QUEST. XXVII. Whether or no the King be the sole supreme and finall interpreter of the Law? to QUEST. XXVIII. Whether or no, Wars raised by the Subjects and Estates, for their own just defence against the Kings bloody Emissaries, be lawfull? (1)

QUEST. XXVII. Whether or no the King be the sole supreme and finall interpreter of the Law?

THis Question conduceth not a little to the clearing of the doubts concerning the Kings absolute power, and the supposed sole nomothetick power in the King. And I thinke it not unlike to the question, whether the Pope and Romish Church havt a sole and peremptory power of exponing Lawes, and the Word of God? We are to consider that therr is a twofold exposition of Lawes, one speculative in a Schoole way, so exquisite Iurists have a power to expone Lawes. 2. Practicall, in so farre as the sense of the Law falleth under our Practice, and this is twofold; either private and common to all, or judiciall and proper to Iudges, and of this last is the question.

For this Publicke, the Law hath one fundamentall rule, Salus populi, like the King of Planets the Sunne, which lendeth Star-light to all Lawes, and by which they are exponed; whatever interpretation swarveth either from fundamentall Lawes of policy, or from the Law of Nature, and the Law of Nations, and especially from the safety of the publick, is to be rejected as a perverting of the Law: and therefore, Conscientia humani generis, the naturall conscience of all men, to which the oppressed people may appeale unto, when the King exponeth a Law unjustly, at his owne pleasure, is the last rule on earth, for exponing of Lawes. Nor ought Lawes to be made so obscure, as an ordinary wit cannot see their connexion with fundamentall truths of policy, and the safety of the people, and therefore I see no inconvenience, to say that, The Law it selfe is Norma & regula juduicandi, the Rule and directory to square the Iudge, and that the Iudge is the publicke practicall▪ interpreter of the Law▪

Assert. 1. The King is not the sole and finall interpreter of the Law.

1. Because then inferiour Iudges should not be interpreters of the Law, but inferiour Iudges are no lesse essentially Iudges, then the King[gap] Deut. 1.17. 2 Chron. 19.6. 1 Pet. 2.14. Rom. 13.1, 2. and so by Office must interpret the Law, else they cannot give sentence according to their conscience and equity, now exponing of

the Law judicially is an act of judging, and so a personall and incommunicable act, so as I can no more judge and expone the Law according to another mans conscience, then I can beleeve with another mans soule, or understand with another mans understanding, see with another mans eye: The Kings pleasure therefore cannot be the rule of the inferiour Iudges conscience, for he giveth an immediate accompt to God the Iudge of all, of a just or an unjust sentence. Suppone Caesar shall expone the Law to Pilate, that Christ deserveth to dye the death, yet Pilate is not in conscience to expone the Law so. If therefore inferiour Iudges judge for the King, they judge only by power borrowed from the King, not by the pleasure, will, or command of the King thus and thus exponing the Law, ergo the King cannot be the sole interpreter of the Law.

2. If the Lord say not to the King only, but also to other inferiour Iudges, Be wise, understand, and the cause that you know not, search out; then the King is not the only interpreter of the Law. But the Lord saith not to the King only, but to other Iudges also, Be wise, understand, and the cause that you know not search out, ergo the King is not the sole Law-giver. The Major is cleare from Ps. 2.10. Be wise now therefore, O yee Kings, be instructed yee Iudges of the earth. So are commands and rebukes for unjust judgement given to others then to Kings, Ps. 82.1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Ps. 58.1, 2. Esay 1.17, 23 25▪ 26. Esay 3.14. see Iob. 29.12, 13, 14, 15. c. 31. v. 21.22.

3, The King is either the sole interpreter of Law, in respect▪ he is to follow the Law as his Rule, and so he is a ministeriall interpreter of the Law, or he is an interpreter of the Law according to that super-dominion of absolute power, that he hath above the Law. If the former be holden, then it is cleare that the King is not the only interpreter, for all Iudges, as they are Iudges, have a ministeriall power to expone the Law by the Law: but the second is the sense of Royalists.

Hence our second Assertion is, That the Kings power of exponing the Law, is a meere ministeriall power, and he hath no dominion of any absolute Royall Power, to expone the Law as he will, and to put such a sense and meaning of the Law as he pleaseth.

