QUEST. XXVIII. Whether or no, Wars raised by the Subjects and Estates, for their own just defence against the Kings bloody Emissaries, be lawfull? (2) to QUEST. XXIX. Whether, in the case of Defensive warre, the distinction of the person of the King, as a man, who can commit acts of hostile Tyrannie against his Subjects: and of the Office and Royall power that he hath from God, and the People, as a King; can have place? (1)

QUEST. XXVIII. Whether or no, Wars raised by the Subjects and Estates, for their own just defence against the Kings bloody Emissaries, be lawfull? (2)

2. We owe thanks to his good will, that he killeth not so many; but no thanks to the nature and genuine intrinsecall end of a King, who hath power from God to kill all these, and that without resistance made by any mortall man. Yea, no thanks (God avert blasphemie) to Gods ordinary providence, which (if Royalists may be beleeved) putteth no barre upon the illimited power of a man inclined to sinne, and abuse his power to so much crueltie. Some may say, the same absurditie doth follow, if the King should turne Papist, and the Parliament all were Papists; in that case there might be so many Martyrs for the truth put to death: and God should put no bar of providence

upon this power, then, more then now: and yet in that case, the King and Parliament, should be Iudges given of God, actu primo, and by vertue of their office obliged to preserve the people in Peace and Godlinesse. But I answer: If God gave a lawfull officiall power to King and Parliament to worke the same crueltie upon millions of Martyrs, and it should be unlawfull for them by armes to defend themselves; I should then think that King and Parliament were both ex officio, by vertue of their office, and actu primo, Iudges and Fathers, and also by that same office, Murtherers and Butchers. Which were a grievous aspersion to the unspotted Providence of God.

6. If the Estates of a Kingdome give the power to a King, it is their own power in the fountaine; and if they give it for their own good, they have power to judge when it it used against themselves, and for their evill; and so power to limit and resist the power that they gave. Now that they may take away this power, is cleare in Athaliahs case. It is true, she was a Tyrant without a Title, and had not the right of Heaven to the Crown; yet she had, in Mens Court, a title. For supposing all the seed Royall to be killed, and the peoples Consent; we cannot say, That for these sixe yeares, or thereabout, she was no Magistrate. 2. That there were none on the Throne of David at this time. 3. That she was not to be obeyed as Gods Deputie. But grant that she was no Magistrate: yet when Iehoash is brougbt forth to be crowned, it was a controversie to the States, to whom the Crown should belong. 1. Athaliah was in possession. 2. Iehoash himselfe being but seven yeares old, could not be Iudge. 3. It might be doubted, if Ioash was the true sonne of Ahaziah, and if he was not killed with the rest of the blood Royall.

Two great Adversaries say with us: Hugo Grotius, de jur. belli & pacis, l. 1. c. 4. n. 7. He saith, He dare not condemne this, if the lesser part of the People, and every one of them indifferently, should defend themselves against a Tyrant, ultimo necessitatis praesidio. The case of Scotland, when we were blocked up by Sea and Land, with Armes: The case of England, when the King, induced by Prelates, first attempted to bring an Army to cut off the Parliament, and then gathered an Army, and fortified Yorke, and invaded Hull, to make the Militia his own, sure is considerable. Barclay saith, The People hath jus se tuendi adversus immanem saevitiem. Advers. Monarchomach.

l. 3. c. 8. A power to defend themselves against prodigious crueltie. The case of England and Ireland, now invaded by the bloody Rebels of Ireland, is also worthy of consideration. I could cite hoasts more.

QUEST. XXIX. Whether, in the case of Defensive warre, the distinction of the person of the King, as a man, who can commit acts of hostile Tyrannie against his Subjects: and of the Office and Royall power that he hath from God, and the People, as a King; can have place? (1)

