more power over his neighbours life, then over his own. 11. But, saith the P. Prelate, The Communitie conceived without government,