1. Because Saul maketh a Law, 1 Sam. 14.24. Cursed be the man that tasteth any food till night, that the King may be avenged on his enemies, the Law according to the letter was bloudy, but according

to the intent of the Law-giver, and substance of the Law profitable, for the end was that the enemies should be pursued with all speed. But King Sauls exponing the Law after a Tyrannicall way, against the intent of the Law, which is the Diamond and Pearle of all Lawes, the safety of the innocent people, was justly resisted by the people, who violently hindered innocent Jonathan to be killed. Whence it is cleare, that the people and Princes put on the Law its true sense and meaning, for Ionathans tasting of a little honey, though as it was against that sinfull and precipitate circumstance a rash oath, yet it was not against the substance and true intent of the Law, which was the peoples speedy pursuite of the enemy. Whence it is cleare, that the people including the Princes, hath a ministeriall power to expone the Law aright, and according to its genuine intent, and that the King as King hath no absolute power to expone the Law as he pleaseth.

2. The Kings absolute pleasure can no more be the genuine sense of a just Law, then his absolute pleasure can be a Law, because the genuine sense of the Law is the Law it selfe, as the formall essence of a thing differeth not really, but in respect of reason from the thing it selfe. The Pope and Romish Church cannot put on the Scripture, Ex plenitudine potestatis, what ever meaning they will, no more then they can, out of absolute power, make Canonicke Scripture. Now so it is, that the King by his absolute power cannot make Law no Law.

1. Because he is King by, or according to Law, but he is not King of Law. Rex est Rex secundum legem, sed non est Dominus & Rex legis.

2. Because although it have a good meaning, which Vlpian saith, Quod principi placet legis vigorem habet The Will of the Prince is the Law, yet the meaning is not that any thing is a just Law, because it is the Princes Will, for its rule formally: for it must be good and just before the Prince can will it, and then he finding it so, he puteth the stampe of a humane Law on it▪

3. This is the difference between Gods Will, and the will of the King, or any mortall creature. Things are just and good, because God willeth them, especially things positively good (though I conceive it hold in all things) and God doth not will things, because they are good and just; But the creature, be he King, or any never so eminent, doe will things, because they are good and just, and the

Kings willing of a thing, maketh it not good and just: for only Gods will, not the Creatures will, can be the cause why things are good and just. If therefore it be so, it must undeniably hence follow, that the Kings will maketh not a just Law to have an unjust and bloody sense: and he cannot, as King, by any absolute super-dominion over the Law, put a just sense on a bloody and unjust Law.

4. The advancing of any man to the Throne and Royall dignitie, putteth not the man above the number of rationall men: But no rationall man can create, by any act of power, never so transcendent or boundlesse, a sense to a Law, contrary to the Law. Nay, give me leave to doubt if Omnipotencie can make a just Law to have an unjust and bloody sense, aut contra: because it involveth a contradiction; the true meaning of a Law, being the essentiall forme of the Law. Hence judge what bruitish, swinish flatterers they are, who say, That it is the true meaning of the Law, which the King, the only supreme and independent expositor of the Law, saith is the true sense of the Law. There was once an Animal, a Foole of the first magnitude, who said, He could demonstrate by invincible reasons, that the Kings dung was more nourishing food, then bread of the floore of the finest wheat. For my part, I could wish it were the Demonstrators only food for seven dayes; and that should be the best demonstration he could make for his proofe.

5. It must follow, that there can be no necessitie of written laws to the Subjects; against Scripture, and naturall reason, and the law of Nations, in which all accord, That Lawes not promulgated and published, cannot oblige as Lawes: Yea, Adam, in his innocencie, was not obliged to obey a Law not written in his heart by Nature, except God had made known the Law; as is cleare, Gen. 3.11. Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? But if the Kings absolute Will may put on the Law what sense he pleaseth, out of his independent and irresistable Supremacie; The Lawes promulgated and written to the Subjects, can declare nothing, what is to be done by the Subjects, as just, and what is to be avoyded as unjust: because the Lawes must signifie to the Subjects, what is just, and unjust, according to their genuine sense. Now, their genuine sense, according to Royalists, is not only uncertaine and impossible to be known, but also contradictorious: for the King obligeth us without gainsaying, to believe that the just Law hath