BEfore I can proceed to other Scripture-proofes for the lawfulnesse of Resistance; this Distinction, rejected by Royalists, must be cleered. This is an evident and sensible distinction: The King in concreto, the Man who is King; And the King in abstracto, the Royall office of the King. The ground of this distinction we desire to be considered from, Rom. 13. we affirme with Buchanan, that Paul, Rom. 13, speaketh of the office and duty of good Magistrates, and that the text speaketh nothing of an absolute King, nothing of a Tyrant; and the Royalists distinguish where the Law distinguisheth not, against the Law, l. pret. 10. gl. Bart. de pub. in Rem. and therefore we move the question here, Whether or no to resist the illegall and Tyrannicall will of the man, who is King, be to resist the King, and the ordinance of God, we say no: Nor doe we deny the King, abusing his power in unjust acts, to remaine King, and the Minister of God, whose person for his royall office, and his Royall Office both are to be honoured, reverenced and obeyed. God forbid that we should doe so as the sonnes of Belial, imputing to us the doctrine of Anabaptists, and the doctrine falsely imputed to Wicliffe, That Dominion is founded upon supernaturall grace, and that a Magistrate being in the state of mortall sin, cannot be a lawfull Magistrate; we teach no such thing. The P. Prelate sheweth us his sympathy with Papists, and that he buildeth the Monuments and Sepulchres of the slaine and murthered Prophets, when he refusing to open his mouth in the Gates for the righteous, professeth he will not purge the Witnesses of Christ, the Waldenses and Wicliffe, and Husse of these notes of disloyalty, but that these acts proceeding from this roote of bitternesse, the abused power of a King should be acknowledged with obedience active or passive, in these unjust acts, we deny.

1. Assert. It is evident from Rom. 13. That all subjection and

obedience to higher powers commanded there is subjection to the power and office of the Magistrate in abstracto, or (which is all one) to the person using the power lawfully, and that no subjection is due by that text, or any Word of God, to the abused and Tyrannicall power of the King, which I evince from the Text, and from other Scriptures. 1. Because the Text saith, Let every soule be subject to the higher powers. But no powers commanding things unlawfull, and killing the innocent people of God, can be [gap] higher powers, but in that lower powers. 1. He that commandeth not what God commandeth, and punisheth and killeth where God is personally and immediatly present, would neither command nor punish, is not in these acts to be subjected unto, and obeyed as a superiour power, though in habit he may remaine a superiour power, for all habituall, all actuall superiority is a formall participation of the power of the most high. 2. Arnisaeus well saith, That of Aristotle must be true, It is against nature, that better and worthier men should be in subjection to unworthier, and more wicked men: but in this when Magistrates command wickednesse, and killeth the innocent, the non-obeyers eatenus in so far, are worthier the commanders (whatever they be in habite and in office) actually, or in these wicked acts are unworthier and inferiour, and the non-obeyers are in that worthier, as being zealous adherents to Gods Command, and not to mans will. I desire not to be mistaken, if we speake of habituall excellency, godly and holy men as the Witnesses of Christ in things lawfull, are to obey wicked and Infidell Kings and Emperours, but in that these wicked Kings have an excellency in respect of office above them; but when they command things unlawfull, and kill the innocent, They doe it not by vertue of any office, and so in that they are not higher powers, but lower and weak ones. Laertius doth explain Aristotle well, who defineth a Tyrant by this, That he commandeth his subjects by violence, and Arnisaeus condemneth Laertius for this, Because one Tyrannicall action doth no more constitute a Tyrant, then one unjust action doth constitute an unjust man. But he may condemne (as he doth indeed) for this also Covarruvias pract. quest. c. 1. and Vasquez Illustr. quest. l. 1. c. 47. n[gap]. 1.12. for this is essentiall to a Tyrant, to command and rule by violence. If a lawfull Prince doe one, or more acts of a Tyrant, he is not a Tyrant for that, yet his action in that is Tyrannicall, and he doth not that as a King, but in that act as a sinfull man, having something

of Tyrannie in him. 2. The Powers, Rom. 13.1. that are, are ordained of God, as their author and efficient; But Kings commanding unjust things, and killing the innocent, in these acts, are but men, and sinfull men; and the power by which they doe these acts, a sinfull and an usurped power, and so far they are not powers ordained of God, according to his revealed Will, which must rule us. Now the authoritie and officiall power, in abstracto, is ordained of God, as the Text saith, and other Scriptures doe evidence. And this Polititians doe cleare, while they distinguish betwixt jus Personae, and jus Coronae, the power of the Person, and the power of the Crown and Royall office. They must then be two different things. 3. He that resisteth the power, that is, the officiall power, and the King, as King, and commanding in the Lord, resisteth the Ordinance of God, and Gods lawfull constitution, v. 2. But he who resisteth the Man, who is the King, commanding that which is against God, and killing the innocent; resisteth no ordinance of God, but an ordinance of Sin and Sathan: for a man commanding unjustly, and ruling Tyrannically, hath, in that, no power from God. 4. They that resist the power and Royall office of the King in things just and right, shall receive to themselves damnation, ver. 3. but they that resist, that is, refuse, for Conscience, to obey the man who is the King, and choose to obey God rather then men, as all the Martyrs did, shall receive to themselves salvation. And the 80 valiant men, the Priests, who used bodily violence against King Vzzahs person, and thrust him out of the house of the Lord, from offering incense to the Lord, which belonged to the Priest only: received not damnation to themselves, but salvation in doing Gods will, and in resisting the Kings wicked will.