this unjust sense. Hence this of flattering Royalists, crueller to Kings, than Ravens, (for these ear but dead men, and they devoure living men) when there is a controversie between the King and the Estates of Parliament, who shall expone the Law, and render its native meaning? (say Royalists) not the Estates of Parliament, for they are Subjects, not Iudges to the King, and only Counsellers and advisers of the King. The King therefore must be the only judiciall and finall expositor. As for Lawyers (said Strafford) the Law is not inclosed in a Lawyers Cap. But I remember this was one of the Articles laid to the charge of Richard the Second, that he said, The Law was in his head and breast. And indeed it must follow, if the King, by the plenitude of absolute power, be the only supreme, uncontrollable Expositor of the Law, that is not Law which is written in the Acts of Parliament, but that is the Law which is in the Kings breast and head: which Iosephus, lib. 19. Antiq. c. 2. objected to Caius. And all justice, and injustice should be finally and peremptorily resolved on the Kings will and absolute pleasure.

6. The King either is to expone the Law by the Law it selfe; or, by his Absolute power loosed from all Law, he exponeth it; or according to the advise of his Great Senate. If the first be said, he is nothing more then other Iudges. If the second be said, he must be omnipotent, and more. If the third be said, he is not absolute, if the Senate be only Advisers, and he yet the only Iudiciall expositor. The King often professeth his ignorance of the Lawes; and he must then both be absolute above the Law, and ignorant of the Law, and 2. the sole and finall Iudiciall exponer of the Law: And by this, all Parliaments, and their power of making Lawes, and of judging, i[gap] cryed down.

They object, Prov. 16.10. A Divine sentence is in the lips of the King, His mouth transgresseth not in judgement, ergo, he only can expone the Law.

Ans. 1. Lavater saith, (and I see no reason on the contrary) by a King, he meaneth all Magistrates. 2. Aben Ezra, and Isidorus read the words imperatively. The Tigurine version: They are Oracles which proceed from his lips: let not therefore his mouth transgresse in judgement. Vatabulus: When he is in his prophecies, he lyeth not. Iansenius: Non facile errabit in judicando. Mich. Iermine: If he pray. Calvine: If he read in the booke of the Law, as God commandeth him, Deut. 17. But why stand we on the place? He speaketh of

good Kings, saith Cornel, à Lapide. Otherwise, Ieroboam, Achab, Manasseh, erred in judgement. And except, (as Mercerus exponeth it) We understand him to speake of Kings according to their office, not their facts and practice, we make them Popes, and men who cannot give out grievous and unjust sentences on the Throne: against both the Word, and experience.

Object. 2. Sometimes all is cast upon ou[gap] mans voice, why may not the King be this one man?

Answ. The Antecedent is false, the last Voter in a Senate, is not the sole Iudge, else why should others give suffrages with him. 2. This were to take away inferiour Iudges, contrary to Gods Word, Deut. 1.17. 2 Chron. 19.6, 7. Rom. 13.1, 2, 3.

QUEST. XXVIII. Whether or no, Wars raised by the Subjects and Estates, for their own just defence against the Kings bloody Emissaries, be lawfull? (1)

A Ruisaeus perverteth the question; he saith, The question is, Whether or no, the Subjects may according to their power,

judge the King, and dethrone him; that is, Whether or no, is it lawfull for the Subjects in any case, to take arms against their lawfull Prince, if he degenerate, and shall wickedly use his lawfull power?

The state of the question is much perverted, for these be different questions, Whether the Kingdom may dethrone a wicked and Tyrannous Prince? And whether may the Kingdom take up arms against the man who is the King, in their own innocent defence: For the former is an Act offensive, and of punishing, the latter is an Act of Defence.

2. The present question is not of Subjects onely, but of the Estates, and Parliamentary Lords of a Kingdom; I utterly deny these as they are Iudges, to be subjects to the King; for the question is, Whether is the King, or the representative Kingdom greatest, and which of them be subject one to another: I affirm, Amongst Iudges as Iudges, not one is the Commander or Superiour, and the other, the commanded or subject. Indeed, one higher Iudge may correct and punish a Iudge, not as a Iudge, but as an erring man.

3. The question is not so much concerning the authoritative Act

of War, as concerning the power of naturall Defence, upon supposition, That the King be not now turned an habituall Tyrant, but that upon some acts of mis-information, he come in arms against his Subjects.

2. Arnisaeus maketh two sort of Kings, Some Kings integra Majestatis, of intire power and Soveraignty; some Kings by pactions or voluntary agreement, between King and people. But I judge this a vain distinction: For the limited Prince, so he be limited to a power onely of doing just and right; by this is not a Prince integrae Majestatis of entire Royall Majestie, whereby he may do both good, and also play the Tyrant; but a power to do ill, being no wayes essentiall, yea, repugnant to the absolute Majestie of the King of Kings, cannot be an essentiall part of the Majestie of a lawfull King; and therefore the Prince limited by voluntary and positive paction onely, to rule according to law and equity, is the good, lawfull, and entire Prince, if he have not power to do every thing just and good in that regard, onely he is not an intire and compleat Prince. So the man will have it lawfull to resist the limited Prince, not the absolute Prince; by the contrary, it is more lawfull to me to resist the absolute Prince, then the limited, in as much, as we may with safer consciences resist the Tyrant, and the Lyon, then the just Prince and the Lamb. Nor can I assent to Cunnerus de officio princip. Christia. c. 5. & 17. Who holdeth, that these voluntary pactions betwixt King and people, in which the power of the Prince is diminished, cannot stand, because their power is given to them by Gods Word, which cannot be taken from them, by any voluntary paction, lawfully; and from the same ground, Winzetus in v[gap]lit. contr. Buchan. p. 32. will have it unlawfull to resist Kings, because God hath made them unresistable. I answer, If God by a divine institution make Kings absolute, and above all Laws (which is a blasphemous supposition, the holy Lord can give to no man a power to sin, for God hath not himself any such power) then the Covenant betwixt the King and people, cannot lawfully remove and take away what God by institution has given; but because God, Deut. 17. hath limited the first lawfull King, the mould of all the rest, the people ought also to limit him by a voluntary Covenant; and because the lawfull power of a King to do good, is not by divine Institution placed in an indivisible point. It is not a sin for the people to take some power, even of doing good from the King, that

he solely, and by himself, shall not have power to pardon an involuntary homicide, without advice, and the judiciall suffrages of the Councell of the Kingdom, least he, insteed of this, give pardons to Robbers, to abominable Murtherers, and in so doing, the people robbeth not the King of the power that God gave him as King, nor ought the King to contend for a sole power in himself, of ministring justice to all; for God layeth not upon Kings, burdens unpossible, and God by Institution, hath denied to the King, all power of doing all good, because it is his Will that other Iudges be sharers with the King in that power, Num. 14.16. Deut. 1.14, 15, 16, 17. 1 Pet. 2.14. Rom. 13.1, 2, 3, 4. And therefore the Duke of Venice to me cometh neerest to the King, moulded by God, Deut. 17. in respect of power, de jure, of any King I know in Europe. And in point of conscience, the inferiour Iudge discerning a murtherer, and bloody man to die, may in foro conscientiae, despise the Kings unjust pardon, and resist the Kings force by his sword and coactive power that God hath given him, and put to death the bloody murtherer, and he sinneth, if he do not this; for to me it is clear, The King cannot judge so justly and understandingly of a murtherer in Scotland, as a Iudge, to whom God hath committed the sword in Scotland: Nor hath the Lord laid that unpossible burden on a King to judge so of a murther four hundreth miles, removed from the King, as the Iudge nearer to him, as is clear by Num. 14.16. 1 Sam. 7.15, 16, 17. The King should go from place to place, and judge; and whereas it is unpossible to him, to go thorow three Kingdoms, he should appoint faithfull Iudges, who may not be resisted, no not by the King.

2. The question is, If the King command A. B. to kill his father, his pastour; the man neither being cited nor convicted of any fault, may lawfully be resisted.

3. Queritur, If in that case in which the King is captived, imprisoned, and not sui juris, and awed or over-awed by bloody Papists, and so is forced to command a barbarous and unjust War; and if being distracted Physically or Morally through wicked Counsell, he command that which no father in his sober wits would command, even against Law and Conscience, That the sons should yeild obedience and subjection to him, in maintaining with lives and goods, a bloody Religion, and bloody Papists: If in that case, the King may not be resisted in his person, because the power lawfull

and the sinfull person cannot be separated? We hold the King using, contrary to the oath of God, and his Royall Office, violence in killing against Law and Conscience his Subjects, by bloody Emissaries, may be resisted by defensive Wars, at the commandment of the Estates of the Kingdom.