Arg. 5. The lawfull Ruler, as a Ruler, and in respect of his office, is not to be resisted, because he is not a terrour to good workes,

but to evill; and no man who doth Good, is to be afraid of the Office, or the Power, but to expect praise, and a reward of the same, v. 3. But the man who is a King, may command an idolatrous and superstitious Worship, send an Army of Cut-throats against them, because they refuse that Worship: and may reward Papists, Prelates, and other corrupt men, and may advance them to places of State and Honour, because they kneele to a Tree-Altar, pray to the East, adore the letters and sound of the word [Jesus] teach and write Arminianisme: And may imprison, deprive, confine, cut the eares, and

rip the noses, and burne the faces of those who speake, and preach, and write the truth of God: and may send Armies of Cut-throats, Irish Rebels, and other Papists, and malignant Atheists, to destroy and murther the Iudges of the Land, and innocent defenders of the Reformed Religion, &c. The Man (I say) in these acts, is a terrour to Good workes, an incouragement to Evill: And those that doe Good, are to be afraid of the King, and to expect no praise, but punishment and vexation from him; Ergo, this reason in the Text will prove that the Man, who is the King, in so far as he doth these things that are against his offi[gap]e, may be resisted; and that in these we are not to be subject, but only we are to be subject to his power and Royall authori[gap]ie, in abstracto, in so farre as according to his office, he is not a terrour to good workes, but to evill. 6. The lawfull Ruler is the minister of God, or the servant of God, for Good to the Commonwealth: And to resist the servant in that wherein he is a servant, and using the power that he hath from his Master, is to resist the Lord his Master, v. 4. But the man who is the King, commanding unjust things, and killing the innocent; in these acts▪ is not the minister of God, for the Good of the Commonwealth: he serveth himselfe, and Papists and Prelates, for the destruction of Religion, Lawes and Commonwealth: therefore the Man may be resisted, by this Text, when the office and power cannot be resisted. 7. The Ruler, as the Ruler, and the nature and intrinsecall end of the office is, that he beare Gods sword, as an avenger to execute wrath on him that doth evill, v. 4. and so cannot be resisted without sinne. But the man who is the Ruler, and commandeth things unlawfull, and killeth the innocent; carieth the Papists and Prelates sword, to execute, not the righteous judgement of the Lord, upon the ill-doer; but his own private revenge, upon him that doth well: Ergo, the Man may be resisted, the Office may not be resisted: and they must be two different things. 8. We must needs be subject to the Royall office, for [gap]onscience, v. 5. by reason of the fifth Commandement. But we must not needs be subject to the man who is King, if he command things unlawfull: for D. Ferne warranteth us to resist, if the Ruler invade us sodainly; 2. Without colour of Law or Reason; 3. Vnavoydably. And Winzetus, and Barclay, and Grotius, as before I cited, give us leave to resist a King, turning a cruell Tyrant. But Paul, Rom. 13. forbiddeth us to resist the Power, in Abstracto; Ergo, it must be the Man, in concreto, that we must resist. 9. Those