But before I produce Arguments, to prove the lawfulnesse of resistance, a little of the case of resistance. 1. Doct. Ferne, part. 3. sect. 5. pag. 39. granteth resistance by force to the King to be lawfull. 1. When the assault is sudden. 2. Without colour of a Law, and Reason. 3. Inevitable. But if Nero burn Rome, he hath a colour of Law and Reason; yea, if all Rome, and his mother, in whose Womb he lay, were one neck. A man who will with reason go mad, hath colour of Reason, and so of Law, to invade and kill the innocent.

2. Arnisaeus saith, If the Magistrate proceed extra-judicialiter, without order of Law by violence, the Laws giveth every private man power to resist, if the danger be irrecoverable; yea, though it be recoverable. L. prohibitum, C. de jur. fisc. l. quemadmodum. 39. §. Magistratus ad l. Aquil. l. nec Magistratibus, 32. de injur. Because while the Magistrate doth against his office, he is not a Magistrate, for Law and right, not injury, should come from the Magistrate. L. meminerint. 6. C. unde vi. Yea, if the Magistrate proceed judicially, and the losse be irrecoverable. Jurists say, That a private man hath the same Law to resist, Marantius, dis. 1. n. 35. And in a recoverable losse, they say, every man is holden to resist, si evidenter constet de iniquitate; If the iniquity be known to all, D. D. Iason. n. 19. dec. n. 26. ad l. ut vim de just. & jur.

3. I would think it not fit, easily to resist the Kings unjust Exactors of custome or tribute; 1. Because Christ payed tribute to Tiberius Caesar, an unjust usurper, though he was free from that, by Gods Law, least he should offend. 2. Because we have a greater dominion over Goods, then over our Lives and Bodies; and it is better to yield in a matter of Goods, then to come to Arms; for of sinlesse evils, we may choose the least.

4. A Tyrant without a Title may be resisted by any private man. Quia licet vim vi repellere; Because we may repell violence by violence, yea, he may be killed. Vt l. & vim. F. de iustit. & jure, ubi plene per omnes. Vasquez, l. 1. c. 8. n. 33. Barcla. contra. Monarcho▪ l. 4▪ c. 10. pag. 268.

For the lawfulnesse of resistance in the matter of the Kings unjust invasion of life and Religion, we offer these Arguments.

1. That power which is obliged to command and rule justly and religiously, for the good of the subjects, and is only set over the people on these conditions, and not absolutely, cannot tye the people to subjection without resistance, when the power is abused to the destruction of Lawes, Religion, and the subjects. But all power of the Law is thus obliged, Rom. 13.4. Deut. 17. vers. 18, 19, 20. 2 Chron. 19.6. Ps. 132.11, 12. Ps. 89.30, 31. 2 Sam. 7.12. Ier. 17.24, 25. and hath, and may be abused by Kings, to the destruction of Lawes, Religion, and Subjects.

The Proposition is cleare, for the powers that tye us to subjection, only are of God. 2. Because to resist them, is to resist the ordinance of God. 3. Because they are not a terrour to good workes, but to evill. 4. Because they are Gods Ministers for our good, but abused powers are not of God, but of men, or not ordinances of God: they are a terrour to good workes, not to evill; they are not Gods Ministers for our good.

2. That power which is contrary to Law, and is evill and Tyrannicall, can tye none to subjection, but is a meere Tyrannicall power and unlawfull; and if it tye not to subjection, it may lawfully be resisted. But the power of the King abused to the destruction of Lawes, Religion, and subjects, is a power contrary to Law, evill and Tyrannicall, and tyeth no man to subjection; wickednesse by no imaginable reason can oblige any man. Obligation to suffer of wicked men, falleth under no Commandement of God, except in our Saviour. A Passion, as such, is not formally commanded, I meane a Physicall Passion, such as to be killed. God hath not said to me in any Morall Law, Be thou killed, tortured, beheaded; but only, be thou patient, if God deliver thee to wicked mens hands, to suffer these things.

3. There is not a stricter Obligation Morall betwixt King and people, then betwixt Parents and Children, Master and servant, Patron and Clients, Husband and Wife, the Lord and the Vassell; between the Pilot of a Ship and the Passengers, the Physitian and the sick, the Doctor and the schollars: but the Law granteth l. Minime 35. De Relig. & sumpt. funer. If these betray their trust committed to them▪ they may be resisted; if the father turne distracted, and arise to kill his sonnes, his sonnes may violently apprehend him, and

bind his hands, and spoile him of his Weapons: for in that he is not a father, Vasquez, Lib. 1. Illustr. question. c. 8. n. 18. Si dominus subditum enormiter & atrociter oneraret, princeps superior vassallum posset ex toto e[gap]imere a sua jurisdictione, & etiam tacente subdito & nihil petente. Quid papa in suis decis. Parliam. grat. decis. 62. si quis Baro. abutentes dominio privari possunt. The servant may resist the Master, if he attempt unjustly to kill him; so may the Wife doe to the Husband: if the Pilot should wilfully run the ship on a Rock to destroy himselfe and his Passengers, they might violently thrust him from the Helme. Every Tyrant is a furious man, and is morally distracted, as Althusius saith, Politi. c. 28. n. 30. & seq.

4. That which is given as a blessing and a favour, and a Scrine betweene the peoples liberty and their bondage, cannot be given of God, as a bondage, and slavery to the people. But the power of a King is given as a blessing, and favour of God to defend the poore and needy, to preserve both Tables of the Law, and to keepe the people in their liberties from oppressing and treading one upon another. But so it is, that if such a power be given of God to a King, by which, Actu primo, he is invested of God, to doe acts of Tyranny, and so to doe them, that to resist him in the most innocent way, which is selfe defence, must be a resisting of God, and Rebellion against the King, his Deputy, then hath God given a Royall power as incontrollable by mortall men, by any violence, as if God himselfe were immediatly and personally resisted, when the King is resisted, and so this power shall be a power to wast and destroy irresistably, and so in it selfe a plague and a curse; for it cannot be ordained both according to the intention and genuine formall effect, and intrinsecall operation of the power to preserve the Tables of the Law, Religion and Liberty, Subjects and Lawes, and also to destroy the same; but it is taught by Royalists that this power is for Tyranny, as well as for peaceable Government, because to resist this Royall Power put forth in Acts either waies, either in acts of Tyranny, or just Government, is to resist the Ordinance of God, as Royalists say, from Rom. 13.1, 2, 3. And we know to resist Gods ordinances and Gods Deputy, formaliter, as his Deputy, is to resist God himselfe, 1 Sam. 8.7. Mat. 10.40. as if God were doing personally these Acts, that the King is doing, and it importeth as much as the King of Kings doth these Acts in, and through the Tyrant. Now it is blasphemy to thinke or say, that when a King is drinking the

blood of innocents, and wasting the Church of God, that God, if he were personally present, would commit these same acts of Tyranny, (God would avert such blasphemy) and that God in, and through the King, as his lawfull Deputy, and Vicegerent in these acts of Tyranny, is wasting the poore Church of God. If it be said in these sinfull acts of Tyranny, he is not Gods formall Vicegerent, but only in good and lawfull acts of Government, yet he is not to be resisted in these acts, not because the acts are just and good, but because of the dignity of his Royall Person. Yet this must prov[gap] that these who resist the King in these acts of Tyranny, must resist no ordinance of God, but only that we resist him, who is the Lords Deputy, though not as the Lords Deputy; what absurd is there in that more then to disobey him, refusing active obedience to him who is the Lords Deputy, but not as the Lords Deputy, but as a man commanding, beside his Masters Warrant?

5. That which is inconsistent with the care and providence of God in giving a King to his Church, is not to be taught. Now Gods end in giving a King to his Church, is the feeding, safetie, preservation, the peaceable and quiet life of his Church, 1 Tim. 2.2. Esa. 49.23. Psal. 79.71. But God should crosse his own end in the same act of giving a King, if he should provide a King, who, by office, were to suppresse Robbers, Murtherers, and all oppressors and wasters in his holy Mount: and yet should give an irresistible power to one crowned Lyon, a King, who may kill a thousand thousand Protestants for their Religion, in an ordinary Providence, and they are by an ordinary law of God to give their throats to his Emissaries and bloody executioners. If any say, The King will not be so cruell: I beleeve it; because, actu secundo, it is not possibly in his power to be so cruell.