we may not resist, to whom we owe tribute, as a reward of the onerous worke, on which they, as Ministers of God, doe attend continually. But we owe not tribute to the King as a man; for then should we be addebted tribute to all men: but as a King, to whom the wages of tribute is due, as to a Princely workman, a King as a King: ergo, the Man and the King are different. 10. We owe fear and honour as due, to be rendred to the man who is King, because he is a King, not because he is a man; for it is the highest feare and honour due to any mortall man, which is due to the King, as King. 11. The Man, and the inferiour Judge are different: and we cannot, by this Text, resist the inferiour Iudge, as a Iudge, but we resist the ordinance of God, as the Text proveth. But Cavaliers resist the inferior Iudges as men, and have killed divers members of both Houses of Parliament: but they will not say, that they killed them as Judges, but as Rebels. If therefore to be a Rebell, as a wicked Man, and to be a Iudge, are differenced thus: then, to be a Man, and to commit some acts of Tyrannie; and to be the supreme Iudge and King, are two different things. 12. Mr. Knox, Hist. of Scotland, l. 2. The Congregation, in a letter to the Nobilitie, say: There is great difference betwixt the Authoritie, which is Gods Ordinance, and the Persons of those who are placed in authoritie. The Authoritie, and Gods ordinances can never doe wrong; for it commandeth that Vice and wicked men be punished, and Vertue, with vertuous men and just. be maintained: But the corrupt Person placed in this Authoritie, may offend, and most commonly doe contrary to this Authoritie: and is then the corruption of Man to be followed, by reason that it is clothed with the name of Authoritie? And they give instance in Pharaoh and Saul, who were lawfall Kings, and yet corrupt Men. And certainly, the Man, and the Divine authoritie, differ as the Subject and the Accident; as that which is under a Law, and can offend God; and that which is neither capable of Law, nor sinne. 13. The King, as King, is a j[gap]st creature, and by office a living and breathing Law: His Will, as he is King, is nothing but a just Law: But the King, as a sinfull man, is not a just creature, but one who can sinne, and play the Tyrant: and his Will, as a private sinfull man, is a private Will, and may be resisted. So the Law saith, The King, as King, can doe no wrong: but the King, as a Man, may doe a wrong. While as then the Parliaments of both Kingdomes resist the Kings private will, as a Man, and fight against his illegall Cut-throats, sent out by him,

to d[gap]stroy his native subjects, they fight for him as a King, and obey his publick Legall will, which is his Royall will, de jure, and while he is absent from his Parliaments as a man, he is Legally and in his Law-Power present, and so the Parliaments are as Legall, as if he were personally present with them.

Let me answer Royalists. The P. Prelate saith it is Solomons word, By me Kings raign. Kings in concreto, with their Soveraignty, he saith not, By me Royalty or Soveraignty raigneth. And elsewhere he saith, that Barclay saith, Paul writing to the Romans, keepeth the Roman usuall diction in this, who expresse by Powers in abstracto, the persons authorized by Power, and it is the scriptures Dialect; By him were created thrones, Dominions, Principalities, that is Angels, to say Angels, in abstracto, were created, 2 Pet. 2.10. They speak ill of dignities, Iud. 8. dispise dominion. That is, they speak ill of Cajus, Caligula, Nero; our Levites rail against the Lords Anoynted, the best of Kings in the world. Nero, Rom. 13.4. in concreto beareth not the sword in vain. Arnisaeus saith it better th[gap]n the Prelate, (he is a witlesse theef. Rom. 13.4. the Royall Power in abstracto, doth not bear the sword, but the Person, not the Power but the Prince himself beareth the sword. And the Prelate poor man following Doctor Fern saith, Its absurd to pursue the Kings Person with a canon-bullet at Edge-hill, and preserve his authority at London, or elsewhere. So saith Fern 16. sect. 10. pag. 64. The concret Powers here are purposed as objects of our obedience, which cannot be directed, but upon power in some person, for it is said [gap], the Powers that are, are of God, now Power cannot be [gap] existent, but in some person; and Pag. 69. saith Fern, can Power in the abstract have praise? Or is tribute payed to the Power in the abstract. Yea the Power is the reason why we yeeld obedience to the person, &c. and the Prelate hath as much learning as to coppy out of Fern, and Barclay, Arniseus, and others these words and the like, but hath not wit to adde the sinewes of these Authors reason, and with all this he can in his Preface call it his own, and provoke any to answer him if they dare, whereas while I answer this excommunicated Pamphletter.

I answer these learned Authors, from which he stealeth all he hath, and yet he must perswade the King, he is the onely man can defend his Majesties Cause, and the importunity, forsooth, of friends extorted this peece, as if it were a fault, that this Delphick Oracle (giving out railings, and lies for responses) should be silent. 2. Not